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Abstract	  
 From the mid-1990s, the amalgamation of security, development, and 
humanitarian imperatives under the single umbrella of ‘state-building’ has provided a 
compelling justification for increasingly intrusive interventions into the political, 
economic, and social affairs of subject countries. Guided by the assumptions of liberal 
peace theory, state-building initiatives engage directly with states, seeking to achieve 
a reformulation of structures of government as a first step towards the implementation 
of wider socio-economic reforms. The state-building project is geared towards the 
construction of a particular form of statehood in subject states; state institutions are to 
be reconstructed in accordance with a liberal template, and tasked with establishing 
the necessary institutional environment for market-led development and the liberal 
peace.  
 Contemporary discourses of state-building and development are 
fundamentally interlinked, representing a unified process of neo-liberal replication in 
subject states, whereby fundamental transformations of social, political, and economic 
structures are to be implemented and sustained through the construction of liberal 
state institutions. Pressure to court international approval due to conditions of aid 
dependence curtails the potential for meaningful democracy in subject countries. Key 
questions of social and economic policy are subsumed as technical matters of good 
governance and removed from domestic democratic contestation, facilitating a 
transfer of formerly domestic considerations into the international sphere. These 
interlocking processes of state-building and neo-liberal discipline have contributed to 
an inversion of sovereign statehood, whereby the state serves to channel inward an 
externally driven agenda, rather than acting as a sovereign expression of domestic 
interests. This reality raises important questions regarding the nature of democracy in 
post-conflict environments, and in particular the impact of state-building activities on 
the prospects for broadly inclusive democracy in subject states. 
 This study will examine the evolution of state-building as a critical 
components of peace-building missions, its central assumptions and goals, and its 
implementation in practice in Timor-Leste. The state-building process in Timor-Leste 
has contributed to the formation of an insulated state with little basis in Timorese 
society. The democratic experience in Timor-Leste has been profoundly 
disempowering; conditions of aid dependence have constrained elected governments 
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in key areas of social and economic policy, resulting in a loss of popular legitimacy 
and mounting public disenchantment. Closer examination of food and agricultural 
policy and management of Timorese oil reserves reveals the extent to which 
government policy remains constrained by international preferences. In these areas, 
the government’s inability to act in the interests of the Timorese public has 
compounded social hardships and popular discontent, contributing to the build-up of 
anti-government sentiment that manifested itself in the 2006 crisis.  
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INTRODUCTION	  
 
Introduction:	  State-­‐building	  and	  the	  ‘Security-­‐Development	  Nexus’	  
 Over the past two decades, United Nations-led peace-building efforts have 
come to be dominated by the logic of state-building, an approach which emphasizes 
the role of the state in the challenges of fostering peace and development after 
conflict. Whereas previous approaches to peace-building and development sought to 
bypass the state in the interests of greater efficiency and transparency, state-building 
rhetoric elevates the state to a position of primary importance as international partner 
and domestic facilitator of development initiatives. State-building has emerged as the 
focal point of a strategic alignment of the domains of security and development, and 
is upheld as a solution to the challenges of conflict and underdevelopment during a 
time of crisis in both the peace-building and development communities. 
 The domains of security and development remained largely distinct until the 
1990s, when shifting historical and political conditions enabled the evolution of a new 
paradigm to address the failure of international attempts to promote peace and 
development. In the development sphere, structural adjustment initiatives in the 1980s 
sought to achieve economic growth through liberalization policies that reduced state 
involvement in economic affairs. The failure of these policies to achieve the 
anticipated outcomes necessitated a reevaluation of orthodox approaches to 
development. Analysts identified low state capacity as the primary reason for poor 
economic performance, calling for future development initiatives to engage with 
states in order to implement policies more effectively.1  
 The 1990s also witnessed the reexamination of international approaches to 
peace and security, with a series of devastating conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda 
highlighting the inability of traditional security measures to address contemporary 
conflicts. Traditional security structures were paralyzed to prevent the humanitarian 
                                                
1 R. Abrahamsen. (2000) Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in 
Africa. London: Zed Books, p. 40-41 
D. Craig and D. Porter. (2006) Development Beyond Neoliberalism? Governance, Poverty Reduction 
and Political Economy. New York: Routledge, p. 12-13 
World Bank. (1991) World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
———. (1997) World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
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crises springing from such conflicts, culminating in widespread efforts to create more 
effective peace-building structures capable of ensuring human security. Viewing 
ineffective statehood as a common factor contributing to contemporary conflicts, key 
actors in the international community identified weak states as a significant threat to 
human security, and advocated measures to build state capacity as a means of 
preventing conflicts and upholding the welfare of civilians.2 Furthermore, observers 
highlighted the negative impact of prolonged conflict on institutions of governance, 
often resulting in an absence of national mechanisms to engage in meaningful post-
conflict reconstruction and a long-term, unsustainable level of dependence on 
international actors following conflict. Strong state institutions were thus seen by 
many as key to a country’s ability to manage the transition to peace after conflict.3 
 Advocating a renewed role for the state alongside international actors in the 
areas of development and peace-building, frontline organizations such as the United 
Nations and the World Bank called for a concerted emphasis on building state 
capacity in developing countries.4 They were joined by influential commentators and 
public figures such as Lakhdar Brahimi and Francis Fukuyama, who identified state-
                                                
2 M. Ignatieff. (2002) Intervention and State Failure. Dissent 49(1):114-23. 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (2001) The Responsibility to Protect: 
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottowa: International 
Development Research Centre. 
3 S. Chesterman. (2005) You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-
Building. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
J. Fearon and D. Laitin. (2004) Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States. International Security 
28(4):5-43. 
F. Fukuyama. (2004a) The Imperative of State-Building. Journal of Democracy 15(2):17-31. 
S. Krasner. (2004) Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States. 
International Security 29(2):85-120. 
R. Paris. (2004) At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
4 This terminology of ‘developed’, ‘developing’, and ‘underdeveloped’ is used throughout this thesis 
for clarity of reference, particularly in sections that focus on economic processes associated with neo-
liberal development. The use of these terms pose considerable difficulties for critical authors, 
recognizing the systems of power that pervade development discourse and the Western claims to 
knowledge they represent. Narratives of development/underdevelopment create a false dichotomy that 
overlooks the exercise of Western power over its undeveloped ‘others’, and the ongoing processes of 
exploitation and accumulation that continue to define development practice. Throughout this thesis, 
this developed/developing/underdeveloped phraseology is used with caution, recognizing the tensions 
presented by such usage and acknowledging the structures of discursive power and the “will to spatial 
power” it represents (Escobar, p. 9). As it is a terminology that offers greatest clarity with reference to 
relations between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ regions of the global capitalist economy, I have used this 
language where necessary, whilst eschewing the exercise of power and exploitation this language has 
frequently been used to sustain.  
See A. Escobar. (1995) Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 8-9; M. Duffield. (2001) Global Governance and the New 
Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. New York: Zed Books, p. 4 
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building as the primary objective of peace operations. 5  By the late 1990s, an 
international consensus had begun to grow around the importance of effective 
statehood for overseeing the transition to peace. Amongst the development 
community, advocates of the ‘good governance’ agenda had reached similar 
conclusions regarding the importance of state capacity for sustainable peace and 
development.6 State-building has thus become a strategic imperative, a unifying 
innovation in the domains of international development and security, and a guiding 
logic for peace and development in the twenty-first century.7 
  Mark Duffield argues that the ‘security-development nexus’ 8  – as this 
alignment of security and development concerns has come to be known – represents a 
radicalization of development, with development policy now seeking to implement 
widespread social transformations in the global South9 in order to eliminate violent 
conflict.10 From the mid-1990s, the amalgamation of security, development, and 
humanitarian imperatives under the single umbrella of ‘state-building’ has provided a 
compelling justification for increasingly intrusive interventions into the political, 
                                                
5 L. Brahimi. (2007) State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries. In 7th Global Forum on 
Reinventing Government. Vienna, Austria. Online at 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan026305.pdf> (Accessed 16 
November 2012) 
Fukuyama (2004a) 
F. Fukuyama. (2004b) State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press. 
———. (2005) ‘Stateness’ First. Journal of Democracy 16(1):84-88. 
6 United Nations. (n.d.) Governance. <http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/governance/index.shtml> 
(Accessed 13 November 2012) 
World Bank. (1992) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, p. xii 
7 Duffield 
8 The term ‘security-development nexus’ (or ‘development-security nexus’) is used by scholars to refer 
to the coming together of the distinct policy areas of security and development since the 1990s.  
See D. Chandler. (2007) The Security-Development Nexus and the Rise of 'Anti-Foreign Policy'. 
International Relations and Development 10(4):362-86.  
9 The term ‘South’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to those areas of the world that are formally 
excluded from – or only partially or conditionally integrated – the core regional areas of the global 
economy, which are described as the ‘North’ (Duffield, p. 4). Distinctions such as Third World/First 
World and developed/developing/underdeveloped are regimes of representation that reflect the “will to 
spatial power” that characterised first the colonial era and remains an essential feature of the 
contemporary development project (Escobar, p. 9). Such discourses are produced and maintained under 
conditions of unequal power, and the use of such universalizing terminology has been a crucial part of 
Western constructions of knowledge and domination over large parts of the globe.  
Recognising the power of such dichotomies throughout the history of the twentieth century 
development project, the use of the phraseology ‘South’ and ‘North’ is preferred where possible, in 
acknowledgement of the mobilizations of political and economic power that have given rise to such 
distinctions. 
See Duffield, p. 3-4; Escobar, p. 8-9; Focus on the Global South. (n.d.) About Focus on the Global 
South. <http://focusweb.org/about> (Accessed 8 December 2014) 
10 Duffield 
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economic, and social affairs of subject countries.11 Such intrusions have not been 
limited to post-conflict environments; contemporary peace-building efforts also 
include preventative initiatives that employ social, economic and political measures to 
prevent potential conflicts by eliminating conditions of underdevelopment and 
bolstering state capacity.12 
 A particular form of statehood is required in order to discharge the tasks of 
maintaining security and overseeing national development in accordance with 
international objectives. Whereas previous development initiatives had preferred a 
minimalist state with limited influence in development matters, proponents of the 
state-building agenda envision a crucial management role for the state, calling on 
states to ‘partner’ with the international community and civil society in the 
development process.13 States are tasked with creating an environment in which 
development initiatives can prosper, thus facilitating the transition to peace by 
eliminating underdevelopment and the roots of conflict. This role requires 
considerable administrative capacity; states must be capable of providing a standard 
of reliable public services in order for economic development to flourish. State 
institutions must conform to certain principles of management and organization in 
order to fulfill the role envisioned by the international community; they must display 
a strong commitment to democracy and the rule of law, and adhere to principles of 
efficiency and accountability. The implementation of these norms and processes 
within states is the express goal of state-building operations.14   
 The contemporary state-building project15 aspires to the realization of strong, 
reconfigured states, equipped to carry out the profound transformation of post-conflict 
                                                
11 For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘subject countries’ or ‘subject states’ will be used to refer to 
countries that have been – or are currently – subjected to international interventions. This term may be 
used in reference to state-building interventions, or to associated programmes of external intervention 
such as structural adjustment or good governance. 
12 Duffield, p. 113-14 
United Nations. (2004) A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: United Nations, p. 12-13 
13 World Bank (1997)  
14 Ibid. 
15 The state-building agenda is set by organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations, and 
the International Monetary Fund, and by key donor governments and non-governmental organizations 
associated with development activities. There is no single guiding framework for state-building 
practice – rather a body of reports, policy statements, ‘best practice’ documents, and academic 
literature that has coalesced to form a broad international consensus on what constitutes ‘state-
building’. Duffield describes the convergence of state and non-state actors around issues of security 
and development as ‘strategic complexes’. At times throughout this thesis, this body of policies and 
literature is referred to as ‘the state-building project’ or ‘agenda’. This terminology is employed for 
ease of reference, but should not be taken to imply that state-building theory or practice is an entirely 
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society deemed necessary for building sustainable peace.16 The form of governance 
and statehood to be constructed in subject states is highly prescribed by international 
actors. Guided by the assumptions of liberal peace theory, the state-building 
programmes implemented by the international community embody a definite and 
highly ideological system of preferences that require an extensive restructuring of 
relations of government, economy and society in subject countries. By engaging 
directly with states, state-building initiatives are intended to reformulate structures of 
government as a first step towards the implementation of a wider ranging set of socio-
economic reforms. Recognizing the importance of states as a crucial link between 
external actors and domestic societies, organizations and institutions of the ‘security-
development nexus’ seek to recruit states as partners in this transformative process.17 
 This ‘partnership’ between external actors and subject states is characterized 
by highly asymmetrical relations of power. Despite paying lip service to concepts of 
sovereignty, cultural competence, and local ownership and empowerment, state-
building programmes essentially embody a schedule of reforms that re-orient systems 
of governance to reflect a set of externally determined preferences. These values are 
represented as universal and apolitical, and the process of reforms as a purely 
technical matter. However, scholars and commentators such as Rita Abrahamsen and 
Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara contend that such claims serve to obscure the highly 
political nature of interventions into developing countries, justifying and concealing 
the extent of reforms behind a veneer of bureaucratic language that deliberately 
recasts sensitive political interventions as technical processes.18  
 The good governance agenda has been a primary instrument for the 
implementation of state-building reforms. Identifying certain systems of governance 
in terms of ‘good governance’ has served as a discursive tool to legitimize a series of 
highly intrusive policies within state institutions.19 Although the wider implications of 
such policies are often highly contentious, governance reforms are typically externally 
                                                                                                                                       
monolithic or uncontested framework. Nor is the use of this term of reference intended to confer this 
state-building framework itself with agency; it is merely a convenient phrase used to refer to a general 
ideological consensus and a constellation of agencies and institutions that have come together around 
the idea and practice of ‘state-building’. 
16 Brahimi 
17 World Bank (1997) 
18 Abrahamsen 
C. Hewitt de Alcántara. (1998) Uses and Abuses of the Concept of Governance. International Social 
Science Journal 50(155):105-13. 
19 Abrahamsen 
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implemented and shielded from domestic democratic oversight. Casting reforms as 
technical matters of ‘good governance’ and attaching them to systems of aid 
conditionality serves to obscure their political implications whilst removing them 
from the remit of democratic political authority. Political accountability thus becomes 
separated from decision-making, with the power to direct key government policies 
located outside the state. Good governance initiatives have been a central mechanism 
in divesting the political and economic authority of states and transferring this 
authority to unrepresentative external mechanisms of global governance.20 
 The result is that governments subject to state-building interventions face a 
dilemma between two standards of legitimacy. States face considerable tension 
between their obligations to local constituencies and the expectations of the external 
donor community.21 Where these obligations are at odds, states are expected to 
prioritize the demands of the international community, or risk jeopardizing access to 
the international resources on which their administrations depend. Despite their 
rhetoric regarding local ownership, power in state-building relationships remains in 
the hands of the international community, who set the priorities which frame national 
decision-making and render national authority and domestic political processes 
subject to internationally regulated frameworks of governance.22 Caroline Hughes 
describes this situation – experienced by many states in the global South – as ‘aid 
dependence’. Relations of aid dependence have proved a central means of assuring 
the ongoing compliance of states with international state-building and wider 
development programmes.23 
 Pressure to court international approval curtails the potential for meaningful 
democracy in subject countries. Key questions of social and economic policy are 
subsumed as technical matters of good governance and removed from domestic 
democratic contestation, facilitating a transfer of formerly domestic considerations 
into the international sphere.24 This reality raises important questions regarding the 
nature of democracy in post-conflict environments, and in particular the impact of 
                                                
20 Duffield; Abrahamsen 
21 S. Tadjbakhsh. (2010) Human Security and the Legitimisation of Peacebuilding. In Palgrave 
Advances in Peacebuilding : Critical Developments and Approaches, edited by Oliver P. Richmond, 
pp. 116-36. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
22 D. Chandler (2006) Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building. Ann Arbor, M.I: Pluto, p. 50 
23 C. Hughes. (2009) Dependent Communities: Aid and Politics in Cambodia and East Timor. Cornell 
Southeast Asia Program. Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications. 
24 Chandler (2006), p. 45 
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state-building activities on the prospects for broadly inclusive democracy in subject 
states. Abrahamsen argues that the form of democracy being promoted by 
contemporary development discourse and state-building practice is a minimalist, 
‘procedural’ version of democracy that emphasizes formal procedures of participation 
whilst emptying democracy of its content.25  
  The international state-building project raises a number of issues regarding 
the nature of power and the distribution of resources in the current international 
system. By subjecting formally sovereign states to unprecedented levels of external 
intervention and surveillance, the state-building project is challenging the concept of 
‘sovereignty’ itself. David Chandler argues that international state-building attempts 
have brought about the ‘inversion’ of the sovereign state, wherein the state no longer 
embodies the collective wishes of the nation, serving instead to channel inward an 
externally driven agenda.26 By subordinating the political process to the bureaucratic 
and administrative disciplines of ‘good governance’, state-building initiatives are 
facilitating the creation of new forms of statehood – states embedded in, and subject 
to, international frameworks of regulation.27  
 Advocates of state-building argue that the solution to dilemmas of 
underdevelopment, conflict, and state failure lies in a strengthening of state 
institutions, the reconstruction of legitimate authority in weak or post-conflict states, 
and the transformation of systems of governance. However, questions must be asked 
regarding the nature of the institutions being implemented in states of the South as 
part of the state-building project. What roles have discourses of neo-liberal 
development – in particular good governance discourse – played in reconstituting 
patterns of social, political, and economic organization? What – or whose – 
assumptions and values do these structures and systems of organization embody? 
How are such extensive intrusions into domestic affairs justified by the international 
community, and what are their implications for state sovereignty?  
 This thesis will explore the process by which state-building reforms are 
justified and implemented, with an emphasis on the normative implications of these 
policies and the inequalities and systems of power they reveal. The hegemonic, 
coercive nature of contemporary state-building and development practice disguises 
                                                
25 Abrahamsen, p. 77-79 
26 Chandler (2006), p. 43 
27 Ibid. p. 38-39, 42 
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itself through discourses of democratic empowerment and local ownership, whilst 
exercising an unparalleled degree of authority over the policies of purportedly 
‘sovereign’ states.28 The result has been a dramatic transformation of the nature of 
sovereignty and democracy in the global South. 
Case	  Study:	  State-­‐building	  and	  Neo-­‐liberal	  Development	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  
 These issues and contradictions within international state-building will be 
explored in connection with the experiences of Timor-Leste.29 Since independence, 
Timor-Leste has been exposed to an unprecedented degree of international 
involvement, leading some commentators to compare it to the trusteeship 
arrangements of the early twentieth century.30  The United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) that assumed control of the country in 1999 
was authorized to carry out transitional administration and capacity building for the 
future Timorese state. These tasks included the exercise of legislative, executive, and 
judicial authority, public and military security functions, and the coordination of 
humanitarian and development assistance programmes. However, despite the 
extraordinary authority and generally favourable conditions met by UNTAET upon 
deployment to East Timor, the mission has been widely criticized for its centralized 
nature, its failure to promote a meaningful level of Timorese participation, and its 
inadequacies in terms of building state capacity in preparation for independence.  
The independent Timorese government that assumed authority from the 
United Nations in 2002 displayed similar centralized and non-consultative tendencies 
to the UNTAET administration. Although initially receiving a high degree of popular 
support, the state’s insulated nature and inability to respond to popular demands 
served to distance it from the Timorese population. Continuing high levels of 
international involvement in Timor-Leste associated with development and 
governance activities has served to constrain the policy choices of successive national 
                                                
28 Chesterman 
Abrahamsen; Chandler (2006) 
29 ‘Timor-Leste’ is the Portuguese term for East Timor. Upon independence in May 2002, the Timorese 
government adopted the ‘Democratic Republic of East Timor’ (in Portuguese, ‘República Democrática 
de Timor-Leste’, and in Tetum, ‘Repúblika Demokrátika Timor Lorosa’e’), and has requested that the 
shortened term ‘Timor-Leste’ be used internationally. This is the title that will be used to refer to the 
country post-independence (ie., post-2002) throughout this thesis. The name ‘East Timor’ is used to 
refer to the country prior to independence, as this is the title by which the country is most commonly 
known in English, and to which it was commonly referred prior to independence. See Hughes, p. ix-x 
30 P. Gorjão. (2002) The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor. Contemporary Southeast Asia 24(2):313-36. 
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governments, locking the state into a position of aid dependence and limiting state 
discretion to actions specifically endorsed by donors and the international community. 
Where these external preferences differ from the demands of the majority of the East 
Timorese population, the national government is generally compelled to prioritize 
donor expectations, or risk the consequences in terms of reduced economic and 
technical assistance and international alienation.  
In Timor-Leste, as in other countries, the form of statehood produced in this 
aid dependent context has served to alienate many elements within Timorese society. 
The process of state formation in Timor-Leste did not arise naturally in response to 
the historical, social, and political contingencies of Timorese society. On the contrary, 
the state-building process that took place resembled an experiment in liberal ‘state 
transplantation’, reflecting a Western discourse of state formation rather than any 
meaningful attempt to support the emergence of locally relevant governing structures. 
Adhering to internationally prescribed concepts of what constitutes a peaceful, 
‘developed’ society, interveners disregarded existing governance structures in favour 
of an institutionalist, technocratic model.31 Accordingly, the ‘peace’ that has been 
constructed in Timor-Leste amounts to little more than a ‘virtual peace’, presided over 
by the ‘empty institutions’ of an ineffective state. These institutions have failed to 
perform as viable instruments of public administration, or to demonstrate any 
relevance to Timorese society.32  
This situation has troubling implications for domestic politics and the potential 
for broadly inclusive democracy in Timor-Leste. The process of state formation paid 
little regard to local structures of governance, and produced a state that lacks political 
legitimacy. No ‘contract’ between state and society exists; in its place has been 
erected a state based on the governance contract, the requirements of which the state 
has been largely unable to fulfill.33 External requirements have constrained elected 
Timorese governments in key areas of economic and social policy, preventing them 
from responding to the demands of their domestic constituency and exacerbating 
popular disillusionment with the ‘democratic’ experience. Closer examination of food 
and agricultural policy and management of Timorese oil reserves reveals the extent to 
which government policy remains constrained by international preferences, despite 
                                                
31 Hughes, p. 95-96 
32 O. Richmond and J. Franks. (2008) Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperor's New 
Clothes? International Peacekeeping 15(2):185-200, p. 197-98 
33 Hughes; Richmond and Franks 
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formal independence in 2002. In these areas, the government’s inability to act in the 
interests of the Timorese public has compounded social hardships and popular 
discontent, contributing to the build-up of anti-government sentiment that manifested 
itself in the 2006 crisis.34 
This study will examine the development of state-building as a critical 
component of peace-building missions, its central assumptions and goals, and its 
implementation in practice in Timor-Leste. Close attention will be paid to the 
relationship between state-building efforts and development activities in post-conflict 
countries, the particular approaches to development this involves, and the impact of 
these approaches on societies in post-conflict developing countries. A key concept for 
analysis is the notion of ‘good governance’, which represents the main link between 
the complementary projects of state-building and economic development in the 
contemporary era. The case study will incorporate a close examination of Timor-
Leste’s food and agricultural policy and the management of the country’s oil 
resources and oil revenues, in order to explore the implications of aid dependence on 
government policy and practice in two areas that have been identified as central to 
national economic development. 
Organization	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
 The body of this thesis can be broadly divided into two main sections – a 
theoretical section and a case study section. Chapters 1-3 contain analyses of the 
concepts of peace-building, state-building, and neo-liberal development respectively. 
Each chapter contains an overview of the historical and theoretical developments 
relating to its subject, and incorporates a literature review setting out key arguments in 
the evolution of peace-building, state-building, and neo-liberal development theory. 
The chapters then conclude with a critical discussion exposing the tensions and 
implications that arise from the application of these concepts in practice, building on 
each other to highlight key issues raised by the intersection of peace-building, state-
building, and neo-liberal development agendas. 
 Chapter One examines the development of United Nations peace operations 
and the concept and evolution of peace-building. Since their emergence in the 1990s, 
peace-building missions have come to incorporate a sweeping programme of social, 
economic, and political measures that are considered necessary for establishing the 
                                                
34 Hughes 
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conditions for stable peace. This chapter will explore the relationship between peace-
building and liberal peace theory – a system of ideas that promotes economic 
liberalization and democratization as key to reducing internal (and external) armed 
conflict and building sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. The tenets of liberal 
peace theory are evident in peace-building theory, which identifies underdevelopment 
as a crucial factor in contemporary armed conflict, and argues for the implementation 
of democratic reforms and (neo-)liberal development measures as the solution to such 
conflicts. The bringing together of development and security concerns within the 
peace-building agenda provides a powerful impetus for intervention in conflicts in the 
global South, and has become a mechanism for the replication of the ‘liberal peace’ in 
warring or ‘underdeveloped’ countries. 
 Chapter Two examines the emergence of the state-building agenda as a central 
focus of contemporary peace-building efforts. State-building has arisen in response to 
a multiplicity of factors, including the threat of weak or failed states, the failures of 
previous peace-building missions, and a growing international consensus regarding 
the need for strong, rejuvenated states in order to protect human rights and facilitate 
national development (in partnership with international institutions). The chapter 
includes a literature review, which discusses the emergence of the concept of state-
building and arguments made by key theorists in support of international engagement 
in state-building activities, and identifies the primary functions and goals of 
contemporary state-building efforts. It then turns to a critical discussion of the social 
impacts of state-building, highlighting the extraordinary degree of social engineering 
involved in the process of implementing specific state forms in post-conflict states. 
Contemporary state-building programmes continue to channel the basic assumptions 
of liberal peace theory, seeking to implement a form of statehood that is modelled on 
liberal, Western institutions. In many countries in the South, this process embroils 
national governments in tensions between conflicting standards of external and 
internal legitimacy. Furthermore, conditions of aid dependence limit the ability of 
these governments to respond to the demands of their citizenry. Having laid out the 
central arguments in favour of state-building, this chapter explores the implications of 
the state-building project for subject countries, particularly in relation to issues of 
sovereignty, responsibility, accountability, and democracy.   
 Chapter Three begins with an account of the evolution of the concept and 
practice of development since the Second World War. It outlines significant theories 
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and approaches to development during this time, such as state-led development, 
modernization theory, and dependency and world systems theories. In light of the 
ideological dominance of neo-liberal economics since the 1980s, considerable 
attention is paid to the evolution of market-based theories of development and their 
implementation in countries of the South, particularly in the post-conflict context. 
Particular attention is paid to the concept of ‘good governance’, which has played a 
crucial role in bringing together neo-liberal development and state-building, and has 
served as a focal point of state-building efforts in post-conflict and ‘underdeveloped’ 
countries. ‘Good governance’ represents a specifically neo-liberal approach to 
governance, and has wide-ranging implications for political organization and 
questions of social and economic policy. This overlapping of state-building, neo-
liberal development, and governance objectives raises a number of important 
questions. To what extent do neo-liberal governance reforms condition the limits of 
possibility for social and economic development in the global South? What type of 
‘democracy’ is being promoted through the state-building project, and how do 
relationships of ‘aid dependence’ and conditionality affect the exercise of democratic 
decision-making in subject countries? This chapter examines the impact of 
international attempts to boost development outcomes through governance initiatives 
in subject countries, and the implications of these efforts for autonomous national 
development and democracy. 
 Chapters Four and Five explore how the concepts of peace-building, state-
building, and neo-liberal development have been applied in practice, through a case 
study of the experiences of Timor-Leste between 1999 and the present. Chapter Four 
constitutes an overview of the international state-building process in Timor-Leste. 
Particular attention is paid to the experiences and legacy of the UNTAET transitional 
administration, and the ongoing impact of post-independence state-building efforts. It 
is argued that, despite the unprecedented levels of international involvement in Timor-
Leste – or perhaps because of them – the state-building project in Timor-Leste has 
contributed to the formation of an ‘insulated state’ which has little basis in Timorese 
society. The national government is locked in a situation of aid dependence, rendering 
the state more responsive to an international constituency than to the local population. 
This reality restricts the government’s policy options and prevents it from responding 
adequately to the demands of its citizens. Despite having received formal legal 
sovereignty at independence, the exercise of Timorese sovereignty is constrained due 
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to ongoing state-building and development activities. The state occupies a subordinate 
position within the international architecture of global governance, which extends its 
influence into states of the global South through regimes of neo-liberal governance. In 
Timor-Leste, these mechanisms have limited the potential for democratic governance, 
equitable development, and autonomy, resulting in widespread public dissatisfaction 
and contributing to further outbreaks of conflict. 
 Chapter Five explores the implications of aid dependence in two specific 
contexts within Timor-Leste. The first section examines the country’s oil sector, with 
a particular focus on the management of oil revenues and the quandary the 
government has faced between international restrictions over its use and its desire to 
channel these funds towards public welfare and economic growth. The next section of 
the chapter discusses the country’s approach to the intersecting issues of food security 
and agricultural policy, highlighting the contradictions between the government 
imperatives of generating food security, self-sufficiency and local employment, and 
the desire to develop the cash crop sector and attract foreign investment in order to 
generate foreign exchange and stimulate infrastructural development. These examples 
clearly demonstrate the ways in which international regulation and neo-liberal 
governance mechanisms act to limit the possibilities for autonomous national 
development. The disconnect between the domestic interests and expectations of the 
Timorese population and the exigencies of external organizations and donors reveals 
the undemocratic nature of international liberal governance, which serves to limit the 
possibilities for economic development and national policy in subject states to a set of 
narrow, externally determined parameters. This chapter will expose the exercise of 
neo-liberal discipline in Timor-Leste, in order to highlight the fundamental tension 
between Timorese national objectives of self-sufficiency and social welfare, and 
external objectives of fiscal discipline and liberalization. 
 The conclusion draws together the main threads of argument from each 
chapter and draws them together into a concise conclusion. Throughout the thesis, 
each chapter contributes to the contention that state-building is transforming the 
nature of sovereignty and democracy in the global South. It has become a mechanism 
of international regulation over countries that are seen to pose a threat to the 
international community, and positions the state as a mediator between international 
authority and domestic politics. The remit of state authority over questions of 
domestic and foreign policy is severely curtailed, with conditions of aid dependence 
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serving to lock states into a relationship of subordination to external authority. The 
result is the degradation of the meaning of sovereignty and democracy, and a 
restriction of the possibilities for national development to those prescribed by neo-
liberal development policies. For all its claims, the process of national development 
being implemented is externally driven and highly disempowering, and the form of 
democracy that has been institutionalized through the state-building project lacks 
substance. These realities call into question the potential for equitable national 
development and democratic governance in subject states, and the long-term 
sustainability of the state-building project itself. 
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Chapter	  One:	  PEACE-­‐BUILDING	  
 
	   Introduction	  
 United Nations operations in Timor-Leste since 1999 have signaled a 
watershed in peace-building strategy. Whereas peace-building operations of the 1990s 
tended to bypass the state in their efforts to build peace after civil conflict, a 
significant intellectual shift in academic and policy-making circles towards the end of 
the decade saw a revitalization of the role of the state in post-conflict development 
activities. Informed by the failures of the 1990s, this approach to peace-building – 
known as state-building – attributes a high level of importance to state institutions in 
securing peace and development. This approach has been implemented to its fullest 
extent in Timor-Leste, where the United Nations has spearheaded an extensive state-
building effort in concert with international organizations, donor governments, and 
NGOs. 
 The state-building strategy implemented in Timor-Leste illustrates the 
evolution of peace-building over the last two decades, and the convergence of 
development and security concerns in academia and policy-making circles. Peace-
building in the 1990s was guided by a broad consensus on the importance of 
democratization and marketization for countries transitioning from civil conflict. This 
seemingly inexhaustible faith in the ability of market democracy to address a plethora 
of social ills has survived the failures of the first decade of peace-building. Despite 
renewed attention to the role of state institutions, the liberalization agenda continues 
to dominate the field. As will be seen, the new role for the state in peace-building 
represents not a retreat from market-based development, but an opportunity for 
extending and maintaining market reach in non-market societies. The following 
sections will outline the evolution of contemporary peace-building in light of the 
liberalization of development in recent decades and the reemergence of the liberal 
peace thesis. 
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The	  Evolution	  of	  United	  Nations	  Peace	  Operations:	  	  
Peace-­‐keeping	  to	  Peace-­‐building	  
During the Cold War period, the United Nations was largely limited to 
traditional peace-keeping functions, involving predominantly military tasks such as 
the deployment of lightly armed forces as a neutral international presence to monitor 
ceasefires and buffer zones between former combatants. Cold War politics and 
ideological differences, together with Charter restrictions regarding interference in 
domestic affairs, restricted the role of the UN in the domestic security issues of 
states.1 As such, peace-keeping missions of this era sought merely to minimize 
external conflict, rather than to advance more fundamental goals to eradicate conflict 
and prevent its occurrence.2  
With the end of the Cold War, the UN was afforded an opportunity for greater 
involvement in domestic affairs. Former client regimes of the United States and 
Soviet Union experienced a dramatic decrease in previous levels of military and 
economic assistance, particularly in Africa. Protracted conflicts in a number of 
countries necessitated the more direct involvement of the United Nations and other 
international organizations, particularly as ‘superpower’ interest in such conflicts 
waned.3 UN peace operations evolved rapidly from 1989, as UN missions carried out 
disarmament, facilitated elections, contributed to the writing of constitutions, 
conducted human-rights training and monitoring, and, in the case of Cambodia, even 
assumed administration of an entire country for a time.4  
The term ‘peace-building’ gained entrance to the international lexicon in 1992 
through then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s seminal report, An 
Agenda for Peace. This document heralded renewed opportunities for peace following 
the breakdown of the Cold War ideological divide, and outlined evolving forms of 
UN peace operations in response to new threats to security. In contrast to traditional 
‘peacekeeping’ forces, which were largely limited to observational tasks, ‘peace 
enforcement’ missions constituted more heavily armed deployments authorized to use 
                                                
1 Paris, p. 15-16 
2 Ibid. p. 16 
S. Ratner. (1995) The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 1 
3 Paris, p. 16 
4 R. Paris and T. Sisk. (2009) The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of 
Postwar Peace Operations. New York: Routledge, p. 4 
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force for defined goals. ‘Post-conflict peace-building’ constituted a third category, 
which sought to consolidate peace after civil conflict.5 In this initial manifestation, 
peace-building was conceived as post-conflict “action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse 
into conflict.”6 As perceptions of challenges to peace and security broadened to 
include non-traditional threats such poverty, inequality, disease, famine, and even 
environmental degradation, it became clear that efforts to obtain peace and security 
“must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife 
and warfare that have characterized the past.”7  
Peace-building functions continued to evolve throughout the 1990s in 
response to the experiences and perceived shortcomings of UN missions. Initially 
conceived of in relation to a conflict continuum, in which peace-building activities 
were reserved for the post-conflict period, by the mid-1990s the concept had 
broadened considerably to incorporate preventative measures and actions taken during 
conflict. The concept of peace-building in contemporary discourse is ambitious and 
wide in scope, aiming to eliminate the ‘root causes’ of war through poverty 
eradication, accountability and transparency, democratic governance, and respect for 
human rights, together with more immediate conflict-related concerns such as the 
repatriation of displaced persons, disarmament, and providing security. 8  The 
publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000 helped to solidify these new attitudes to 
peace operations, reinforcing the links between military-based security objectives and 
wider peace-building goals. 
In 2000 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations to conduct an assessment of UN peace and security 
operations and provide recommendations for improvement. The panel was chaired by 
Lakhdar Brahimi – future Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General and UN 
envoy in Haiti, South Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria – and is thus commonly 
referred to as the ‘Brahimi Report’. The findings of the Brahimi Report had a marked 
influence on subsequent UN peace operations. In particular, the report called for a 
‘doctrinal shift’ within peace operations to accommodate a central emphasis on 
                                                
5 B. Boutros-Ghali. (1992) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
Keeping. New York: United Nations. 
6 Ibid. para. 21 
7 Ibid. para. 13 
8 C. Call and V. Wyeth. (2008) Building States to Build Peace. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 
5-6 
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conflict prevention and peace-building. Whilst the concept of peace-building had been 
gaining credence within the UN and beyond since the early 1990s, the Brahimi Report 
highlighted the interdependency between a broad approach to peace-building and the 
imperative of post-conflict security. Crucial peace-building tasks identified for future 
peace operations included electoral assistance, democratization, support for 
governance structures and political institutions, support for the rule of law and human 
rights, disarmament, reintegration and national reconciliation.9 Michael Lund argues 
that the issuing of the Brahimi Report lent authority to ideological shifts within the 
UN during the previous decade: 
[W]hat used to be called just ‘peacekeeping’ in post-conflict settings has 
evolved into ‘second generation peacekeeping,’ then transmogrified into 
‘peace operations,’ and now military activities are intricately linked to civil 
administration and other functions under the rubric of ‘post-conflict 
peacebuilding.’ With the issuing of the Brahimi Report in 2000, the 
interdependency of ensuring post-conflict security and achieving broader 
peacebuilding was made explicit and more official.10 
The new post-conflict peace-building – as expounded and validated through the 
Brahimi Report and related policy developments – linked military activities to civil 
administration and other internal functions which had previously remained outside the 
remit of UN peace operations.11 
Liberal	  Peace	  Theory	  Rediscovered	  
Simultaneous to this evolution in UN peace operations has been the 
development of an increasingly vociferous democratization agenda. Concepts of 
democracy promotion form an integral element of democratic peace theory, which 
developed during the 1980s and 90s and have had a significant impact on 
conceptualizations of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. The 
assumptions of the ‘liberal peace’ have been internalized within peace-building 
discourse, and are evident in the promotion of market-based democracy as a panacea 
for post-conflict societies.  
                                                
9 United Nations. (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. New York: United 
Nations. 
10 M. Lund. (2003) What Kind of Peace Is Being Built? Taking Stock of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
and Charting Future Directions. Ottowa: International Development Research Centre, p. 6 
11 Ibid. p. 6 
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In 1983, Michael Doyle precipitated a resurgence of interest in liberal peace 
(or democratic peace) theory, taking Immanuel Kant’s ‘perpetual peace’ argument 
and applying it to the modern era to contend that democratic states rarely fight each 
other, constituting a ‘democratic peace’.12 Previous works by academics such as Dean 
Babst and R. J. Rummel had highlighted such a trend in relationships between 
democratic nations, but Doyle’s work received a wider readership and therefore 
greater attention. To support his claims, Doyle (like Rummel before him) carried out a 
systematic analysis of data on interstate war, which added empirical authority to the 
democratic peace proposition.13 Much of the research that followed this seminal work 
examined the relationship between liberal democracy and interstate violence, with the 
concept of democratic peace being hailed as the closest thing to “an empirical law in 
international relations”. 14  Further studies made links between liberal economic 
policies and the promotion of peaceful relations among democracies – a belief which 
received crucial support in the policy arena and was central to the Clinton 
administration’s foreign policy of ‘democratic enlargement’.15  
The resurrection of Kantian democratic peace theory also stimulated interest in 
the relationship between liberal democracy and internal conflict. Foremost amongst 
these studies were the findings of Rummel, who argued that democracies are less 
likely to suffer from a range of violent domestic issues, with the violent tendencies 
evoked by social conflict being resolved in democratic processes of representation, 
negotiation and compromise. 16  This position was supported by further studies, 
including a comprehensive 2001 Norwegian analysis of democracy and internal 
violence, which concluded that of all state political systems, established democracies 
are least vulnerable to civil conflict.17 
                                                
12 T. Smith. (2007) A Pact with the Devil: Washington's Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of 
the American Promise. New York: Routledge, p. 97 
M. Doyle. (1983a) Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy and Public Affairs 
12(3):205-35 
 ———. (1983b) Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2. Philosophy and Public Affairs 
12(4):323-53. 
13 J. L. Ray. (1998) Does Democracy Cause Peace? Annual Review of Political Science 1(1):27-46, p. 
31-32 
14 J. Levy. (1988) Domestic Politics and War. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18(4):653-73, p. 
662, as quoted in Smith (2007), p. 99 
15 Paris, p. 42 
16 R. J. Rummel. (1997) Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence. New Brunswick, N.J: 
Transaction, p. 85 
17 Hegre et al. (2001) Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 
1816-1992. The American Political Science Review 95(1):33-48. 
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 These views have been widely adopted in policymaking circles. Scholars with 
extensive links to the policy community, such as Larry Diamond in the United States, 
have been instrumental in translating academic debate into policy. Diamond has 
vocally supported democracy promotion both as a measure against interstate war and 
internal violence, bringing democracy promotion into the arena of national security as 
a preventive, defensive imperative.18 This equation of democratization with national 
and international security has been crucial in forging a broad consensus on the 
primacy of democratic forms of state organization.  
These arguments reflect a long-standing tradition of American democracy 
promotion, beginning with the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson believed that 
democratic states were inherently more stable and peaceful than other political 
systems, thus forming the most appropriate building blocks for a peaceful 
international system.19 Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech to Congress in January 1918 
outlined a political vision that set the tone of American foreign policy throughout the 
following century. He argued for an international system composed of states based on 
the consent of the governed and the rule of law, a community of market democracies 
bound together by commercial interests and respect for international law.20 Although 
Wilson’s primary concern was interstate conflict, the international peace he 
expounded would be based on political stability within states, dependent on the 
democratic self-determination of all peoples. Wilson was the first public official to 
articulate such a strategy of democracy promotion – now called the liberal peace 
thesis, or democratic peace theory. Contemporary peace-building is based on similar 
assumptions, such as beliefs in the ability of democratization and marketization to 
foster peace in countries emerging from civil conflict.21 
A suitable definition of ‘democracy’ has been much contested by democratic 
peace proponents. Many past systems for assessing democracy have been accused of 
                                                
18 Paris, p. 44; Smith (2007), p. 115 
For examples of Diamond’s academic works in the area of democracy promotion, see L. Diamond. 
(1994) The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World Order. Current History 93(579):1-7; L. 
Diamond. (2006) Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges. 
Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2(2):93-116. 
19 T. Smith. (2000) National Security Liberalism and American Foreign Policy. In American 
Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry 
and Takashi Inoguchi, pp. 85-102. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 93  
20 Ikenberry et al. (2009) The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First 
Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 10-11 
21 Paris, p. 40-41 
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subjectivity, ethnocentricity, inconsistency or incomplete data, and bias.22 Democratic 
governments are typically conceived of as receiving authority on the basis of consent 
and popular legitimacy, and responding to the wishes of their constituents. However, 
governments of vastly different structures and political leanings can be perceived as 
responsive to the needs and desires of their constituents – many of which are 
decidedly undemocratic in nature. Advocates of democratic peace theory have 
generally assumed a procedural view of democracy, emphasizing competitive 
elections, universal suffrage, rule of law, civil rights and freedoms such as freedom of 
speech and the press.23 The values often reflected in these conceptions of democracy 
are the products of the American political experience,24 which becomes problematic 
when applied to non-Western contexts with no historical experience of liberal 
democracy.25 Attempts by peace-building advocates to normalize systems of political 
and social (and economic) organization based on the principles of liberal peace have 
proved more difficult than anticipated, necessitating more intrusive measures to 
institutionalize liberal democratic structures.  
Democratization	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  
The growth of democratic peace theory complemented the democratic 
preferences of the United Nations, although democracy promotion remained a 
controversial subject until the early 1990s.26 During the Cold War, the United Nations 
was prevented by East-West ideological differences from promoting particular forms 
of domestic governance. While both the Soviet bloc and the US and its allies 
promoted certain forms of democracy, and non-aligned developing countries 
promoted their own brand of developmental democracy, disagreement persisted over 
the nature and meaning of democracy itself. Thus, despite near-universal support for 
democracy in some form, the United Nations avoided advocating particular models of 
democratic governance. This distancing of the organization from domestic matters – a 
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23 Ray, p. 31-32 
24 Chan, p. 65 
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Approaches, edited by Oliver P. Richmond, pp. 99-115. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 100 
26 O. Tansey. (2009) Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 26 
  22 
central tenet of the UN Charter – was manifested in the strict operational neutrality 
observed by UN peace operations of the time, and the refusal to intervene in internal 
affairs that saw these missions largely limited to the role of monitoring cease-fires.27  
With the end of the Cold War, many commentators and policymakers 
perceived the collapse of the Soviet Union as indicative of a worldwide triumph of 
market democracy. This mood was exemplified in an influential 1989 article by 
Francis Fukuyama, which proclaimed the end of the Cold War as signifying the 
victory of economic and political liberalism and the potential “end point of mankind's 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the 
final form of human government.” 28  The perceived victory of liberalism over 
socialism and the premises of democratic peace theory provided a powerful impetus 
for policymakers in nations such as the United States and Britain to promote the 
spread of liberal democratic governance as a means of achieving peace in 
international relations. 
The erosion of ideological barriers to democracy promotion in the UN also 
facilitated a strong intellectual shift in support of democratization, evident in the 
arguments of Secretaries-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan. Boutros-
Ghali spearheaded the emerging consensus on democratic governance in the UN in 
the 1990s and articulated a central role for the organization in promoting it.29 In An 
Agenda for Democratization, Boutros-Ghali hailed the international shift to 
democracy for “contribut[ing] to preserving peace and security, securing justice and 
human rights, and promoting economic and social development.”30 Democratic states 
not only reduce the risk that disputes will lead to violent conflict, he argued, they “are 
more likely to promote and respect the rule of law, respect individual and minority 
rights, [and] cope effectively with social conflict”.31 Not only are they less prone to 
abuses of power, he asserted that democratic states foster “the evolution of the social 
contract upon which lasting peace can be built.”32 This brought democratic systems of 
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political organization into the sphere of peace-building, paving the way for attempts 
to foster democratic structures in post-conflict countries. 
Kofi Annan was also outspoken in his support for democracy promotion. He 
argued that such a strategy is a highly effective means of conflict prevention – both 
internally and between states – based on an historic tendency of democratic states not 
to go to war with one another, and the ability of democratic governance to peacefully 
resolve internal dissent, thus avoiding civil conflict.33 The success of the democratic 
method of “non-violent conflict management”, he claimed, is borne out by studies that 
demonstrate lower levels of violence in democratic states than in non-democracies.34 
The democratic principle, he argued, has universal recognition and relevance and the 
challenge is to ensure its universal application.35 
As the international body with primary responsibility for matters of peace and 
security and the pre-eminent institution of international law, the support of the UN for 
democratization and the precepts of ‘liberal peace’ theory has ensured their wide 
acceptance. That the UN remains the only body with the undisputed authority to 
confer legitimacy on international military action demonstrates its ongoing centrality 
in international affairs. In its support of democratization for achieving both 
international and internal peace, the UN has ensured that this approach to conflict 
prevention and management achieves primacy. Its subsequent, widespread adoption 
by international financial institutions, development agencies, national governments, 
and non-governmental organizations – not to mention its uncritical acceptance by 
many academics and researchers 36– has occurred largely due to the propagating role 
of the UN. It is highly unlikely that the works of scholars such as Doyle and 
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Diamond, and even the policies of individual governments, could have produced such 
international consensus on the premises of liberal peace without this crucial support. 
Thus the concept of liberal peace has come to pervade the most influential 
arenas of the international system, and has become the prevailing orthodoxy in the 
field of peace-building. The following sections will outline the evolution of United 
Nations peace operations, with a focus on the development of a peace-building 
framework in the early 1990s. 
Understanding	  Conflict	  and	  Building	  Peace	  
During the Cold War, two separate ‘sets of architecture’ were established to 
address the spheres of socio-economic development and peace and security.37 Issues 
such as development, poverty, social injustice, and disease were considered matters of 
domestic jurisdiction, and as such international agencies including specialized UN 
departments, bilateral and multilateral donors, and Bretton Woods institutions sought 
to support sovereign states in providing for human needs through official 
development and humanitarian assistance programmes. 38  However, the bulk of 
financial resources and effort was reserved for the realm of peace and security, with 
the United Nations – the institution entrusted with ensuring international peace and 
security – effectively sidelined due to East-West rivalry while new security 
organizations affiliated with the great power blocs were created outside the UN 
framework.39  
 As discussed above, the end of the Cold War was a time of tremendous 
optimism in international relations. Ideas of an era of peace and a ‘new world order’ 
were expounded, boosting hopes for a time of nuclear disarmament, increased 
international cooperation, greater equality, and respect for human rights. Despite the 
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horrific patterns of civil conflict which began to emerge – dampening initial 
prophecies of a ‘peace dividend’ – UN peace operations were launched in an 
atmosphere of heightened optimism regarding ability of liberal principles to provide 
solutions to a proliferation of internal conflicts. The way conflict was, and continues 
to be understood – in particular the causes of conflict – contributed to this optimism. 
In this context, post-Cold War responses to conflict facilitated a historic convergence 
of the formerly disparate spheres of development and security, which has been pivotal 
in the emergence of the peace-building project. 
Conflict	  Trends	  in	  the	  1990s:	  Domestic	  Conflict	  	  
 In the early 1990s, the alarming incidence and impacts of internal conflict 
began to gain increasing attention from policymakers and analysts. Civil wars 
constituted 94 per cent of armed conflicts waged in the 1990s, exacting an 
unprecedented toll on civilians. The targeting of civilians emerged as a common 
theme in civil conflicts in this period, including tactics such as systematic rape, 
torture, mass executions, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. It has been estimated that 
during the 1990s, 90 per cent of deaths in armed conflicts were civilians – an 
inversion of the situation at the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
approximately 90 per cent of war victims were soldiers.40 Internal conflicts during the 
final decade of the century claimed the lives of approximately five million people, 
displacing many millions more and sparking mass refugee movements.41  
 Aside from concern over the devastating humanitarian costs of internal 
conflict, civil unrest was also – and continues to be – perceived as a threat to regional 
and global stability. Roland Paris identifies the mass movement of refugees and the 
spread of conflict across international borders as factors contributing to regional 
instability. Few examples have demonstrated this danger more clearly than the case of 
the Rwandan genocide in 1994. During the conflict, mass population movements into 
refugee camps in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo contributed to an internal 
and regional conflict that claimed the lives of millions of people, and has left a legacy 
of instability in the region that continues to this day.42   
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Paul Collier et al. argue that civil war destabilizes surrounding countries 
politically and economically, provoking regional arms races, economic disinvestment, 
and trade disruption.43 Refugee flows across borders facilitate the spread of infectious 
disease – in particular malaria and HIV/AIDS – into neighbouring countries, and 
present a financial burden for the governments of asylum countries.44 A strong 
correlation is made between the humanitarian effects of internal conflict and wider 
regional security implications. 
 Political commentators also draw links between internal conflict and 
transnational crime and terrorism, arguing that conditions of civil unrest allow 
criminal and terrorist networks to operate with impunity – a danger that is taken to 
extend across borders given contemporary advanced communication technology and 
ease of travel.45 The UN has acknowledged the threat-magnifying potential of these 
technological innovations: 
The technological revolution that has radically changed the worlds of 
communication, information-processing, health and transportation has eroded 
borders, altered migration and allowed individuals the world over to share 
information at a speed inconceivable two decades ago. Such changes have 
brought many benefits but also great potential for harm. Smaller and smaller 
numbers of people are able to inflict greater and greater amounts of damage, 
without the support of any State. A new threat, transnational organized crime, 
undermines the rule of law within and across borders.46 
 In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, conditions of internal 
unrest in Afghanistan have been viewed as fostering international terrorism and 
destabilizing the region.47 This conflict, and its association with regional instability, 
international crime (such as drug trafficking), and terrorism, has been interpreted by 
many as an exemplar of the consequences of failing to address internal conflict.48 
Terrorism has become an issue of primary importance in foreign and domestic policy 
in the twenty-first century, and its perceived links with internal instability have 
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heightened the sense of urgency amongst policymakers and analysts to address civil 
conflict. 
 Mary Kaldor describes contemporary patterns of conflict as ‘new wars’ – a 
form of organized violence which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.49 Such conflicts 
are typified by the blurring of traditional distinctions between ‘war’ as violence 
between states or political groups for political motives; organized crime by privately 
organized groups, largely for financial purposes; and large-scale violations of human 
rights perpetrated against civilian targets. While the majority of these wars are 
localized – and as such are frequently described as internal or civil wars – they are 
also becoming increasingly globalized in their connections to transnational networks 
including criminal organizations, ethnic diasporas, international media, NGOs and 
international organizations.50 
The emergence of new wars is attributed to the erosion of traditional state 
sovereignty, and in particular the erosion of monopolies on legitimate organized 
violence, resulting in increasing privatization of violence. As a result, the fighting 
encompasses a range of groups including paramilitaries, warlords, criminal gangs, 
police forces, mercenaries, and regular armies. Politics of identity – rather than 
ideology or state-interest – are held to be the key factors in claims to power, and new 
wars are waged to gain political control of populations through techniques of fear and 
destabilization. As a result, the majority of violence is directed at civilians, resulting 
in massive violations of human rights and forced displacement.51 
According to this estimation, the framework of identity politics offers no 
possible long-term solutions for the new conflicts, as they tend to exacerbate the 
conditions and cleavages within society which first contributed to the outbreak of 
violence. Kaldor believes that the only resolution is the establishment of legitimacy 
based on an inclusive, cosmopolitan set of democratic values. She calls for a form of 
cosmopolitan law enforcement to defend international humanitarian and human rights 
standards, and protect victims of violent conflict. Dismissing long-standing debates 
over intervention, she claims that the modern context has rendered the very concept of 
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‘non-intervention’ void due to unprecedented levels of external involvement in 
internal conflicts – the provision of aid being the most potent example.52 Such 
arguments disregard – or significantly undermine – sovereignty considerations in 
situations of civil conflict. Kaldor’s claim that new wars are symptomatic of an 
erosion of sovereignty lends itself to a ‘continuum’ approach to sovereignty, in which 
objections to intervention can be overcome by reference to the break down or absence 
of state sovereignty, and may even be justified as a necessary measure towards the 
restoration of sovereignty.53 Such interpretations gained momentum in the 1990s, as 
the UN struggled to reconcile its obligation to ensure peace and security with the 
doctrine of non-intervention. The reconceptualization of security in terms of ‘human 
security’ and sovereignty as ‘responsibility’ appeared to offer a resolution to this 
dilemma. 
Human	  Security	  and	  the	  Decline	  of	  State	  Sovereignty	  
Initially created to address interstate conflicts, the United Nations – as the 
international body entrusted with responsibility for international peace and security – 
struggled to combat the proliferation of civil conflicts in the post-World War Two era. 
In light of the appalling civilian casualties associated with the ‘new’ wars, the issue of 
humanitarian intervention came to receive unprecedented attention in the 1990s. 
Shifting attitudes to sovereignty spurred by attempts to resolve the sovereignty-
intervention dilemma have been instrumental in paving the way for the unprecedented 
scope of international intervention in post-conflict environments in the twenty-first 
century. 
Central to the UN Charter are principles of state sovereignty and non-
intervention, with Article 2(4) prohibiting the use of force by any state against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of other states. Exceptions to the 
international prohibition against the use of force include actions taken in self-defense, 
or forcible action to maintain international security, authorized by the Security 
Council in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.54 While 
respect for human rights is also enshrined in the UN Charter, no provisions exist for 
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humanitarian intervention outside of Security Council authorized operations. 55 
However, the consequences of international indifference to a number of civil conflicts 
in the 1990s – in particular the genocidal violence in Rwanda – led to attempts to 
reconcile contemporary humanitarian imperatives with the concept of security.56 This 
linkage was achieved through the championing of a new ‘human security’ agenda, 
signifying a shift away from traditional concepts of state security.57 
In a speech to delegates at the annual gathering of the UN General Assembly 
in 1999, Kofi Annan proclaimed the need for UN and the international system to 
adapt to the new realities of the international system. Annan argued that growing 
recognition of the importance of ‘individual sovereignty’ – understood as individual 
rights and freedoms – had contributed to the redefinition of state sovereignty, and 
magnified the imperative to protect individual human beings: 
State sovereignty is being redefined … States are now widely understood to 
be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. … At the 
same time individual sovereignty … has been enhanced by a renewed and 
spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, 
we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human 
beings, not to protect those who abuse them.58 
In the Secretary-General’s Millenium Report the following year, Annan appealed to 
the international community to find a way past the sovereignty dilemma in order to 
respond to “gross and systematic violations of human rights”. 59  In 2001, the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was formed under the 
auspices of the Canadian government to examine this question.  
The Commission proposed a reconceptualization of sovereignty from 
traditional territorial notions of sovereignty to ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. This 
doctrine – known as the Responsibility to Protect – claims that the international 
community has a responsibility to protect civilians in countries where governments 
                                                
55 R. Thakur. The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility 
to Protect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 205 
56 J. L. Holzgrefe. (2003) The Humanitarian Intervention Debate. In Humanitarian Intervention: 
Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, edited by J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, pp. 15-52. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 17 
57 Thakur 
58 K. Annan. (16 September 1999) Two Concepts of Sovereignty. The Economist 352(157):49. 
59 ———. (2000b) We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. New York: 
United Nations, p. 48 
  30 
are unwilling or unable prevent large-scale human rights abuses.60 This normative 
shift was driven by a novel approach to security that located security at the individual 
level – a ‘human security’ approach responsive to the needs, rights, and welfare of 
individual human beings. 
The concept of human security was pioneered by the 1994 Human 
Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme, which 
emphasized the security of individuals as an alternative to traditional state-centred 
notions of security.61 Rejecting these limited concepts of security, which focused on 
aspects such as territorial protection against external aggression, the defense of 
national interests, and global security from the nuclear threat, the report argued that 
the time had come “to make a transition from the narrow concept of national security 
to the all-encompassing concept of human security.”62  The report outlined two 
primary components of human security – freedom from fear and freedom from want – 
both concepts that had been enshrined in the United Nations Charter, but had since 
been tilted in favour of the former component at the expense of the latter. Facilitating 
this shift in emphasis would require a move from “security through armaments to 
security through sustainable human development.”63 From a primary focus on the 
physical security of states from aggression, perceived threats to human security came 
to encompass matters of economic security, food security, health security, 
environmental security, personal security (security from violence emanating from 
oneself, individuals, groups, the state, or other states), community security, and 
political security.64  
Human security represents a cornerstone of the new normative framework that 
developed in the 1990s – a framework that conceives of human needs and welfare not 
only within the realm of human rights, but as security concerns. Acknowledging that 
threats to human security extended beyond the traditionally narrow conception of 
physical security – which equated security primarily with issues of violence and 
conflict – the human security framework also asserted that failure to ensure broader 
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human security outcomes in the context of human development65 increases the 
potential for violent conflict. The authors warned that “(f)ailed or limited human 
development leads to a backlog of human deprivation – poverty, hunger, disease or 
persisting disparities between ethnic communities or between regions. This backlog in 
access to power and economic opportunities can lead to violence.”66 This notion 
provided a link between previously distinct terrains of development and security, and 
formed a pillar of the emergent peace-building agenda. 
The attenuation of state sovereignty that accompanied the rise of the human 
security agenda has likewise been fundamental to the evolution of peace-building. An 
Agenda for Peace hinted at a new role for the state within the framework of UN peace 
operations. Whilst acknowledging that the state must remain central to peace activities 
and its sovereignty respected, Boutros-Ghali argued that the “time of absolute and 
exclusive sovereignty … has passed … It is the task of leaders of states today to 
understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance 
and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.”67 This new approach to 
statehood has facilitated new levels of interventionism in subject states as part of the 
peace-building process. The role of the state in peace-building activities will be 
discussed in the following chapter on state-building. 
The	  Emergence	  of	  the	  ‘Security-­‐Development	  Nexus’	  
With the transcendent liberalism of the post-Cold War period came greater 
attention to the causes of conflict in an effort to stem the devastating impacts of civil 
violence. The dominant interpretation that emerged located the underlying causes of 
conflict in conditions of underdevelopment.  A dominant interpretation in liberal 
circles, this linkage between underdevelopment and conflict demands that conditions 
of underdevelopment be addressed.68 Such conditions – while dangerous, in that they 
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are seen as posing a threat to both domestic and international security – are seen as 
amenable to remedy; liberal development is seen as providing the solution to conflict, 
both as a preventive measure and as a means of post-conflict rehabilitation.69 Mark 
Duffield argues that the merging of development and security signifies the 
radicalization of development, whereby development policy seeks to bring about 
social transformation in order to eliminate violent conflict. The association of 
underdevelopment with a high risk of conflict has become a core assumption within 
development discourse.70 
 Common approaches to conflict analysis attribute causation to specific 
groupings of factors, often involving long-term factors, trigger factors, and factors 
generated by conflict itself that further entrench patterns of violence. The UN report 
‘Developing National Sustainable Development Strategies in Post-Conflict Countries’ 
identifies root or structural causes, destabilizing or proximate factors, and trigger 
factors in the onset and perpetuation of violence.71 Structural causes are long-term in 
nature, and include factors such as social or political marginalization, inequality, and 
unequal access to resources. These contextual factors are central to conflict, but 
require a spark to trigger the onset of violence. Such trigger factors – for example an 
event such as an assassination or coup d’état – translate the conflict potential provided 
by structural causes into violence. Destabilizing or proximate factors are factors that 
perpetuate conflict, a frequently cited example being that of war economies. Certain 
actors and groups are understood to benefit from conflict, deriving profit from illicit 
activities such as the plunder of natural resources or drug trafficking. These 
commercial interests provide a motive for the continuation of violence.72  
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The role of structural factors in the onset of conflict is a primary concern in 
conflict analysis. The prevalence of conflict in the global South in the post-Cold War 
period has suggested a close correlation between underdevelopment and conflict.73 
According to the World Bank, empirical evidence demonstrates that civil war is 
heavily concentrated in ‘developing’ countries – particularly those with the lowest 
development outcomes. Arguing that poverty increases the chances of civil war, Paul 
Collier et al. hypothesize that “the key root of civil conflict is the failure of economic 
development.”74 Further, the authors assert that once conflict has occurred, countries 
become locked into a pattern of continuing conflict, known as a ‘conflict trap’.75 
Factors such as low average income, unequal distribution of income, the presence of 
two or three ethnic groups, significant natural resource endowments, and the 
development of war economies are held to contribute to conflict duration and the 
likelihood of relapses into violence.76 Socio-economic changes associated with war, 
such as emigration, increased military spending, altered patterns of resource and 
income distribution, and legacies of hatred are also seen as placing societies at a 
higher risk of reverting to conflict.77 ‘Breaking’ post-conflict countries out of this 
conflict trap is thus considered essential for successful peace-building operations. 
Given the high level of attention paid to economic factors as a primary 
structural cause of civil conflict, it is unsurprising that peace-building reflects a 
developmental agenda. Duncan Brack argues that sustainable development acts as a 
‘counter’ to conflict and insecurity. His economically-driven argument exemplifies 
much contemporary thought linking peace and development: 
Figures derived from World Bank econometric models show a striking 
relationship between the wealth of a nation and its chances of having a civil 
war. A country with a gross domestic product (GDP) of $250 per capita has a 
predicted probability of war beginning at some point over the following five 
years of 15 per cent … This probability reduces by half for a country with 
                                                                                                                                       
parties often increasingly motivated by greed as the profits reaped by illegal activities accumulate. 
Such arguments are closely related to the concept of the ‘resource curse’, which posits that countries 
which are richly endowed with natural resources are more likely to experience violent conflict due to 
the higher profits available from illicit commercial activity.  
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GDP of $600 per capita, and by half again, to less than 4 per cent, for a 
country with $1250 per head; countries with GDP of over $5000 per capita 
have a less than 1 per cent chance of experiencing civil conflict.78 
In this estimation, civil war not only destroys a country’s development gains, it 
springs from the failure of development itself.79  
With developmental failures now viewed as an important source of internal 
conflict, threats to peace – both at the domestic and the international level – have been 
increasingly broadly defined, as demonstrated in the following excerpt from the 2004 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: 
Poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation and war feed one 
another in a deadly cycle. Poverty … is strongly associated with the outbreak 
of civil war. Such diseases as malaria and HIV/AIDS continue to cause large 
numbers of deaths and reinforce poverty. Disease and poverty, in turn, are 
connected to environmental degradation; climate change exacerbates the 
occurrence of such infectious disease as malaria and dengue fever. 
Environmental stress, caused by large populations and shortages of land and 
other natural resources, can contribute to civil violence.80 
The linking of development and security has been a central feature of the post-Cold 
War intellectual landscape, one that is now accepted throughout international 
organizations, NGOs, the policy arena and academia alike. Furthermore, locating the 
causes of conflict in conditions of underdevelopment implies a clear method of 
countering the various security threats thought to spring from such conditions.  
 Collier et al. examine links between civil war and underdevelopment in an 
attempt to identify development policies that may counteract the current trend of 
conflict in ‘developing’ countries. They argue that countries locked in the conflict trap 
(as discussed above) together with ‘marginalized developing countries’ suffer the 
greatest risk of conflict. ‘Marginalized developing countries’ comprise states that 
have been unable to sustain policies and institutions deemed necessary for achieving 
economic growth and diversity beyond dependence on primary commodities.81 The 
combination of low income, economic decline, and dependence on primary 
commodity exports are held to markedly increase a country’s risk of conflict.82 Many 
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post-conflict countries exhibit all of these characteristics, placing them at an even 
greater risk of further conflict. Collier et al. contend that is imperative that such states 
are ‘brought into mainstream development’ and subjected to international 
interventions to ensure social stability in the critical first post-conflict decade.83 
In addition, the World Bank-commissioned report argues that newly 
independent countries are at a much higher risk of conflict than other countries. A 
combination of weak institutions and legacies of decolonization is held to render new 
states five times more conflict-prone in their first years of independence than older 
states which have arisen from similar circumstances. That the majority of the world’s 
new states – such as South Sudan and Timor-Leste – are low-income developing 
countries is believed to further double their risk of conflict, rendering newly 
independent, developing countries 10 times more vulnerable to civil conflict than 
other countries.84 
Peace-building is thus conceived of as ameliorating the structural causes of 
conflict, by eliminating the contributing factors of underdevelopment, inequality, and 
marginalization. Traditional security-oriented aspects of peace-building – such as 
disarmament of combatants and the establishment of local security, generally through 
international contingents under UN auspices – are complemented by a more radical 
commitment to reverse the conditions which gave rise to violence in the first place, 
thus laying the groundwork for lasting peace. As these conditions have been 
increasingly associated with underdevelopment in the last two decades, development 
has become of paramount concern in contemporary peace operations. The UN High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change reflects the centrality of development 
to contemporary security concerns, arguing that development must form the basis of 
conflict prevention strategies: 
In describing how to meet the challenge of prevention, we begin with 
development because it is the indispensable foundation for a collective 
security system that takes prevention seriously. It serves multiple functions. It 
helps combat the poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation 
that kill millions and threaten human security. It is vital in helping States 
prevent or reverse the erosion of State capacity, which is crucial for meeting 
almost every class of threat. And it is part of a long-term strategy for 
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preventing civil war and for addressing the environments in which both 
terrorism and organized crime flourish.85 
These deep associations between conflict and underdevelopment have brought 
about a strategic alignment of the development and security communities. The peace-
building efforts generated by this convergence are viewed as both a moral and a 
strategic necessity – essential for ensuring the security and stability of individual 
states, surrounding regions, and the wider international system. These initiatives are 
also seen as critical for promoting human well-being – or human security – by 
ensuring levels of economic development deemed necessary for fulfilling human 
needs and promoting human rights through a commitment to the rule of law in newly-
emergent, reconstructed states emerging from civil conflict.  
Conclusion	  
 Contemporary peace-building initiatives seek to respond to existing conflicts 
and to pre-empt the emergence of such conflicts by eradicating conditions of 
underdevelopment and human insecurity. This approach entails a historic convergence 
of the security and development communities, brought about by the moral and 
strategic imperative to address multi-level threats to human security, state security, 
and regional security stemming from contemporary conflict. The scope of peace-
building activities since the 1990s has been informed by this interrelationship between 
underdevelopment and conflict, with peace-building initiatives now incorporating a 
range of non-traditional measures such as health policies, environmental initiatives, 
and poverty alleviation strategies in order to promote sustainable peace and 
development. 
 The reemergence of liberal peace theory has played a pivotal role in the 
evolution of international peace-building efforts. The equation of liberal democracy 
with domestic and international peace has given rise to a powerful international 
consensus in favour of democratization, and has shaped the policies and aspirations of 
peace-building operations. Conditions of underdevelopment and the absence of liberal 
democracy in the global South have been problematized as the source of conflict and 
instability, whereas liberal development is upheld as the panacea for instability, 
conflict, and underdevelopment. This ideological consensus has contributed to the 
internalization of the assumptions of liberal peace theory within contemporary peace-
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building policy – particularly concepts of market-led development, economic and 
political liberalization and procedural democracy. 
 This liberal peace-building vision has been afforded unprecedented scope for 
action in light of the devastating costs of conflict and human insecurity throughout the 
1990s. The goal of eradicating underdevelopment and implementing a liberal vision 
for sustainable peace and development amounts to no less than the social, economic, 
and political transformation of underdeveloped or war-affected countries. Duffield 
describes this process as “a radical developmental agenda of social transformation”; 
the liberal peace-building agenda amounts to a distinctly “political project … [that 
aims] to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on 
its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities.” 86 
However, this ambitious project has failed to fulfill its mandate, as the appalling 
civilian costs of conflict in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century suggests. The 
failure of peace-building missions to respond successfully to such conflicts raised 
questions about the viability of the liberal peace project, leading to calls for a 
modified approach to addressing conflict that would engage states in efforts to carry 
out the liberal transformation of conflict-affected societies. The following chapter will 
chart the rise of the state-building agenda as a crucial element of contemporary peace-
building efforts, and outline the new role for the state as a partner in the process of 
liberal social transformation. 
 
 	  
                                                
86 Duffield, p. 11 
  38 
Chapter	  Two:	  STATE-­‐BUILDING	  
	  
Introduction	  
The many failures and limited successes of the first peace-building decade 
convinced the peace-building community of the need to develop new strategies for 
fostering liberal transformations in post-conflict societies. Commentators and official 
bodies alike sought to derive lessons from peace-building’s mixed record, concluding 
that past operations had paid inadequate attention to strengthening state structures as a 
part of post-conflict peace efforts. From the late 1990s, an international consensus 
began to grow around the importance of effective statehood for overseeing the 
transition to peace. Frontline organizations such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations called for a concerted emphasis on building state capacity in developing 
countries, and influential commentators and public figures such as Francis Fukuyama 
and Lakhdar Brahimi identified state-building as the central objective of peace 
operations.1 This constituted a momentous shift from the attitudes that had dominated 
the development sphere in the late 1970s and 1980s, which had given rise to 
development initiatives that largely bypassed the state.2 
 Despite the strong correlation between conflict and underdevelopment, 
attempts to foster peace by improving development outcomes had met with minimal 
success. Many countries experienced a resumption of conflict in the years following 
peace settlements, regardless of the considerable resources mobilized by the 
international community and channeled into post-conflict societies. 3  Observers 
recognized that prolonged conflict in many cases precipitates a collapse of systems 
and institutions for governing society, resulting in an absence of national mechanisms 
to coordinate the reconstruction effort and, correspondingly, an unsustainable 
dependence on international actors. They reasoned that the low priority given to 
rebuilding national institutions was a primary reason for past failures, and concluded 
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that the establishment of effective and self-sustaining government systems is essential 
for lasting peace and development.4 
 Whereas the prevailing development model of the previous decades had called 
for a minimalist state with limited influence in development matters, the ‘new’ agenda 
envisioned a pivotal management role for the state in securing national development. 
Reflecting this shift in development theory, the peace-building community called on 
the state to ‘partner’ with international institutions and organizations, markets, and 
civil society in the development process.5 States were tasked with cultivating an 
environment in which development initiatives could prosper, facilitating the transition 
to peace by eliminating underdevelopment and the roots of conflict. This task would 
require considerable administrative capacity, calling on the state to provide a level of 
reliable public services as a prerequisite for economic development. State institutions 
would be required to conform to certain principles of management and organization to 
carry out the role envisioned by the international community. A firm commitment to 
democracy and the rule of law would be essential for ensuring public accountability 
and the efficient use of resources.6 The realization of a specific form of statehood was 
envisaged as the goal of state-building operations – a revitalized state equipped to 
carry out the profound transformation of post-conflict society deemed necessary for 
building sustainable peace. 
Mounting international concern surrounding weak statehood and the 
ramifications of state collapse contributed heavily to the revival of the state in post-
conflict development. ‘Failed state’ discourse became highly influential in the 1990s, 
with states such as Somalia – and later Afghanistan – taken as exemplars of the 
dangers of state collapse for the international system. Incapable of maintaining 
security and exercising authority throughout their territory, these states are typified by 
human rights abuses, conflict, political repression, and insurgency, often generating 
humanitarian crises and large numbers of refugees. Such states, it was believed, 
provided a haven for terrorist networks and criminal activities, and were capable of 
destabilizing entire regions through the spread of conflict, political and financial 
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instability, and refugees.7 Policymakers and academics alike warned of the need to 
take pre-emptive action to prevent state failure and avert its devastating internal, 
regional, and international ramifications. Fears of the magnified international impacts 
of state collapse associated with globalization appeared vindicated by the terrorist 
attacks of September 2001, which were taken to demonstrate the danger of terrorist 
networks operating with impunity in weak states.8 
 Advocates of state-building argue that the solution to dilemmas of 
underdevelopment, conflict, and state failure lies in a strengthening of state 
institutions, the reconstruction of legitimate authority in weak or post-conflict states, 
and the reformulation of systems of governance and political, social and economic 
organization. This chapter outlines the crucial contribution of failed state discourse to 
the state-building agenda, and provides a summary of key arguments in the literature 
for state-building as a peace-building strategy and a corrective for state weakness. It is 
argued that the international emphasis on building state capacity is geared towards the 
realization of a certain form of statehood. The characteristics and core functions of 
this state model will be explored, highlighting the extent of social and political 
reengineering envisioned as a part of twenty-first century peace-building operations. 
State	  Failure	  
‘Failed states’ discourse gained credence throughout the 1990s and lent 
authority to state-building arguments that emerged towards the end of the decade, 
calling for international action to bolster state capacity in order to prevent violent 
conflict. The issue of state failure gained additional momentum within international 
security and development policy following the 9/11 attacks. The failed state has been 
identified as one of the paramount threats of the modern era, constituting an 
influential justification for interventions associated with the ‘war on terror’ as well as 
wider peace-building and development ventures. 9   Despite the much-vaunted 
diminution of state sovereignty associated with globalization and the increasing power 
of international institutions, nation-states remain the ‘building blocks’ of the 
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international system.10 Neither have conceptual transformations of sovereignty that 
have attended the rise of the human security agenda detracted from the centrality of 
statehood within the current international system. State weakness or failure is seen as 
undermining the stability of that system; the dominant view in contemporary security 
circles attributes a higher likelihood of conflict to failed or failing states, which are no 
longer able to assert their authority within national borders.11  
The notion of ‘failed states’ was conceptualized in 1992, with Gerald Helman 
and Steven Ratner identifying the failed state as a nation-state which is “utterly 
incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.”12 The 
term applies to states that have suffered a disintegration of government structure or 
are otherwise incapable of asserting sovereign authority throughout their territory. 
Having lost the ability to carry out basic public functions, to maintain law and order, 
provide security and exercise a monopoly over the use of violence, functions 
ordinarily carried out by the state are taken up by competing groups in society – 
warlords, gangs, and other groups, often organized along ethnic lines.13 The OECD 
defines state failure – or ‘fragility’ – as a situation in which “state structures lack 
political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty 
reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their 
populations.”14 Failed states are characterized by conflict, food scarcity, an absence of 
government services, and economic stagnation. The humanitarian cost of this 
phenomenon is severe, as witnessed in states such as Somalia, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Sudan, and Afghanistan.15   
Highlighting the threats to the international system posed by state failure – 
including human rights abuse, political instability, violent conflict, refugee flows, and 
the destabilizing impact of such conditions on regional affairs – Helman and Ratner 
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call for a “more systematic and intrusive approach” for preventing failure. “To 
prevent future conflict,” they argue, “the international community must create a new 
political, economic and social environment for states riven by war. That would 
include strengthening governmental institutions, protecting human rights, pursuing 
bilateral cooperation projects, and encouraging demilitarization”.16 Such measures 
would necessitate direct UN involvement in internal affairs, a requirement justified on 
the basis of Charter obligations to ‘maintain international peace and security’.17  
The authors espouse a ‘conservatorship’ role for the UN in failed states, 
proposing three models of guardianship to address varying levels of state failure. For 
failing states which retain a minimal level of government structure, a conditional 
system of UN ‘governance assistance’ is envisaged, which would involve UN 
personnel working alongside government officials to carry out state administrative 
activities, with the host government retaining final decision-making authority.18 They 
argue for a more intrusive conservatorship arrangement for failed states, one in which 
the state delegates a degree of governmental authority to the UN. Citing the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia as a contemporary example of this 
process – in which the UN took over administration of the entire country during 1992-
93 until the completion of UN-organised elections and the drafting of a new 
constitution 19  – they maintain that such an arrangement preserves the legal 
sovereignty of the host state, despite its reduced control over domestic affairs.20 The 
final and most radical option would involve the revitalization of direct UN trusteeship 
– a measure which the authors concede remains outside the UN Charter at the time of 
writing, but is required in extreme cases, thus necessitating the amendment of the 
Charter.21 This suggestion came closer to reality with the establishment of UNTAET 
in East Timor in October 1999, by which the UN administered the country until its 
independence in May 2002. 
The attacks of September 11 elevated state failure to centre-stage in 
international and US security policy, where the spectre of the failed state has provided 
                                                
16 Helman and Ratner, p. 8, emphasis added 
17 Ibid, p. 8 
United Nations (1945) 
18 Helman and Ratner, p. 12-14 
19 United Nations. (2003) United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untac.htm> (Accessed 9 October 2012)  
20 Helman and Ratner, p. 14-15 
21 The authors acknowledge that the process of amending the United Nations Charter would be fraught 
with difficulty, yet maintain its necessity. See Helman and Ratner, p. 16-17 
  43 
a rationale for intrusive external action in order to avert the negative impacts of state 
disintegration on internal affairs and international stability. 22  The imperative to 
prevent such occurrences has given rise to systems of ranking state performance based 
on specific criteria.23 The Foreign Policy Failed States Index is a prominent example: 
first issued in 2005 in collaboration with the Fund for Peace, the Failed States Index is 
produced every year, ranking the world’s states on the basis of a series of social, 
economic, political and military indicators.24 The Peace and Conflict Instability 
Ledger, issued by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management 
at the University of Maryland, is a biannual ranking of countries according to their 
risks of ‘future instability’, based on the interaction between five political, economic, 
social and security factors and events deemed likely to enhance the risk of instability, 
such as revolutions, ethnic conflicts, regime changes, and genocides.25 The Brookings 
Institution has developed its own Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, 
taking into account a similar combination of economic, political, security, and social 
welfare indicators.26 Numerous other ranking systems for state weakness exist, all 
designed to quantify state weakness with a view to informing policymakers’ efforts to 
strengthen ‘fragile’ states in the developing world.  
The ranking of states according to specific criteria to determine their level of 
‘success’ or ‘failure’ offers a powerful impetus for external intervention. Preventive 
action is accorded urgency in order to strengthen ‘weak’ states and thus avert the 
impacts of failure, both from a humanitarian perspective and in terms of international 
security and stability.27 Advocates of intervention call for a pre-emptive approach, 
arguing that it is easier and far more cost-effective to strengthen states against failure 
than to attempt to revive states after collapse.28 Traditional, state-centred security 
measures are thus conceived as a response to multi-leveled threats to human and state 
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security. Despite the reconceptualization of sovereignty to incorporate a central 
emphasis on human security, strong statehood is seen as the key to security threats at 
both the state and the individual level. 
State	  Capacity	  and	  Human	  Security	  
The notion that the international community has a ‘responsibility’ to act to 
protect civilians in cases where states lack the capacity or will to assure physical 
security has contributed further to the international commitment to state-building. 
Michael Ignatieff argues that the central human rights challenges of the new century 
emanate not from strong, oppressive states as in the Cold War, but from weak or 
collapsing states.29 In the contemporary era, he claims, “the worst abuse now occurs 
not where there is too much state power, but too little.”30 In the decade after the Cold 
War, issues of large-scale human rights abuse were predominantly associated with 
ineffective, failing states resorting to increasingly repressive means in the attempt to 
maintain control over their populations. Viewing the breakdown of state order as 
increasing the likelihood of violence both from armed groups rebelling against the 
government and from governments themselves, Ignatieff contends that “the chief 
prerequisite for the creation of a basic rights regime for ordinary people is the re-
creation of a stable national state capable of giving orders and seeing them carried out 
throughout the territory … Without the basic institutions of a state, no basic human 
rights protection is possible.”31 Thus state-building is perceived as essential for human 
security and the creation of human rights regimes. 
Ignatieff argues for a rethinking of humanitarian intervention in light of the 
threat of failing states. Not only do the humanitarian crises generated in many 
instances of state collapse provide a moral imperative for action – they demand 
attention as a direct threat to national interest and state security. He draws a direct 
correlation between issues of human security and national security, arguing that the 
collapse of central authority in one state can destabilize entire regions, creating ‘bad 
neighbourhoods’ which in turn foster terrorism, produce drugs, and engender 
destabilizing refugee movements.32 This linking of conscience and strategic action has 
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provided a powerful impetus for state-building, drawing on shifting approaches to 
sovereignty that have arisen in response to the humanitarian intervention debate.  
Whereas the United Nations Charter enshrines state sovereignty and non-
intervention as inviolable principles of international law33, the unprecedented civilian 
casualties and humanitarian crises generated by conflict in the 1990s sparked intense 
debate over the issues of humanitarian intervention, adding moral impetus to state-
building arguments.34 As discussed in the previous chapter, in 2001 the ICISS 
proposed a reformulation of the concept of sovereignty as the ‘responsibility to 
protect’, which called on the international community to protect civilians whose own 
governments are incapable or unwilling to do so.35 This principle has achieved strong 
normative status amongst the international community36, yet has not achieved the 
status of international law. Selver Sahin argues that this notion of international 
responsibility has lent itself to a perceived international duty to prevent the 
consequences of state failure. In the absence of domestic capacity to reverse state 
fragmentation, the international community has a ‘responsibility’ to prevent state 
collapse in order to avert the regional destabilization and humanitarian catastrophes 
associated with state failure.37 
David Chandler argues that redefining sovereignty in terms of state capacity 
rather than political independence introduces a continuum approach to sovereignty, 
whereby some states are considered more sovereign than others. Sovereignty is no 
longer understood as an inviolable right to self-government.38 In the context of state 
failure, external interventions and engagement with weak states can be construed as 
supporting sovereignty, rather than violating it.39 State failure discourse thus justifies 
highly intrusive modes of external intervention, appealing to the twin imperatives of 
human security and national security as a rationale for unprecedented incursions into 
the sovereign domain of nation-states.  
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When perceived as a multi-leveled threat at the individual, regional, and 
international levels, state failure precipitates an international response based on the 
convergence of human security, national interest, regional security, and international 
peace and security concerns. The reconceptualization of sovereignty to incorporate a 
greater individual emphasis has not detracted from the centrality of the state within 
the international security system. Rather, discourses of human security and state 
failure have been mutually reinforcing, with qualifications of sovereignty associated 
with the human security agenda serving to justify intrusive measures to bolster states 
against multi-leveled threats of state failure.40 The rise of human security has not 
spelled an end to statism, but has instead merged with it to produce a discourse that 
promotes strong states as the solution to human security. This has lent urgency to the 
state-building cause, contributing to its current position at the forefront of peace-
building initiatives. 
The	  Emergence	  of	  State-­‐building	  
By the late 1990s the failure of the peace-building project to fulfill its 
ambitious mandate had become clear. Peace-building operations failed to prevent 
further outbreaks of violence in a number of cases. Where further violence was 
averted, missions proved unequal to the task of establishing a ‘sustainable basis for 
peace’, and incipient governments appeared incapable of effectively administering 
their territories and carrying out the functions deemed necessary for promoting 
peaceful relations on their own.41 Brahimi attributes these shortcomings primarily to 
insufficient attention to rebuilding national institutions as a part of international peace 
efforts. He argues that peace and development cannot be maintained without 
effective, ‘self-sustaining government systems’; lasting peace is contingent upon 
functioning national institutions capable of providing long-term security for their 
populations.42 Further, such institutions are needed to oversee the ongoing process of 
development within their territory. Transforming states into viable structures for the 
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maintenance of peaceful relations should, from this perspective, be the aim of post-
conflict peace-building efforts.43 
Defining	  State-­‐building	  
The term ‘state-building’ is generally used to denote efforts to strengthen or 
create legitimate government institutions capable of carrying out core state functions 
in an efficient manner. Initial approaches to state-building viewed it primarily as a 
technical matter of building institutions and developing state capacity. Charles Call 
and Elizabeth Cousens define state-building as “actions undertaken by international or 
national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state”44, while 
Fukuyama describes it as “the creation of new governmental institutions and the 
strengthening of existing ones”.45 More recent conceptions of state-building have 
adopted a broader view, incorporating a greater emphasis on state-building’s political 
dimensions in the context of the relationship between the state and society. These 
‘progressive’ approaches to state-building emphasize government legitimacy and 
resilience over capacity, and acknowledge state formation and state-building as a 
predominantly endogenous process, with external assistance to strengthen institutional 
capacity playing a secondary role.46  
The OECD defines state-building as “purposeful action to develop the 
capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political 
process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups.”47 This 
definition places particular emphasis on the state-society relationship, rejecting ideas 
of state-building that view the state purely in terms of formal institutions. It places 
state-building within a wider context of state formation, acknowledging the context-
specific, historical process whereby states emerge in relation to societies. This 
relationship between state and society is not permanently fixed, yet may be afforded 
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greater resilience by the extent to which relations are institutionalized and embedded 
in historical and cultural conditions.48 
State-building is not synonymous with peace-building; rather, it comprises a 
component of wider efforts to implement lasting peace in post-conflict societies. 
Strengthening or constructing effective institutions has achieved great prominence as 
a part of peace-building activities, but does not constitute a replacement for other 
peace-building initiatives. Nor should state-building be confused with nation-building, 
which refers to efforts to promote collective identity and national unity.49 The terms 
‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ are often used interchangeably;50  however, 
while some degree of overlap between the two exists, they remain distinct concepts.51  
State-­‐building	  as	  Peace-­‐building	  
While calls for the need to boost state capacity in weak states had become 
increasingly vociferous by the late 1990s, the dominance of state-building within 
peace-building discourse was solidified in 2004 with a series of publications which 
advanced similar arguments in their critiques of peace-building theory and practice. 
Francis Fukuyama, Simon Chesterman, Stephen Krasner, James Fearon and David 
Laitin, and Roland Paris all arrived at the related conclusion that peace-building 
missions had failed to recognize the importance of strong government institutions in 
securing lasting peace in post-conflict societies. International attempts to implant a 
liberal peace had foundered in the absence of basic institutions necessary for 
governing society, particularly in the areas of security, economy, administration, and 
the rule of law.52 Such arguments contributed to the adoption of a state-building 
agenda by subsequent UN peace-building missions.  
Fukuyama proposes a framework for analyzing the different dimensions of 
‘stateness’, one that distinguishes between the scope of state activities and state 
strength. State scope denotes the range of different functions taken on by governments 
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– the breadth of activities the state involves itself in, such as security and finance, 
health, and education. State strength refers to the capacity of states to plan and 
implement policy and enforce the rule of law – this dimension is often referred to as 
‘state capacity’, or ‘institutional capacity’, and has traditionally been the primary 
concern of state-building.53  
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the dominant paradigm for developed and 
developing countries alike emphasized reducing the size of the state sector in order to 
increase efficiency. This was a critical period, a time of widespread democratic 
transition with the emergence of former communist countries and a number of 
countries in the developing world from authoritarian regimes. Highly dependent on 
financial assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs), these countries 
were advised – and often required as a condition attached to loan packages – to 
implement a range of liberalization policies designed to cut back the scope of state 
activity and reduce state intervention in economic affairs.  Although advocating the 
importance of economic liberalization, Fukuyama argues that the scaling back of state 
sectors needs to be accompanied by state strengthening in other areas.54 The resultant 
reduction of both state scope and state strength had had a counterproductive effect, as 
evidenced by declining development outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa, economic 
difficulties in post-communist countries, and a devastating economic crisis in Asia in 
1997-98. Fukuyama attributes these developments to the unintended consequences of 
liberalization in the absence of sufficient institutional capacity. He calls for the 
strengthening of institutional capacity, arguing that institutions are crucial to 
development, and suggesting that state strength is more important than state scope in 
terms of economic performance.55  
Roland Paris makes a similar argument in his book At War’s End: Building 
Peace After Civil Conflict, in which he claims that the processes of democratization 
and marketization are inherently destabilizing transformations, which in post-conflict 
environments may undermine fragile peace. 56  These two processes form the 
cornerstone of the liberal peace thesis, and have thus been central to the peace efforts 
carried out by the international community over the past two decades. The outcome of 
these international efforts has been disappointing: 
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[I]nternational efforts to transform war-shattered states have, in a number of 
cases, inadvertently exacerbated societal tensions or reproduced conditions 
that historically fueled violence in these countries. The very strategy that 
peacebuilders have employed to consolidate peace – political and economic 
liberalization – seems, paradoxically, to have increased the likelihood of 
renewed violence in several of these states.57 
While supporting the goal of transforming post-conflict states into liberal market 
democracies, Paris maintains that the peace-building missions of the 1990s placed 
too much faith in the ability of liberalization to create peace. He claims that the 
introduction of democratization and marketization have the potential to create high 
social competition at times when states are least capable of dealing with them.58  
States emerging from civil war are particularly vulnerable to the risks of 
increased social competition associated with liberalization. In such contexts of deep 
social conflict, the international community’s attempts to promote peace by 
stimulating further political and economic competition can provoke renewed conflict. 
Paris argues that post-conflict states often lack systems to reduce the potential for 
social conflict, such as a culture of peaceful conflict resolution or a structure of 
‘cross-cutting cleavages’ whereby different forms of identity overlap to form 
interconnected group memberships. 59  Most significantly, post-conflict states 
generally lack ‘effective political institutions’ capable of maintaining the rule of law, 
implementing policies, or responding to social demands. As a result, such states are 
unable to reconcile the conflicting demands of society – a function that is particularly 
crucial in times of dramatic change. Nor are they capable of providing a minimal 
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level of institutional capacity required to oversee the process of liberal reform. Thus, 
post-conflict states are poorly equipped to manage the destabilizing effects of 
heightened social contestation associated with liberalization.60 
To mitigate these challenges, Paris proposes a strategy of ‘Institutionalization 
before Liberalization’, which would seek to minimize the destabilizing effects of 
liberalization by delaying the introduction of democratic and market reforms until 
basic institutions have been developed to deal with the strains of the liberalization 
process. After this initial institutionalization period, democratic and market 
transitions may be carried out in incremental steps. 61  This task will require 
international peace-building operations to take on more intrusive forms: 
Rebuilding effective governmental institutions, managing a phased and 
gradual transition to market democracy, and ensuring that the rule of law is 
sufficiently strong to defend the new state against inevitable challenges … 
require a more interventionist and long-term approach to peacebuilding than 
what has been practiced to date. They require international peacebuilders to 
take on the role of nation builders – to serve as surrogate governing 
authorities for as long as it takes to implement the liberalizing reforms that 
the peacebuilders themselves prescribe for war-shattered states.62  
Such a gradual, controlled approach to liberalization is deemed more likely to 
foster peace and sustainable democratic systems in the long term.63 This approach is 
known as ‘sequencing’, and is often referred to by organizations such as the United 
Nations as critical to the success of post-conflict reforms. The ‘prioritizing’ of policy 
reforms is promoted in order to avoid social destabilization, and to solidify 
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institutional foundations before the introduction of more extensive reforms.64  
Simon Chesterman explores issues in state-building and transitional 
administration by considering whether it is possible “to establish the conditions for 
legitimate and sustainable national governance through a period of benevolent 
foreign autocracy.”65 He argues that a fundamental tension exists between the means 
and the ends of transitional administration: the international community exercises a 
certain hypocrisy in its act of imposing ‘benevolent autocracy’ in preparing 
populations for democratic governance.66 Modern day transitional administrations 
bear a number of similarities to post-World War military occupations and the 
international mandate and trusteeship systems of the League of the Nations and 
United Nations, yet the international community seeks to distance itself from 
sensitive parallels to colonialism and occupation.67 Nonetheless, these parallels exist, 
and are shrouded by language of local ‘ownership’, which is used to obscure the 
nature of international power in such administrative arrangements.68 
Chesterman argues that such ownership claims are inaccurate and even 
counter-productive, reflecting the ends of transitional administration but not the 
means. ‘Autocratic powers’, he contends, must temporarily rest with international 
actors due to the absence of local capacity; such ‘trustee-like’ relationships are 
required in order to achieve the goal of establishing viable democratic systems. 
Despite the tension between liberal democratic ends and benevolent autocratic 
means, he predicts that circumstances of state failure will continue to demand 
intervention. The political and institutional climate surrounding such interventions is 
likely to ensure that transitional administration remains an exceptional activity to be 
entered into on an ad hoc basis.69  
To avoid counterproductive disputes over power and ownership, Chesterman 
contends that greater clarity is needed regarding the nature of the relationship 
between international and local actors. Power should be held by international 
authorities acting in consultation with local actors, and geared towards the gradual 
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transferal of power to local authorities. 70  Lessons must be drawn from past 
experiences of transitional administration, with the independent future of trust 
‘territories’ ever in mind. Despite what Chesterman deems a legitimate assumption of 
autocratic authority by international powers, he maintains that modern trusteeships 
must earn the trust of local actors, requiring accountability and transparency and a 
high degree of understanding and cultural sensitivity. Where the UN and the 
international community are required to take on the functions of states, “they must 
not lose sight of their limited mandate to hold that sovereign power in trust for the 
population that will ultimately claim it.”71 
James Fearon and David Laitin take Chesterman’s argument a step further, 
calling for ‘neotrusteeship’ arrangements for weak states by ongoing international 
administrations to restore stability and build state capacity. The authors suggest that 
international interventions that seek solely to mediate political differences, alleviate 
social and political grievances, and facilitate peace processes are misconceived and 
doomed to fail in cases where state capacity is low.72  Where state structures are 
incapable of ensuring domestic security, they argue, exit without state-building is 
likely to precipitate a return to conflict.73 
Controversially, Fearon and Laitin contend that in some cases the complete 
withdrawal of international intervention may never be possible. States that 
consistently fail to provide security for their civilian populations will be subject to 
continued international surveillance. In such situations, they recommend the 
transferal of authority “not to full sovereignty[,] but rather as a state embedded in and 
monitored by international institutions.”74 Fearon and Laitin cite Kosovo and Bosnia 
as two cases in which a long-term, internationally embedded form of statehood may 
be necessary. The proposed strategy for this is to subsume national governance 
within broader governance structures, rendering national governance less relevant 
than local and international governance structures.75  
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Stephen Krasner likewise prescribes a form of trusteeship for the international 
community, arguing that new policy tools are required for external actors to deal with 
the threats emanating from failing or collapsed states. The current repertoire (at the 
time of writing) for addressing bad governance in weak states is woefully inadequate, 
he argues, with governance assistance to such states and short-term transitional 
administrations achieving mixed results. Krasner proposes two further options for 
international engagement with these states: de facto trusteeships and shared 
sovereignty contracts.76 De facto trusteeships in some form by major states or 
regional or international organizations are seen as a potential means of assuring 
stability in failing or collapsed states. He proposes that international actors exercise 
authority over local functions for an indefinite time period, with no immediate or 
medium-term plans for withdrawal. International authorities may terminate the 
international legal sovereignty of the territory they administer – in entirety or in 
specific areas – if required.77  
Shared sovereignty arrangements would entail the involvement of external 
actors in selected domestic authority structures for an indefinite time. Such 
engagements would be legitimized by voluntary contracts between national 
authorities and international actors, thus involving a voluntary relinquishing of 
autonomy by the state in question.78 Similar arrangements have been observed in 
states such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Timor-Leste, Iraq, and Kosovo, where local 
administration is highly dependent on external actors who implement a number of 
functions usually reserved for domestic governments. Under shared sovereignty 
contracts, however, such arrangements would become permanent rather than 
transitional.79 Krasner’s arguments confer an extraordinary degree of authority to 
external actors, going so far as to recommend that international powers be authorized 
to terminate state sovereignty where it is deemed necessary.80 To obscure the extent 
of the power imbalance such an arrangement would entail between local authorities 
and intervening actors, Krasner recommends referring to shared sovereignty 
arrangements as ‘partnerships’, which would allow political leaders to claim 
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sovereignty despite violating many of its core principles. This would enable 
policymakers to “engage in organized hypocrisy, that is, saying one thing and doing 
another. … It would allow actors to obfuscate the fact that their behaviour would be 
inconsistent with their principles.” 81  Like Chesterman, Krasner recognises the 
inconsistency between the exercise of international autocratic authority and claims of 
legal sovereignty. However, Krasner demonstrates little discomfort with such 
arrangements, recommending instead the deliberate concealment of such 
inconsistencies between principles and practice. 
The arguments of Fearon and Laitin and Krasner occupy the more extreme 
margins of state-building theory, yet nonetheless have contributed to the theoretical 
discourse that guides state-building practice in the twenty-first century. Central to 
this discourse is the claim that strong state capacity, together with development, is 
essential for lasting peace in post-conflict societies. The coalescing of human and 
strategic security imperatives in the 1990s led the way for the emergence of state-
building as the perceived remedy for state failure in the eyes of the international 
community. Such is the prominence of state-building arguments within the peace-
building community that it is now held by some to be the ‘central objective of any 
peace operation’.82 As Brahimi contends, sustainable peace is more than the mere 
absence of conflict – effective governance is required to oversee the process of 
development and uphold peaceful relations in post-conflict societies. Peace-building 
activities would therefore be required to extend beyond civil society efforts and focus 
on bolstering state capacity.83 Only then would states be capable of moving beyond 
dependence on the international community and governing competently and 
peacefully. 
Building	  State	  Capacity:	  Core	  Functions	  of	  the	  Contemporary	  State	  
 But what institutional forms are envisaged for such states? Robert Rotberg 
contends that the role of the nation-state is to deliver political goods to its citizenry, 
of which the most essential is security. States are therefore required to prevent 
incursions into their own territory, to address domestic or external threats to nation 
and society, to prevent crime, and to provide means of managing disputes in a non-
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violent manner. The provision of other political goods is contingent upon sustaining 
a certain level of security, which is to be achieved through the rule of law, property 
rights regimes, and a judicial system.84 Further political goods include democratic 
rights, tolerance of dissent, and civil and human rights, together with healthcare and 
education systems, physical infrastructure, communications, and a financial and 
banking system. States’ ability to provide these political goods forms the basis by 
which they are deemed strong, weak, or failed.85  
The building of institutions capable of providing these political goods is the 
express aim of state-building efforts. The World Bank contends that effective states 
share certain common features, regardless of variations in context or setting.86 Ashraf 
Ghani and Clare Lockhart outline ten crucial functions for contemporary states:  
• rule of law 
• monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 
• administrative control over various functions within the state’s territory 
• sound management of public finances 
• investment in human capital 
• creation of citizenship rights through social policy 
• provision of infrastructure services 
• formation of a market 
• management of public assets 
• effective public borrowing87 
Success in performing these ten functions is believed to create a ‘virtuous circle’, 
bolstering the rights and opportunities of the citizenry and generating greater 
legitimacy and trust for the state. Ghani and Lockhart describe this as a ‘sovereignty 
dividend’. However, failure to discharge all of these functions effectively is held to 
fuel a negative cycle, which in extreme cases leads to violence and a ‘sovereignty 
gap’. The extent of this sovereignty gap is taken as an indicator of state weakness. 88 
One of the first tasks of any peace-building mission – and a necessary 
prerequisite for state-building efforts – is to restore state security capabilities. This 
capacity has long been perceived as central to statehood, based on an arrangement 
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between state and citizens whereby the state is granted monopoly over the use of 
violence, and in exchange provides for the physical security and wider rights of the 
citizenry.89 In post-conflict environments, achieving this goal is contingent on the 
successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former 
combatants into society.90  
 Upholding the rule of law is one of the primary tasks of viable democratic 
states. These rules form the basis of the governance arrangements of a given society: 
they delineate the functions of the state and the rights and duties of citizens, and 
establish a framework for relations between the public and private spheres.91 Ghani 
and Lockhart describe the rule of law as the “‘glue’ that binds all aspects of the state, 
the economy, and society”92 – it provides accountability mechanisms to constrain the 
actions of government, regulates society and establishes processes for resolving social 
tensions, and forms the institutional framework for a market economy. Establishing 
the rule of law in post-conflict states is a central preoccupation of state-building 
operations. The contemporary emphasis on ‘institution-building’ and ‘capacity-
building’ is entirely predicated on the supremacy of this system. The writing of a 
constitution is thus accorded great significance in post-conflict situations. The 
constitution sets out the rules and principles by which a state is governed; it is the 
cornerstone of the rule of law in society, and perceived as central in the 
transformation from violence to a peaceful society governed by institutions.93 
 A strong state must be capable of exercising administrative control over its 
territory, carrying out the state functions embodied in the constitution effectively 
throughout its territory. Administrative structure may vary depending on cultural and 
historical context, with some states favouring a highly centralized administrative 
arrangement and others opting for a more federal system.94 What is essential is that 
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the state has the capacity to exert its authority throughout the state; the failure to do so 
has proved to be one of the common determinants of state collapse.95 
A state’s human resources are crucial to peaceful development, and states are 
therefore encouraged to invest in human capital, and to provide equal opportunities 
for their populations through social policy and the rights set down in the constitution. 
The importance of education and health care provision in post-conflict environments 
is widely acknowledged. The emergence of a middle class in developing, post-conflict 
countries is dependent on the provision of quality education. This professional cadre 
is considered essential to economic productivity and wealth creation, and provides the 
human resources necessary to carry out the administrative functions of a viable state. 
Investment in public health is also essential – in particular preventative health care. 
Ghani and Lockhart argue that the failure of states to provide quality healthcare and 
education condemns societies to high levels of inequality, social immobility, and 
persistent poverty. In the absence of these social services, the growth of the middle 
class (considered crucial for economic growth) is stalled, resulting in economic 
stagnation and poor development outcomes. It is argued that only a healthy, well-
educated population can provide the social capital needed for the formation of civil 
society networks that hold both state and market accountable.96  
Social policies that protect citizenship rights create equality of opportunity and 
foster collective identity and national unity, prevailing over divisive forms of identity. 
Such policies unite the members of nation-states into communities bound by mutual 
rights and obligations. Of central importance in democratic societies is the right to 
vote, granting all citizens an equal ‘stake’ in the nation’s governance. Beyond the 
civil rights generally associated with liberal democracies, successful states have also 
established mechanisms of labour regulation to protect the rights of the workforce, 
and welfare provisions to protect the vulnerable and prevent entrenched inequality 
from undermining the state’s development efforts. Geographically and ethnically 
diverse states may put in place policies that provide additional support to 
disadvantaged regions and seek to remove barriers to opportunity. The failure to 
implement inclusive social policies can exacerbate social cleavages, heightening the 
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risk of conflict and fuelling harmful social divisions which undermine the integrity of 
the state.97 
 One of the primary goals of state-building operations is to establish 
functioning market economies in post-conflict states. Although the market is expected 
to constitute an independent private sphere separate from the state – and is commonly 
described as ‘self-regulating’98 – intellectual developments over the past decade 
(particularly in state-building circles) have accorded a more significant role for the 
state in regulating the market economy. The establishment of an enabling 
environment for market relations comprises one of the central functions of the state in 
current peace-building circles. Not only is the state required to provide a market-
friendly legal framework of property rights, laws of contract, and corporate, 
insurance, banking, and employment laws, it is accorded a major role in fostering the 
development of private enterprise, and expected to intervene in cases of market 
failure.99 The market is expected to play a leading role in development in post-conflict 
countries. However, unlike in earlier decades when the state was virtually excluded 
from development, the rise of the state-building agenda has seen a revitalization of the 
role of the state in economic development. That the state has a vital role to play in 
establishing and perpetuating the market is now more openly acknowledged100 – 
particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, which necessitated 
decisive intervention by national governments to address market failures.101 
 The state-building agenda places a great deal of emphasis on states’ 
management of public finances – a concern which constitutes a primary focus of 
‘good governance’ initiatives by donors and financial institutions. The state budget is 
the central instrument of public financial management; it relies on sound procurement 
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policies, accounting, and auditing to ensure public expenditure is carried out 
efficiently and accountably. Governments must develop means of efficient revenue 
collection in order to reduce their dependence on external funding. Financial 
dependence is often high in the early post-conflict years, but ‘sovereign’ governments 
must develop the resources to fund public spending internally.102 
Ghani and Lockhart propose a three-phased system of public expenditure to 
ensure accountability in weak or post-conflict states, beginning with a high level of 
state control to achieve an acceptable degree of accountability. Once transparency in 
financial management is achieved governments are able to pursue greater efficiency 
of outcomes. Finally, after the administration has demonstrated a necessary measure 
of financial responsibility, a lowering of official controls is advised “to allow far 
greater imagination in the use of public resources”.103  
One of the fundamental barriers impeding service provision and public 
initiatives in post-conflict countries is a lack of physical infrastructure. A certain level 
of infrastructure is required for the market to function and the state to fulfill its 
security and administrative obligations. The provision of transportation, power, water, 
and communications are essential for economic productivity, bureaucratic functions, 
and investment in human capital.104 Without adequate infrastructural services, crucial 
sectors such as agriculture, education, and in particular health are heavily affected. 
Reliable infrastructure prevents the formation of isolated areas excluded from the 
market and state administration; it also facilitates participation by developing 
countries in the global economy.105  
Another critical role for the state is the management of public assets, including 
natural assets such as land, water, and mineral deposits, and other assets such as 
physical infrastructure and licensing regimes. These assets can provide a sustained 
source of revenue if managed properly. The management of environmental resources 
and regulation of extractive industries is particularly critical for sustainable 
development in developing countries. Long-term government planning, enforceable 
property and user rights, and regulation are essential to safeguard a country’s 
environmental assets for future generations and prevent the potential destructive 
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impacts of irresponsible resource use.106 The way in which assets are mobilized is 
held to be an indicator of state effectiveness. State-building operations have sought to 
ensure that this process remains transparent, to avoid the corruption and exploitation 
which has plagued many developing countries with rich natural resource 
endowments.107  
 The final area deemed essential to effective statehood is the realm of public 
borrowing, a necessary recourse for investment in physical, institutional, and human 
capital. Access to public borrowing is necessary for a functioning financial sector, and 
is central to the banking system. The state has traditionally played a pivotal role in the 
creation of institutions for public lending. At the international level, states must 
demonstrate financial responsibility to gain access to loans on the international 
market. If invested wisely, these funds are expected to generate a surplus that exceeds 
repayments on the loan itself.108  
 Approaches to state-building are subject to some degree of variation across 
different institutions, commentators, and state-building missions themselves, with 
some actors emphasizing certain elements of these ‘core’ state functions over others, 
and efforts to tailor state-building operations to perceived local needs and realities. 
Despite such inevitable variations, however, a general consensus in official 
institutional approaches to state-building exists, giving rise to discourses and policies 
that conform to a large extent to the vision of statehood outlined above.  
 Fundamentally, this vision represents a repackaging of the assumptions of 
liberal peace theory within a state-building agenda. The key elements of the liberal 
peace – democratization, liberalization, and market-led development – are embedded 
within this revised framework of holistic, social and institutional transformation for 
underdeveloped or post-conflict states. The implementation of these core state 
functions is intended to establish an institutional environment within which liberal 
peace prescriptions can flourish. The ‘sequencing’ of reforms and the establishment of 
certain institutional structures is seen as essential for the successful rolling-out of 
liberal reforms. As Duffield contends, the liberalization process associated with 
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liberal peace-building practice represents a large-scale social transformation. 109 
Previous peace-building experiments have demonstrated that the wholesale 
transplantation of liberal reforms constitutes a deeply destabilizing experience for 
post-conflict states.110 The aim of state-building is to create a favourable institutional 
environment for the implementation of liberalizing reforms, and recruit the state as a 
partner and facilitator in this process.111  
State-­‐building	  as	  Social	  Engineering	  
Despite the consensus within key international organizations concerning the 
state-building imperative and a guiding paradigm for building state institutions in 
‘weak’ or post-conflict states, numerous critiques have emerged which question both 
the practice and the fundamental assumptions of the state-building project. A 
proliferation of ‘best-practice’ critiques have materialized that seek to weigh and 
address shortcomings within state-building theory and practice, without calling into 
question the fundamental assumptions of the wider state-building project itself. Such 
commentaries are plentiful and reform-minded, concerned primarily with a range of 
practical aspects of the state-building project from the experiences of local initiatives 
to the international state-building apparatus itself. The majority of theoretical state-
building research is similarly geared towards reviewing and resolving issues in state-
building theory in order to engender greater success in implementation.112 However, 
there are more fundamental critiques that seek to expose these assumptions and call 
into question the legitimacy and guiding principles of state-building discourse itself, 
and some of these will be explored here. Critical observers question the power 
relations and ideological assumptions that inform state-building practice, recognizing 
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state-building as a contemporary manifestation of extant structures of global power 
and dominance.113 
A common critique of state-building is that it reflects an extremely narrow 
conception of what constitutes a state. M. Anne Brown et al. argue that state-building 
constitutes a Western-dominated discourse based on an idealized model of Western 
states. As a result, the form of statehood envisaged by advocates of state-building is 
often far removed from local systems of governance and legitimacy.114 While much is 
made of ‘local ownership’ and adapting state-building activity to different contexts, 
little genuine attempt is made to understand existing political community structures 
and to base peace-building efforts on these realities. The state-building agenda seeks 
to establish a pre-determined form of statehood, with institutions mirroring the liberal 
democratic, free market states of Western countries.115 
It is true that more recent formulations of state-building draw attention to the 
context-bound nature of state formation and the need for an approach that is based on 
interactions between state and society. 116  The OECD, for example, takes a 
contractarian approach, arguing that:  
[T]he process of establishing and maintaining a mutually agreed social 
contract – of reaching a state of dynamic equilibrium between the expectations 
of society and state capacity to meet these expectations – is intrinsic to the 
process of state formation. It is also a core ingredient of legitimacy.117 
However, the OECD and other influential agents of state-building remain constrained 
by specific notions of state and social organization, in that they continue to view 
liberal, market based systems of governance as desirable and adaptable to vastly 
divergent contexts. The roles recommended for the state in relation to the economic 
and social spheres are shaped by liberal assumptions rooted in Western history and 
experience.118 Perceptions of core state functions – which may not be as exhaustive as 
outlined above but at a minimum include security provision, constitutional rule of 
law, basic public services, and mechanisms of revenue collection and budget 
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implementation119 – reflect this system of organization, and donor activity remains 
strongly linked to the implementation of principles and practices strongly associated 
with the Western experience.120 In most countries the state-building process – like the 
wider peace-building agenda – constitutes a radical transformation of post-conflict 
society, one in which structures of political, social, and economic organization are 
fundamentally reengineered to reflect a state model deemed essential to sustainable 
peace and development.121 
 Rod Nixon has coined the term ‘New Subsistence State’ in his analysis of 
state-building experiences in Timor-Leste as a means of conceptualizing the dramatic 
structural changes expected of post-conflict states. New Subsistence States are states 
with subsistence economies and little historical experience involving the generation 
and management of large, centrally controlled surpluses. They are typified by a 
subsequent lack of workforce stratification and labour specialization, and adherence 
to traditional authority structures rather than ‘legal’ or ‘bureaucratic’ systems of 
authority. In general, statehood in New Subsistence States has been adopted or 
imposed as a model, rather than arising naturally as a result of historical 
development.122  
 Agents of international state-building promote liberal state structures as the 
appropriate model of social and political organization for these societies, regardless of 
historical differences. The social contract promoted by such agencies, Nixon argues, 
is based on Western judicial processes and legal institutions – institutional systems 
that are completely foreign to many ‘developing’ societies, and particularly 
subsistence societies, many of which already possess contracts rooted in custom and 
culture. 123  International state-building organizations encourage subject states to 
conform to the Western state model – which has been canonized through the 
development of the UN system – “in the hope that even stateless societies will 
eventually internalize the state model of social organization even though they may 
have experienced no internally generated need for it.”124 
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 Referring to peace-building more generally, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh argues 
that a dilemma exists between concepts of liberal peace, which conforms to 
‘universal’, international principles, and a communitarian peace rooted in local 
values, cultures and traditions (which may be non-liberal in nature). As a result, the 
post-conflict state is caught between two standards of legitimacy, internal and 
external, which may bear varying degrees of similarity or difference dependent upon 
cultural and historical context. External legitimacy requires a state to adhere to 
international liberal norms; however, internal legitimacy springs from the state’s 
fulfillment of the needs and expectations of its people, as acknowledged in the 
OECD’s definition of state-building. As will be discussed below, this dilemma has 
been particularly pronounced in Timor-Leste, where the nascent state has struggled to 
balance the often-competing demands of the international community and the local 
population, resulting in alienation from its citizenry and public disillusionment with 
the Timorese experiences of nationhood, democracy, and development.125 
 Paris and Sisk identify this dilemma as an inherent contradiction within the 
idea of state-building. The use of external intervention as a tool to foster sustainable 
self-government is fundamentally intrusive, a fact that undermines the legitimacy of 
state-building operations and the states they seek to assist. 126  As Chesterman 
acknowledges, a fundamental tension exists between the means and aims of state-
building. Claims of ‘local ownership’ are inaccurate – a degree of international 
control is always employed in pursuit of this aim, and international agents espouse 
universal values as a solution for local problems.127 Often local or customary systems 
of organization are deemed problematic and held responsible for conflict, justifying 
(in the eyes of peace-builders) the introduction of new systems and institutions 
‘proven’ to promote peace and development.128 
‘Sequencing’ approaches to state-building – such as Paris’ concept of 
‘Institutionalization before Liberalization’ – have likewise been criticized for 
separating decision-making from domestic political accountability. Chandler 
contends that sequencing strategies invert traditional understandings of the rule of 
law based on popular consent and a social contract, removing accountability from 
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policymaking by placing fundamental decisions outside of the political process.129 
Paris’ proposal empowers international ‘nation builders’ to create structures of 
governance with minimal local consultation, resulting in state structures which lack 
local legitimacy – despite the expressed aim of state-building to create ‘legitimate’ 
state institutions rooted in the expectations of society.130  
Arguments for ‘neotrusteeship’, embedded statehood and ‘shared 
sovereignty’ would extend this pattern of external, unaccountable decision-making, 
advocating for unprecedented levels of intrusion into domestic affairs, regardless of 
the absence of an authorizing framework in international law. Fearon and Laitin’s 
endorsement of ongoing international administration of weak states constitutes a 
direct violation of the principle of sovereignty and a renewal of long-abandoned 
practices of international trusteeship. Krasner unselfconsciously suggests a return to 
trusteeship and brazenly endorses the use of obfuscating language to mislead 
populations regarding the limited amount of local control over domestic affairs.131 He 
entrusts an extraordinary degree of power to international actors, recommending that 
international agents be granted authority to terminate states’ sovereignty in the long-
term if such a measure is deemed necessary.132  
In contrast, Brahimi acknowledges the ultimate authority of local leaders, 
arguing that partnerships must be established between international and national 
actors that recognize the leadership role of nationals: 
The foreigners need to fully understand and accept that, vital as their own 
contributions may be, this is not their country, their stay is temporary, and 
however important and even indispensable their contribution … might be, 
they do not have the right to impose their views over the national will and 
the legitimate aspirations of the indigenous people.133  
However, whilst the main body of state-building discourse makes similar claims 
regarding local ownership, practical experiences of state-building to date have 
demonstrated a policy of subordinating domestic concerns to external preferences.134 
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 The dominance of international actors associated with the state-building 
project has raised fears of neo-imperialism from critics of state-building discourse. 
Commentators such as David Chandler and Mark Duffield view the state-building 
agenda as a means of international regulation which seeks to implement radical 
social transformation in subject states, using the state as a mediator between 
international authority and domestic politics.135 The security imperatives of the state-
building agenda – together with the evolution of humanitarian norms and 
international duties of civilian protection – have been used to justify coercive 
international measures to ‘fix’ the problems of failed states and establish states 
responsive to the human security of their populations. The emphasis placed on the 
nature of statehood in the state-building literature brings external influence into the 
realm of domestic administration, politics, and management, affording international 
institutions a more direct role in determining the internal governance mechanisms of 
post-conflict states. As the following chapter will show, previous mechanisms of 
external conditionality such as structural adjustment programmes are no longer 
required. State-building facilitates the formation of states embedded in international 
institutional frameworks.136 Political accountability and responsibility for decision-
making is blurred, politics is subordinated to bureaucratic and administrative 
procedures associated with ‘good governance’ and states become a mediating link 
between the separate spheres of domestic politics and international relations.137 
 This process has been observed in Timor-Leste, where the state’s power to 
respond to local demands is restricted by its reliance on the international 
community. 138  Solutions to issues facing the nascent state must satisfy the 
requirements of donors and international institutions, constraining the options 
available to policymakers and eroding democratic accountability. The government’s 
lack of autonomy prevents it from embodying a collective expression of society, 
undermining political legitimacy and social cohesion and exacerbating the ‘alienation’ 
of the state from Timorese society.139 The Timorese state has been embedded within 
international frameworks of governance that establish narrow boundaries for domestic 
policy and limit governmental authority within a set of externally determined 
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preferences. The state’s authority to exercise sovereignty over domestic affairs has 
been curtailed, rationalized by the reconceptualization of sovereignty as state 
capacity. Through state-building discourse, these interventions appear less as external 
coercion than as internal administrative matters of good governance and institutional 
capacity building.140 
State-building initiatives in Timor-Leste since 1999 have sought to bolster the 
state’s capacity to uphold peaceful relations and manage the development process, 
which is seen as crucial for the realization of sustainable peace. Meeting the 
challenges of peace and development has involved efforts by the international 
community to establish a specific set of institutional conditions seen as necessary for 
the provision of security (national and human security) and the fostering of market-
based development. However, attempts to implement these ‘core state functions’ in 
Timor-Leste have met with limited success.  
External expectations regarding financial management and public expenditure 
have been a regular point of contention. The post-independence Timorese government 
has been frequently criticized for its inability to execute its budget, and remains 
subject to ongoing ‘capacity building’ initiatives, which seek to strengthen the state’s 
administrative capacity to carry out the public expenditure programmes laid out in 
successive budgets.141 As in many post-conflict countries, the government’s ability to 
execute public initiatives in areas such as health, education, transportation, 
communications, and basic public services has been hampered by a lack of physical 
infrastructure. The new Timorese state has faced a particularly severe infrastructural 
deficit, after the scorched earth strategy of the Indonesian military destroyed an 
estimated 70-80 per cent of the territory’s infrastructure in September 1999.142 
The management of natural resources has also proven highly controversial, 
with conflicting attitudes regarding state management of oil revenues demonstrating 
the asymmetrical power relations between the international community and domestic 
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authority. Disputes over the use of the Timorese Petroleum Fund have highlighted the 
extent of international involvement in domestic governance and the means by which 
external conditionality operates within the state-building framework to restrict the 
possibilities for autonomous decision-making in subject-states. This issue will be 
explored in detail in Chapter Six. 
Conclusion	  
 State-building represents the most recent evolution of a historic convergence 
of the development and security communities, a mechanism for fulfilling the peace-
building aspirations of the 1990s and implanting the conditions of the liberal peace 
within post-conflict states. As a central element of peace-building practice, it 
constitutes the transcendent contemporary manifestation of evolving efforts by the 
UN and other international agencies to address conflict and underdevelopment in 
developing countries. Typically emphasizing the importance of institutions and 
bolstered systems of state governance in achieving sustainable peace, state-building 
itself has evolved as a concept to incorporate a more political and societal focus. 
State-building is presented as the solution to security threats associated with state 
failure, to humanitarian catastrophes brought on by civil conflict, and poverty and 
underdevelopment associated with dysfunctional institutions. 143  This strategic 
convergence has ensured state-building’s prominence within peace-building 
discourse.  
 Although conveyed as a largely technical process, the breadth of state-building 
activities afford an opportunity for the reconstitution of social, economic and political 
structures in post-conflict societies according to a liberal template, where previous 
systems have been problematized and a need for social transformation to support 
peace is widely accepted.144 As such, state-building constitutes a mechanism for the 
implementation of liberal peace-building within subject states. Previous efforts to 
implement these liberal prescriptions foundered in the absence of a favourable 
institutional environment or strong states capable of managing the liberal transition. 
State-building efforts are concerned with the construction of the necessary institutions 
for the functioning and reproduction of the liberal peace within states of the global 
South.  
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 Despite more recent conceptualizations of state-building, which pay lip-
service to the political, endogenous nature of the state-building process, power in 
state-building relationships remains in the hands of the international community, who 
set the priorities which frame national decision-making and render national authority 
and domestic political processes subject to internationally-regulated frameworks of 
governance. 145  State-building involves the reconfiguration of the institutions of 
subject states in accordance with a Western model of statehood, with the requirements 
of external powers taking precedence over domestic priorities, and decision-making 
increasingly becoming separated from systems of political accountability. In practice, 
state-building has afforded a revitalization of structures of international regulation and 
dominance over countries of the global South, leading some critics to denounce it as a 
project of twenty-first century neo-imperialism. These claims will be explored in 
greater detail in the next chapter, which examines the interplay between discourses of 
development and state-building, and the way in which development policies have 
acted as mechanisms for the implementation of externally-generated structures of 
social and economic organization.  
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Chapter	  Three:	  NEO-­‐LIBERAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  
	  
Introduction	  
 Since the 1990s, the liberal faith in the promise of market democracy to 
resolve both internal and external conflicts – known as liberal peace theory – has been 
the guiding principle of peace-building operations. From its inception, the peace-
building agenda has strived to implement liberal relations in post-conflict states (or 
states considered at risk of conflict) through ambitious programmes of 
democratization and market reform. By the late 1990s, the failure of such initiatives to 
achieve peace and development using a template approach to marketization and 
liberalization in subject states had convinced international actors of the need for a 
deeper involvement with state institutions, in order to manage and perpetuate the 
profound social transformations associated with liberal transitions. To achieve this, 
the state-building project engineers the installation of systems of liberal governance in 
subject states in order to create favourable institutional conditions for liberal social, 
economic, and political relations.  
 Central to this liberal transition is the creation of market economic conditions 
in subject states. Whereas the peace-building operations of the 1990s sought to 
impose economic liberalization without significant engagement with national 
governments, the state-building agenda entails a far greater intrusion into the 
functioning and structure of states themselves. Bolstered by fears of weak statehood 
and the strategic and humanitarian threats this poses, state-building operations seek to 
reform state institutions themselves in order to establish favourable conditions for 
market-led development. Once introduced, the (neo-)liberal development model is to 
be sustained through the locking-in of reforms at an institutional level and the 
ongoing regulation of subject states by external institutions. 
 On what basis are neo-liberal prescriptions for development justified as a 
solution to conflict? As previous chapters have demonstrated, the prevailing attitude 
amongst the international community since the 1990s has been to locate the root 
causes of conflict in conditions of underdevelopment.1 The liberal model of capitalist 
                                                
1 This identification of structural economic factors with a heightened potential for conflict is limited to 
internal economic conditions. Michael Pugh argues that the peace-building framework “attributes 
  72 
development – based on the historical experiences of the Western tradition – is upheld 
as the solution to underdevelopment and poverty, and an essential element of efforts 
to prevent or resolve the conflicts said to spring from such conditions. This chapter 
contends that the more recent international preoccupation with strong statehood has 
arisen not only out of the perceived security threats emanating from weak and failing 
states, but also in response to the failures of peace-building efforts to implement 
liberal market conditions in the absence of a ‘correct’ institutional environment and 
facilitating state. Neo-liberal institutional reforms associated with the state-building 
project thus represent the latest incarnation of an evolving system of liberal peace-
building, with international actors now turning to more intrusive means of 
reconstructing the social, economic, and political relations of post-conflict or 
‘underdeveloped’ states.  
 This chapter charts the emergence of the neo-liberal development model as the 
dominant framework for international development. During the 1980s, the 
implementation of neo-liberal principles in ‘developing countries’ was primarily 
carried out through development initiatives associated with Washington-based 
international financial institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. With the end of the Cold War, the neo-liberal paradigm has achieved 
widespread acceptance within international organizations (most significantly the 
United Nations), now forming the basis for international trade, financial, and 
development policy, and a template for economic policy within ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ countries alike. Since the 1990s, the neo-liberal development agenda has 
achieved further expression in the global South through liberal peace-building 
initiatives. In its most recent manifestation, the dissemination of international neo-
liberal governance has been associated with the state-building project, through which 
economic reforms are administered at the domestic institutional level, locking in 
systems of neo-liberal organization in post-conflict states without the democratic 
oversight of local constituencies. This chapter will explore the process of neo-liberal 
institutional reform in states of the South, with reference to international state-
building activities in post-conflict states, where the impetus for neo-liberal reform is 
held to be of greater urgency as a deterrent to future conflict. 
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Development	  as	  a	  Historical	  Construct	  
 The term ‘development’ is defined in many different ways, a reflection of the 
myriad agents involved in development activities. It can be used in reference to an 
objective process, or to denote a desired goal, such as ‘sustainable development’. This 
view casts ‘development’ in neutral terms, a pathway to an empirical end state that is 
largely uncontested, and apparently impartial and universal.2 Such is the concept of 
development deployed by many NGOs, international institutions, and policymakers 
worldwide – a descriptive term for a seemingly immutable, ahistorical and benevolent 
process to be carried out in ‘undeveloped’ areas, usually led by external 
representatives of the ‘developed’ world.  
 Critical approaches to development attempt to deconstruct development 
discourse in order to expose the structures of power and knowledge operating through 
it. Rita Abrahamsen views development not as a neutral process or end point, but as a 
historical construct that emerged in a particular historical context. The international 
development agenda arose in the early post-war period, in a time of increasing 
nationalism and demands for independence in the colonial territories of the global 
South. At this historic juncture, colonial powers sought to establish “new ways of 
managing and relating to these areas”, new systems of interaction for a post-colonial 
era that would nonetheless uphold the concentration of power in the North. 3 
Significantly, the global development project emerged during the period of Cold War 
rivalry – a rivalry that was largely contested in the ‘third world’. During this time, 
Western fear of Communism provided a strong motivator for development activity, 
with development initiatives geared towards establishing capitalist regimes to counter 
Soviet influence in the South.4  
 This study adopts the latter perspective, viewing development as a historically 
constructed discourse that represents powerful geopolitical and economic interests.  
As Arturo Escobar contends, development discourse is characterized by a “will to 
spatial power” over the South; the practices and initiatives that have arisen out of this 
discourse from the mid-twentieth century to the present constitute a “regime of 
government over the Third World, a “space for ‘subject peoples’” that ensures certain 
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control over it.” 5  The content of this chapter rests on this understanding of 
‘development’ as a historical construct – a term without fixed meaning, but one whose 
meaning has altered depending on when, by whom, and for what purpose it has been 
deployed. To apprehend the systems of knowledge and power structures that operate 
through development discourse, it is necessary to take a historical view which 
examines the evolution of the international development project from its inception in 
the post-World War Two era to the present day.  
Development	  After	  World	  War	  II	  
 The emergence of ‘development’ in its contemporary sense is generally 
attributed to the end of the Second World War, when immense reconstruction projects 
were implemented in Europe and Japan in order to prevent the reemergence of social 
and economic conditions associated with the onset of international conflict.6 In this 
context, the term ‘development’ is used to denote a process of ‘advancement’ or 
‘progress’ within nations – a process understood primarily in terms of economic 
growth, but also generally involving the ‘modernization’ of economic, social, and 
political systems along Western lines, and the provision of basic social needs.7 This 
concept of development is global in scale, framing a division of the world into 
‘developed’, ‘developing’, and ‘underdeveloped’ nations or regions.8  
 Abrahamsen describes the post-war period as the ‘era of development’ – a 
period which saw the beginning of the institutionalization of development with the 
emergence of development organizations such as the United Nations and the Bretton 
Woods organizations, the devising of national development plans, and the rise of ‘the 
development expert’.9 President Truman’s inaugural address on 20 January 1949 is 
considered a watershed event in the evolution of the development agenda. The 
Truman Doctrine ushered in a new era in international affairs, one in which the US 
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and other ‘advanced’ societies assumed the task of replicating in underdeveloped 
nations the features of industrialized capitalist societies.10  
Truman’s address introduced the term ‘underdevelopment’ to the international 
lexicon, a term that altered the meaning of development itself by implying a process 
of change towards a ‘final state’ – a process which may be enacted by agents upon 
societies and even entire regions. The new ‘developed’/‘underdeveloped’ dichotomy 
precipitated a dramatic shift in how North-South relations were perceived. Having 
previously been understood in terms of the relationship between colonizer and 
colonized, Gilbert Rist argues that the demarcation of members of the international 
system as either ‘developed’ or ‘underdeveloped’ posited a new relationship, one 
which reflected the legal equality of states in the new international regime.11 This 
terminological shift also served to cast development as a predominantly internal 
process – albeit one which can be supported with external assistance – neglecting the 
impact of global economic and political factors on internal development. 
In this estimation, underdevelopment was seen as a natural state of affairs, one 
without historical cause – or springing from a perceived lack of historical 
circumstances – and isolated from global patterns of expansion and accumulation. 
Underdevelopment was merely the rudimentary condition from which development 
was seen to have emerged, with economic growth as the driver of the transition 
between the two. Thus historical conditions that may explain the unequal position of 
countries according to this new international stratum could be overlooked. Henceforth 
all nations would be subject to the same ‘laws of development’ (which were believed 
to operate in the same way for all), as formally equal, individual entities rather than as 
members of an interdependent world structure.12   
Prior to 1950, economic theories specific to development did not exist. The 
1950s witnessed the birth of development economics as a discipline; academic 
interest in the economic plight of developing countries and the challenge of 
“rescu[ing] … poor countries from their poverty”13 came to prominence in the field of 
economics, resulting in a proliferation of theories that took Truman’s notion of the 
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underdeveloped economy as their object, and brought together the concepts of welfare 
and development which, prior to the Second World War, had remained separate.14  
During the 1950s and 1960s the field of development was dominated by 
modernization theories. These theories equated development with economic growth 
and industrialization – to be achieved through deliberate state intervention – and 
social, cultural, and political modernization along Western lines.15 Perhaps the most 
influential advocate of modernization theory was Walt Rostow, whose 1960 
publication The Stages of Economic Growth laid out a generic formula by which all 
nations might make the transition from ‘traditional society’ to modernity and 
development. Rostow’s vision conceived of development in evolutionary terms; 
through the application of certain economic ‘laws’, ‘all societies’ might reach the 
‘final stage’ of development – an ‘age of high mass-consumption’ modelled in the 
West, to which all nations were presumed to aspire.16 
This linear, evolutionary view of development was extremely influential in the 
1960s and early 70s, and was reflected in all areas of the social sciences. 17 
Modernization theories promoted the Western model of capitalism and liberal 
democracy as the key to progressing beyond a state of underdevelopment. In this 
view, developed Western nations possessed the knowledge and duty to assist other 
nations to ‘catch up’.18 Modernization was conceived of as a primarily internal 
process, albeit one which may be assisted through external aid and investment.19 
Deliberate state intervention in key sectors of the economy was prescribed in order to 
promote urban industrialization. However, investment and growth were to be 
concentrated in a few sectors only, with growth in urban cores expected to eventually 
‘trickle down’ to peripheral regions. State intervention was thus conceived only in 
terms of industrial growth. States were not to intervene to address the inequalities 
necessarily arising from such an unbalanced growth process, as the principle of 
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‘polarization’ required that spatial inequalities be permitted to develop in order to 
maximize economic growth.20 
This model has predictably given rise to geographically uneven processes of 
development. The failure of ‘trickle down’ policies to achieve an equitable 
distribution of the profits of industrial growth has contributed to persistent internal 
inequalities.21 Furthermore, critics of modernization theory argued that rather than a 
reduction of inequalities between nations, as anticipated by development economics, 
the disparities between developed and underdeveloped regions of the world were 
becoming more pronounced. The field came under attack for its homogenous 
approach to development; failing to recognize the divergent historical experiences and 
structural conditions of different countries and regions, proponents of modernization 
prescribed a fixed template for development despite vast differences in social, 
political, economic, cultural, and historical context. Modernization arguments also 
emphasized internal factors as a cause of underdevelopment, ignoring the central role 
of external factors.22 Dependency and World Systems theories emerged in response to 
mainstream development theory, drawing attention to the role of global capitalism in 
constituting conditions of development and underdevelopment. 
 One of the most prominent dependency theorists was Andre Gunder Frank, 
who brought the ideas of the dependency school to a wide readership in the late 
1960s. Frank argued that the phenomenon of underdevelopment had arisen as a result 
of unequal relations between underdeveloped, ‘satellite’ regions and capitalist 
‘metropolitan’ countries. The metropoles of the world had achieved economic 
development by extracting economic surplus from their colonial satellites, in a 
process that had persisted since the Spanish colonization of South America. He 
postulated that development and underdevelopment are interrelated processes, with 
the contemporary manifestation of underdevelopment less a result of internal factors 
(although the extraction of capital was assisted by internal agents) than a product of 
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the asymmetrical incorporation of countries into a hierarchical global system.23 
Immanuel Wallerstein expanded on dependency arguments by conceiving of the 
world economy as a ‘world-system’, comprising an ‘extensive division of labour’ 
based on functional and geographic divisions. He termed the components of this 
system ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ – corresponding to the concepts of ‘metropolis’ and 
‘satellite’ in Frank’s analysis – yet argued that an intermediary level exists which acts 
as a mediator between the two, known as the ‘semi-periphery’.24  
Dependency theories – although themselves subject to error, critique and 
revision – provided a valuable analysis of the historical process of development, 
locating development within a broader history of colonial exploitation and refuting 
the homogenizing nature of modernization theories. The unequal international 
structures they highlighted are still instructive for contemporary analyses of economic 
development. However, these arguments never succeeded in usurping the dominance 
of classical liberal narratives within development discourse, and were soon eclipsed 
by conservative trends in development economics that arose out of the troubled 
conditions of the 1970s. 
Despite historical developments since the 1960s and the corresponding 
evolution of development theory beyond modernization arguments, some critics 
maintain that many of the assumptions of modernization continue to drive 
contemporary development discourse. Vestiges of modernization theory can be 
discerned in arguments for peace-building and democratization, which share the same 
commitment to market-centred economic growth and liberal democracy and echo the 
claim that developing nations can achieve a high level of development by emulating 
the development trajectory followed by Western nations.25  
The	  Emergence	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐liberal	  Development	  Model	  
 The concept of ‘neo-liberalism’ has become a commonly referenced term in 
academic and political debate in recent decades. However, definitions of neo-
liberalism itself are often vague and fail to acknowledge the pluralistic nature of neo-
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liberal ideas. Critical literature – where the term is most frequently invoked – 
frequently overlooks the concept’s internal diversity and presents it instead as a 
unified political ideology. 26  In reality, neo-liberalism is not one homogenous 
philosophy, but represents a range of varying positions. In recognition of this, 
scholars such and Dag Thorsen and Amand Lie prefer to consider neo-liberalism as a 
“loosely demarcated set of political beliefs”27, whilst Plehwe at al. discuss it in terms 
of a ‘plural’ set of ideas.28 Suffice to say that neo-liberalism comprises a range of 
beliefs and internal divisions, however it is not the purpose to examine such internal 
debates here.  
 The intellectual roots of the neo-liberal movement can be located in the 
conservative opposition to Keynesian policy that persisted throughout the postwar 
decades, particularly in the United States. In 1947, a collection of academics led by 
Friedrich von Hayek formed the Mont Pelerin Society, a group committed to the 
principles of nineteenth century neoclassical economics. Members of the group 
described themselves as ‘liberals’, owing to their strong commitment to principles of 
personal freedom and individualism (hence the term ‘neo-liberalism’). The Mont 
Pelerin Society viewed the market as the optimal mechanism for orchestrating human 
behaviour and social organization, and strongly opposed all forms of state 
intervention and central state planning 29 This organization was marginalized from 
political and academic circles until the erosion of official Keynesianism in the 1970s, 
when it began to exert considerable influence in the university and to gain political 
prominence in the United States and Britain.30 
 Essentially, neo-liberalism is a revival of the principles of economic liberalism 
that has taken place since the 1970s. Sometimes referred to as neoclassical liberalism, 
neo-liberalism constitutes a return to many of the principles of classical nineteenth 
century liberalism. It is important to note some significant differences between 
classical liberal ideology and modern liberalism. Classical liberalism subscribes to the 
notions of self-interest and individualism, viewing society as an atomistic collection 
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of largely self-reliant individuals. Freedom is viewed in negative terms as the absence 
of interference or coercion. As a result, classical liberalism is typified by a strong 
distrust in state authority and a preference for minimal government.31 Economic 
liberalism forms a part of this classical liberal tradition, viewing the economy as a 
market operating in accordance with natural laws. Market forces are seen as naturally 
coordinating the self-interest of individuals and promoting maximal economic 
prosperity.32 However, economic liberalism is not simply an economic ideology; it 
carries a number of wider social and political implications that amount to an entire 
system of social organization. Adherents of neo-liberalism sought a return to such 
principles against a tide of popular support for government intervention in economic 
affairs, proclaiming themselves ‘neo-liberal’ to signify their adherence to the tenets of 
classical – and in particular economic – liberalism.33  
 Modern liberalism differs from nineteenth century liberalism in a number of 
ways, particularly in its attitude to the state. The modern-day liberal concedes a much 
greater role for the state in the economy, with liberal states characterized by 
considerable market regulation and government provision of essential goods and 
services. Markets are not assumed to operate in a spontaneous, self-regulating manner 
unless they are embedded within a strong pro-market institutional and political 
framework. Thus, whilst liberalism shares a common ideological heritage and 
commitment to individualism, it represents a significant revision of its nineteenth 
century counterpart.34 
 The characteristics of neo-liberalism – in particular its international 
manifestations – are often attributed to the process of globalization. However, 
although the two are related, they remain distinct mechanisms. Globalization refers to 
the internationalization of the world economy – a centuries-old process that began 
with European colonization in the sixteenth century, identified by Marx in the 
nineteenth century as a fundamental tendency of capitalism.35 Duménil and Lévy 
point out that the growth of international trade, capital movements, and the world 
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economy are not neo-liberal phenomena; they are essential characteristics of capitalist 
globalization. Rather, the term neo-liberalism refers to “‘new rules’ of the functioning 
of capitalism”36 – a system of thought and set of policies that emerged in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. 
Fundamentals	  of	  Neo-­‐liberalism	  
 Despite considerable diversity within the neo-liberal camp, there are certain 
fundamental ideas upon which neo-liberals agree. The central element of neo-liberal 
doctrine is a commitment to the free market principles of liberal economics. Andrew 
Heywood describes neo-liberalism as a form of ‘market fundamentalism’, in which 
markets as seen as “morally and practically superior” to political authority and thus 
promoted as the primary organizing force in society. 37  Advocates contend that 
markets unleash the individual creativity and entrepreneurial freedoms that are 
necessary for society’s economic prosperity.38 Markets, it is argued, comprise a 
‘spontaneous order’ in which the laws of supply and demand will naturally determine 
the most efficient allocation of resources in a competitive society of self-interested 
individuals.39  
 Competition is seen as the most effective means of coordinating individual 
efforts in any society. In a competitive order, prices will be determined freely 
according to market values without the intervention of government, which economic 
liberals believe merely serves to distort prices and undermine the natural functioning 
of the market system. Neo-liberals are typically characterized by a deep mistrust of 
government, due to the potential for political powers to encroach upon individual 
liberties. However, an important positive role for government is asserted in 
establishing the institutional framework for the functioning of the market – in 
particular the protection of strong and clearly defined property rights, which are 
essential for market exchange.40  
 The market system is founded upon a particular understanding of human 
nature, which views humans as rational beings motivated by self-interest. 
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Furthermore, individuals’ maximizing behaviour is held to be informed by 
preferences that remain stable regardless of context; human decisions are based on 
pleasure versus pain calculations, and individuals across different time periods, 
cultures, and socio-economic groups will therefore choose to act in a way that 
maximizes their own self-interest.41 Market advocates argue that the market system 
offers the most effective means to utilize human nature for the benefit of society. 
Individuals acting according to their own material self-interest can indirectly facilitate 
economic prosperity in a market system, in which the laws of supply and demand 
efficiently direct the behaviour of participants and allocate scarce resources.42 Market 
society is thus conceived of as a means of efficiently coordinating large groups of 
people acting in accordance with their own inherent natures. This equation of 
economic rationality with the pursuit of material self-interest is held to be a universal 
human trait, justifying efforts to transplant market systems in non-liberal societies.43 
 Market adherents subscribe to the ideals of individualism, freedom, and 
liberty, and believe the market mechanism maximizes the potential for individual 
freedom. Prominent neo-liberal figures such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman 
emphasize the importance of liberty and individual freedom, postulating that the 
market system alone is capable of preserving maximal freedom. Friedman views 
freedom – more specifically the freedom of the individual – as the ultimate social, 
political, and economic good, one which is primarily threatened by the concentration 
of power. In order to prevent the concentration of power and maximize freedom, 
economic and political power must be separated. A free market system ensures the 
dispersal of power by placing economic power in the hands of private individuals, 
thus serving to offset the political power of the state. Where some concentration of 
power is necessary – as it is in government – this threat can be mitigated by checks 
and balances and decentralization. Capitalism, in this estimation, is a necessary 
prerequisite for political freedom, as it removes economic activity from political 
control, thus preventing the abuse of the economic sphere for coercive purposes, and 
establishing economic power as a check to political power.44 
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 Whilst neo-liberals conceive of state power as a threat to individual freedom, 
they accept that some degree of governmental authority is necessary in order to 
regulate society and promote a competitive market order. The functioning of the 
market system is dependent upon the maintenance of law and order, in order to 
prevent coercion between individuals and to enforce contracts voluntarily entered 
into.45 Friedman argues that human nature is imperfect, making the goal of absolute 
freedom impossible. The full exercise of each individual’s freedom will inevitably 
lead to conflict with others, necessitating an established system of law and order, and 
the concession of a degree of individual freedom for the good of society.46  
 Despite distrust of government authority, neo-liberals conceive of a crucial 
role for government in creating and maintaining the conditions necessary for the 
competitive order. Market mechanisms can only operate if certain rules and 
prerequisites are upheld, such as the safeguarding of property rights, the enforcement 
of contracts, and the breaking up of monopolies. Government is therefore required as 
a means of establishing and enforcing the rules of the market. 47  Beyond the 
maintenance of law and order, the primary function of the neo-liberal state is in 
providing “a framework within which free competition [can] flourish and the price 
system operate effectively.”48 Once this framework has been put in place, entrusting 
the majority of economic and social affairs to market forces drastically reduces the 
scope of political activity, thus, it is argued, minimizing the potential for government 
encroachments on individual freedom.49  
Economic	  Crisis	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  Neo-­‐liberal	  Development:	  
Whilst the birth of the neo-liberal intellectual movement is generally attributed 
to the formation of the Mont Pelerin society in the late 1940s, it would be several 
decades before neo-liberal ideas would come to exert a considerable influence on 
development theory and practice. Neo-liberal ideas remained relatively 
inconsequential during the early post-war era, its adherents relegated to the margins of 
public and academic circles until the tumultuous economic conditions of the 1970s. 
However, this period of economic crisis and the breakdown of official Keynesianism 
afforded an opportunity for the rapid growth of neo-liberal influence at both the 
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domestic and international levels. Political administrations in powerful countries such 
as the United States and Britain were among the first to adopt neo-liberal principles, 
after which they quickly gained influence in international financial institutions and 
development organizations. By the late 1980s, neo-liberalism had emerged as the 
dominant model for international development, and the foundation of a global 
economic system centred in the advanced capitalist economies for replication in 
countries of the global South.50 
The first two and a half decades after the Second World War were dominated 
by Keynesian approaches to economics. Keynes argued that capitalist economies are 
prone to crises, during which aggregate supply exceeds aggregate demand, resulting 
in large-scale unemployment. To address this weakness in capitalist systems, Keynes 
argued for regular government intervention to increase public expenditure and reduce 
taxes and interest rates, in order to stimulate demand and decrease unemployment. He 
advocated the use of monetary and fiscal measures in order to mitigate the effects of 
economic recession. Most capitalist governments adopted Keynesian economic 
policies during the 1950s and 60s.51 
During the 1950s and 1960s, employment levels remained high and real wages 
rose steadily in the US and Western Europe. States involved themselves directly in the 
workings of the capitalist economies, with governments in some states assuming 
ownership of a high proportion of productive capacity and implementing expansive 
welfare systems to address health, education, housing, and unemployment.52 This 
period was characterized by a ‘class compromise’ between capital and labour, with 
states intervening in industrial policy and supporting forums that brought together 
labour and management to negotiate wages and working conditions. Such 
arrangements served to restrain the economic power of the upper classes and afforded 
labour a considerable share of economic benefits.53  
Support for Keynesianism eroded in the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973-4, 
with the impacts of the oil shock coinciding with the end of the postwar economic 
boom and escalating debt associated with the Vietnam War, resulting in high 
unemployment, high inflation, and large government deficits. Economic interventions 
                                                
50 Harvey, p. 22-26; Cerny, p. 11-15 
51 C. Lapavitsas. (2005) Mainstream Economics in the Neoliberal Era. In Neoliberalism: A Critical 
Reader, edited by Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, pp. 30-40. London: Pluto Press, p. 31-32 
52 Ibid. p. 31-33  
53 Harvey; Cerny, p. 12 
  85 
along Keynesian lines failed to avert economic crisis, and governments were forced to 
reduce expenditure and implement tight monetary policies in an attempt to reduce 
budget deficits and curb inflation. Under increasing economic pressure, the system of 
fixed exchange rates implemented by the Bretton Woods Agreement was abolished 
and floating exchange rates introduced in 1973.54 The disintegration of Keynesian 
policies and the means by which governments attempted to address the economic 
crisis were critical factors that would determine the future of development policy. 
 Governments responded to the conditions of the mid-late 1970s by abandoning 
attempts to secure full employment, reducing previous levels of welfare provision, 
and privatizing state-owned industries. 55  Budgetary pressure, stagflation 56 , and 
deteriorating relations between labour, management, and government bureaucracy – 
together with international economic decline and the shift to floating exchange rates – 
precipitated the breakdown of postwar mechanisms of labour negotiation and 
facilitated a move toward economic conservatism.57 The breakdown of the postwar 
Keynesian ‘consensus’ cleared the way for the rise of neo-liberalism in the developed 
capitalist countries. Crucial elections in the UK and the US in 1979 and 1980 brought 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan to power, who orchestrated the neo-liberal turn 
within their respective countries and spearheaded an international shift towards neo-
liberal policy.58 
 Some ‘neo-liberal’ policies had been proposed throughout the 1970s in an 
attempt to curb inflation and end recession, but it was the rise to power of the 
administrations of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan that facilitated the dramatic 
consolidation of neo-liberalism. Both leaders sought to roll back the commitments of 
the Keynesian welfare state, and attempted to promote business interests by reducing 
taxes, privatizing state enterprises, and attacking trade unions and other forms of 
organized labour. Economic and financial deregulation in the national context was 
coupled with efforts to reduce barriers to the free movement of goods, services, and 
capital across borders, producing unprecedented freedom and influence for finance 
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capital.59 This process of international liberalization coincided with the rapid accrual 
of financial power in the oil-producing states as a result of the oil price hike of 1973. 
Much of this wealth was invested in US private banks, which now controlled vast 
surpluses for which they sought profitable outlets. These funds formed a pool of 
capital for lending to foreign governments – particularly the governments of 
developing countries, which borrowed heavily during this period.60 This established 
the preconditions for the neo-liberalization of international development; from the 
1980s, global financial conditions would drive the rapid incorporation of developing 
countries into the international economy, which was achieved through the process of 
structural adjustment. 
 In 1979, the US Federal Reserve Bank raised the rate of interest in an effort to 
suppress inflation, triggering a series of defaults by indebted developing countries, 
which were no longer able to service their loans. 61  As a condition for debt 
rescheduling (for both official and private debt), the IMF implemented ‘structural 
adjustment’ programmes that required debtor countries to systematically deregulate 
and liberalize their economies. 62  Governments were required to privatize state 
industries, reduce public expenditure (including government spending on welfare, 
healthcare, and education), weaken systems of labour regulation, and devalue their 
national currency. Adjustment conditions also extended beyond stabilization policies 
to incorporate trade and financial liberalization; trade barriers were to be removed and 
restrictions on foreign capital dismantled, enabling national assets to be purchased by 
foreign companies.63 Thus structural adjustment succeeded in transplanting neo-
liberal policies into developing countries in a relatively short space of time, and the 
economic fate of countries that underwent liberalization was now more systematically 
tied to the vagaries of international markets. 
 Throughout the following decade, the Washington-based financial institutions 
– the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the US Treasury – 
adopted a similar set of broad policy prescriptions that came to be known as the 
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‘Washington Consensus’.64 This framework emphasized ‘getting the prices right’, to 
be achieved by dramatically reducing state involvement in the economy and ‘freeing’ 
interest rates and exchange rates. It was argued that market processes would oversee 
the allocation of resources more efficiently than any state.65 The tenets of the 
Washington Consensus had informed the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s 
and set the agenda for development policy from this time forth. Associating poor 
economic progress in developing countries with excessive state intervention, this 
approach constituted a wholesale assault on the national developmentalism that had 
prevailed since the Second World War.66 
The neo-liberal ‘counter-revolution’ established a new development model 
based on market liberalism, trade openness, and a minimal state, to be undergirded by 
a strong emphasis on individualism.67 The implementation of these policies would 
constitute a radical social transformation in the developing world, as witnessed in the 
case of Timor-Leste, which will be discussed in later chapters.  
Embedding	  Neo-­‐liberalism:	  	  
From	  State	  Roll-­‐back	  to	  State-­‐building	  for	  Markets	  	  
 As has been demonstrated, the ‘neo-liberal revolution’ of the late twentieth 
century gave rise to a broad consensus (amongst key governments and institutions) in 
favour of liberal economic policies. During the 1980s, mainstream economists came 
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to view rapid economic growth not as a matter of natural, physical, or human 
resources, but as a result of the economic policies pursued by governments. In the 
development arena this translated into an array of ‘pro-market’ prescriptions based on 
a set of apparently universal principles for economic growth, to be implemented in 
developing countries through structural adjustment.68 However, these adjustment 
policies failed to produce the expected results, with inconsistent – often negative – 
economic results and tremendous social disruption in participating countries requiring 
development economists to reexamine their policies or cast around for a suitable 
culprit for the failure of adjustment to stimulate economic growth. The explanation 
the development community arrived at would pave the way for the development and 
state-building initiatives of the twenty-first century. The failure to achieve economic 
growth was attributed not to the programmes themselves, but to ‘poor governance’ 
and the failure of state institutions to successfully implement the correct economic 
policies.69 From this point on international development institutions would no longer 
bypass the state, but would seek to engineer a reconfiguration of the state in 
developing countries in a manner consistent with the goals of neo-liberal 
development.  
The	  Crisis	  of	  Structural	  Adjustment	  and	  the	  Reconceptualization	  of	  the	  State	  	  
 The impacts of adjustment have been subject to considerable dispute. Claims 
by the World Bank in the late eighties and nineties that adjustment had improved 
economic performance and raised living standards have been refuted by academics 
and influential organizations alike. The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa came to the opposite conclusion, and charged the Bank with selectivity and 
poor methodology in its analysis. Critics have used the same data used by the Bank to 
demonstrate adverse economic outcomes for adjusting countries, leading them to 
reject the Bank’s argument that the greater the levels of implementation in adjusting 
countries, the better the results. In particular, countries implementing structural 
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adjustment demonstrated low levels of investment even where GDP and export 
growth had occurred – an uncomfortable trend the Bretton Woods institutions have 
been forced to acknowledge. While in many cases adjustment does appear to have 
resulted in export growth, negative investment indicators and a lack of improvement 
in national income have countered positive outcomes in this area.70 
 Despite enduring disagreement regarding the economic impacts of structural 
adjustment, the deleterious social and humanitarian impacts of adjustment have been 
more difficult to refute. A series of reports and studies have confirmed that adjustment 
programmes tend to result in an increase in aggregate poverty. Cases in which a 
degree of macro-economic stability has been achieved have done so at the expense of 
human welfare, with the reduction of public services, rising unemployment and 
decreasing real incomes fuelling greater levels of social immiseration.71 Levels of 
poverty and absolute poverty increased during the adjustment decade (1980-90) and 
developing countries’ economies underwent a period of economic stagnation, leading 
many commentators to refer to the period as the ‘lost decade’ of development.72 
 Overall, structural adjustment failed to deliver on the promise of market-led 
development. Economic outcomes in adjusting countries were poor or mixed at best, 
and the social impacts disastrous for large segments of the population. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa – as in other developing areas – the combination of low economic growth and 
decreased state expenditure in areas such as health and education only magnified 
social hardship. 73  What the adjustment experiment did achieve was a general 
liberalization of the economies of subject countries; in a relatively short space of time, 
adjustment programmes succeeded in bringing about a dramatic reduction in the role 
of the state, the privatization of public sector industries and activities, and the removal 
of state controls over imports, exports, and foreign exchange.74 At a superficial level, 
neo-liberal policies had been grafted into the social, economic and political relations 
of a host of developing countries. Future developments would serve to embed market 
relations more thoroughly within the fabric of developing countries, by seeking to 
engage the state in the implementation of reforms. 
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 The reasons for the failure of structural adjustment policies to deliver expected 
development outcomes were ultimately attributed not to the economic assumptions 
that guided them, but to the failure of states themselves.75 Reflecting the prevailing 
development views of the time, IFIs had up to this point sought to circumvent state 
involvement in development policy, aiming to promote maximum market efficiency 
and growth by preventing economic interference by interventionist states. However, 
this method of dictating policy from afar and using the threat of discontinued financial 
assistance to ensure compliance – whilst in most cases succeeding in dismantling 
systems of state involvement in social and economic policy  – did little to implant 
liberal policies in subject societies. James Ferguson argues that the era of structural 
adjustment failed to develop ‘new technologies of government’ or produce 
‘responsibilized’ citizens.76 The ‘crisis of structural adjustment’ was thus transformed 
into a “crisis of ‘governance,’ for which the appropriate remedy is a reform of … 
governments”.77  
 A new strategy would be required to normalize neo-liberal modes of 
governance – a requirement to be fulfilled by the good governance project of the 
1990s. Having concluded that the problem lay not in the policies themselves – but 
rather in the institutional climate within which these policies were enacted – 
development economists at key institutions now concluded that the success of market-
led development relied on strong enabling states, capable of ensuring the necessary 
institutional basis for economic growth.78 The governance agenda thus represents a 
modification of the neo-liberal development orthodoxy of the 1980s, a necessary 
innovation for managing the adjustment effort that recognized the extent to which 
economic reforms hinged upon the reformation of the state.79 This shift – rather than a 
departure from neo-liberalism – can be understood an extension of neo-liberal order 
on a global scale, the logical progression of an era of neo-liberal institutionalism 
which views the state as the essential tool for the embedding of neo-liberal 
organization in societies, particularly in the global South.80  
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  It is therefore out of the crises of neo-liberalism in the 1980s that efforts to 
reinvent neo-liberal modes of development arose, giving rise to the large-scale 
restructuring of international (and national) institutions. This process – sometimes 
referred to as ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’81 or the ‘post-Washington Consensus’82 – 
has seen neo-liberalism come to pervade “all forms of international regulation, 
making imposition less pressing than reproduction and consolidation.”83   
 Craig and Porter identify the period from 1981 to the present as the ‘age of 
institutional development’, during which the implementation of neo-liberal policy was 
furthered through the embedding of neo-liberal principles in institutions.84 Since the 
1990s, this process of ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’ has taken as its object the state – 
viewed not as a barrier to liberal development, but as a partner and facilitator in this 
undertaking. 85  In an international system characterized by multiple layers of 
governance and authority, the state is the gateway and necessary agent for the 
transplantation of neo-liberal relations into societies; it is the only institution with the 
authority to establish the legal basis for market organization. The state must be 
engaged with and transformed – rather than bypassed – if the neo-liberal development 
promise is to be achieved. Formulating appropriate state institutions for this task is the 
aim of the agents and organizations of neo-liberal institutionalism – the national 
governments, development agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and IFIs 
involved in international development – and a central goal of the state-building 
project. 
Embedding	  Market	  Rationality	  in	  Society:	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Neo-­‐liberal	  State	  
 The reconceptualization of the state has been driven by a crisis of neo-liberal 
development, necessitating new methods for advancing the neo-liberal development 
model in the South.86 Supporters of market economics maintain that markets represent 
the form of economic and social organization most consistent with human nature. All 
people are said to possess an inherent ‘economic rationality’ that predisposes them to 
market arrangements, which enshrine the pursuit of self-interest as a social and 
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economic good that promotes optimal human welfare and freedom. Liberal economics 
is based on a specific understanding of human nature, and the legitimacy of the 
market system is attributed to the presence of certain traits in all human beings, 
regardless of culture, historical context, social status, or other variations of context.87 
However, the failure to regularize neo-liberal relations in non-liberal states during the 
adjustment decade has required a modification of neo-liberal orthodoxy with regard to 
the role of the state in facilitating the construction of institutional environments which 
support this ‘inherent’ economic rationality.88 
 David Williams disputes liberal claims regarding the existence of a 
fundamental, market-oriented ‘economic rationality’ within all persons. Such 
assertions represent a legitimizing discourse that portray market-based economic 
arrangements as natural to all societies: if market characteristics are an inherent part 
of human nature, then market structures constitute a natural, universal system of 
economic organization.89 Williams points to the efforts of international organizations 
such as the World Bank in attempting to instill these apparently natural traits into 
societies in developing countries as evidence that such characteristics are not in fact 
natural, but constructed. In attempting to spread market-based systems around the 
world, these institutions “attempt to construct the traits of economic rationality upon 
which the naturalness of the economy is supposed to rest.”90 In practice, development 
activity clashes with mainstream narratives that depict the market economy as 
fundamentally natural. On the ground, far from receiving experiential validation of 
the inherent nature of market characteristics, the World Bank and other development 
organizations have discovered that “economic development requires detailed 
transformations in institutions and habits, attitudes, and mores.”91 
 As the poor record of prior initiatives to instill liberal market conditions in 
non-liberal societies demonstrates, market economies cannot function in the absence 
of an enabling institutional environment. The role of pro-market institutions is 
particularly vital in environments in which liberal markets have not previously 
existed: for the neo-liberal development model to succeed, neo-liberal institutions 
must be constructed to orchestrate the liberal transformation. Williams argues that the 
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activities of international organizations and institutions in the global South constitute 
a “detailed and intrusive” effort to construct the foundations of a market system in 
subject countries.92 A new economic rationality has to be established in such societies 
with the state now acting as a “central agent in the construction of the economy and 
the traits which underpin it.”93 This vision of the state signifies a marked departure 
from past development policy. The failure of previous liberal development initiatives 
to achieve desired growth outcomes or to embed neo-liberal principles in subject 
societies has necessitated a ‘shift in neoliberal codification’ to incorporate a focus on 
efforts to reconstitute state institutions themselves. 
Redefining	  Statehood:	  The	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  Neo-­‐liberal	  State	  
 The World Bank has played a pioneering role in this redefinition of the state.  
The 1991 World Development Report outlined a new ‘market-friendly’ approach to 
development, one that incorporated a rejuvenated role for the state in fostering 
development outcomes. This approach continued to uphold the market as the optimal 
organizing mechanism for the production and distribution of goods and services in 
society, yet emphasized the importance of the state in providing the necessary legal 
and regulatory framework for the proper functioning of the market. 94  While 
expressing support for the ongoing process of privatization of state-owned enterprises 
and other measures to foster market competition, the report argued that:  
 [T]he proper economic role of government is larger than merely standing in 
for markets if they fail to work well. In defining and protecting property 
rights, providing effective legal, judicial, and regulatory systems, improving 
the efficiency of the civil service, and protecting the environment, the state 
forms the very core of development.95 
The report identified institutions as the key variable in achieving effective market-led 
development. This publication represents a watershed moment in neo-liberal 
development discourse. International neo-liberal development was required to 
reinvent itself after the failure of 1980s orthodoxy; revised development policy would 
involve a new engagement with states in order to construct the foundations of market 
organization in developing countries. This new discourse incorporated the concept of 
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the ‘enabling’ state as an essential feature of market societies, and a means of 
facilitating and safeguarding the success of freshly formed market structures in 
developing countries.96  
 Subsequent World Development Reports (in 1992, 1993, and 1994) set out the 
role for the state in key aspects of development, including protecting the environment, 
promoting health, and providing infrastructure. The policies and systems set forth 
encouraged governments to act to support and supplement the market, and to conform 
to commercial principles in order to achieve outcomes with greater efficiency.97 
However, the clearest articulation of the neo-liberal state is laid out in the 1997 report, 
The State in a Changing World, which describes the new vision for the state in the 
realm of economic and social development. 
 Citing the experiences of the East Asian states, the 1997 World Development 
Report argued “development requires an effective state, one that plays a catalytic, 
facilitating role, encouraging and complementing the activities of private businesses 
and individuals.”98 The report claimed that at the root of the crisis of development 
was located a more fundamental “crisis in state effectiveness” – defined in terms of 
states’ ability to provide the institutional environment necessary to “allow markets to 
flourish”.99 The close of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the fiscal 
crises of welfare states, and the spectre of state failure had sparked a reconsideration 
of the role of the state, culminating in a vision of a certain form of statehood that 
would act in concert with markets to deliver successful development outcomes: 
It is increasingly recognized that an effective state – not a minimal one – is 
central to economic and social development, but more as partner and 
facilitator than as director. States should work to complement markets, not 
replace them.100  
No longer would the Bank’s development activities bypass the state – they now 
sought to directly engage the state in the process of development. However, the nature 
of this engagement is clearly delineated: effective statehood would involve 
transforming states into handmaidens of the market. States would be entrusted with 
maintaining the economic ‘fundamentals’ required for the functioning of the market – 
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such as maintaining “liberal trade, capital markets and investment regimes”101 – 
meanwhile the scope of their activities and their ability to devise alternative courses 
of action would be dramatically prescribed. 
 This new level of engagement with states in development discourse and 
practice corresponds to similar trends in peace-building discourse. As previous 
chapters have demonstrated, the failure of the peace-building project to resolve 
conflicts in the global South and prevent their occurrence through development 
initiatives has culminated in a new emphasis on strengthening institutions and 
building state capacity in order to lay the foundations for liberal peace. The state-
building agenda is geared towards the reconfiguration of the institutions of subject 
states in accordance with a liberal model of statehood. The implementation and 
maintenance of liberal prescriptions is enforced by pervasive systems of international 
regulation, which are justified by references to security threats associated with weak 
statehood and perpetuated through conditions of aid dependence.102 Contemporary 
discourses of state-building and development are fundamentally interlinked. Together 
they represent a unified process of neo-liberal replication in subject states, whereby 
the fundamental transformation of social, political, and economic structures is to be 
implemented and sustained through the construction of liberal state institutions. As 
outlined by the World Bank, states are to play a managerial role in the transformation 
of societies according to a liberal, market-based model.103 
 By directly engaging with the state in the process of establishing the 
conditions for neo-liberal development, the World Bank confirms the importance of 
states as national gatekeepers in a global system of neo-liberal governance. Rather 
than representing a fundamental shift from neo-liberal orthodoxy, new arguments for 
state-facilitated development represent an innovation in liberal governance, whereby 
“the goal of market liberalization is now linked by the World Bank to the development 
of effective regulatory state capacity to sustain private markets.” 104  Thus the 
governance agenda can be understood as a “means of managing the adjustment 
effort”, by taking the state as the subject for the new development project.105 As a part 
of the governance agenda, the Bank has recommended using measures to ‘lock’ states 
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into neo-liberal reforms once a commitment to implementing the desired economic 
and structural reforms had been made. To this end, international agencies were to act 
as “a mechanism for countries to make external commitments, making it more 
difficult to back-track on reforms”,106 and states were encouraged to enter treaties by 
which they would commit to “self-restricting rules, which precisely specify the 
content of policy and lock [states] into mechanisms that are costly to reverse.”107 The 
report also advocated structural reforms that would shield economic decision-making 
from the political process, arguing that in “the technical and often sensitive area of 
economic management, for example, some insulation of decision-making from the 
pressure of political lobbies is desirable.”108 
 The effect of these measures is to transform states into national mechanisms of 
neo-liberal governance, and to reorient state responsiveness in areas of economic 
management (and related areas of social and political organization) outward towards 
an external constituency comprising international lending agencies, national and non-
governmental donors.109 To achieve this, a strict separation between the economic and 
political spheres must be observed. Neo-liberal reforms and institutional structures 
must be shielded from democratic oversight, both during the implementation stage 
and in the future, in order to prevent their overthrow by future administrations. In 
part, this has been achieved through the mobilization of a depoliticizing discourse that 
presents reforms as a neutral, technical matter of implementing universal ‘best 
practice’ principles in order to increase state capacity and efficiency.110 It has also 
been accomplished through the narrowing of the democratic space in subject 
countries. Through the state-building project, key questions of economic and political 
policy are removed from democratic contestation; the result is a formulaic approach to 
democracy that emphasizes procedural aspects such as multi-party elections whilst 
stripping democracy of its content. Formal legal rights are prioritized over socio-
economic rights, and issues such as social justice and redistribution removed from 
political jurisdiction.111 The outcome of neo-liberal development and state-building 
practice is that economic policies are effectively dictated from afar, severely 
curtailing the potential for sovereign democratic decision-making in subject countries 
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and denying local populations and elected governments the right to determine the path 
of national development. 
Institutionalizing	  Neo-­‐liberal	  Development:	  ‘Good	  Governance’	  
 Whilst shifting attitudes to the state amongst international development 
institutions fall short of signifying a break with neo-liberalism, they do represent 
significant innovations in neo-liberal development discourse and a move away from 
the rigid orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus. Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses argue 
that this ‘Post-Washington Consensus’, as it has come be known, represents:  
a novel synthesis of the two previously dominant paradigms in development 
theory and policy, namely national developmentalism with its emphasis on the 
critical role of the state in overcoming market failures, and neoliberalism with its 
unquestioning belief in the benefits of the free market.112 
Advocates of this approach claim that the dogmatic faith in markets that dominated 
earlier development efforts has been replaced by a value-neutral, pragmatic approach 
that seeks to make states and markets work together to achieve development 
outcomes. Development is thus seen to have moved beyond the dogma of the past and 
into a new era of partnership in which states and markets coexist to maximize 
efficiency and well-being.113 However, to what extent does the Post-Washington 
Consensus – and in particular the good governance agenda – remain guided by neo-
liberal principles? What is the relationship between the state-building project and 
good governance initiatives? And what are the implications of the new focus on state 
institutions for subject states?  
 The good governance agenda has been instrumental in the process of neo-
liberal institutionalism. The term ‘governance’ has been defined as “the management 
of society by the people or as the exercise of authority to manage a country’s affairs 
and resources.”114  The concept of a ‘crisis of governance’ achieved prominence 
                                                
112 Öniş and Şenses, p. 286 
113 Ibid. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2009) The Least Developed Countries Report 
2009: The State and Development Governance. New York: United Nations. 
 
114 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2005) Poverty Reduction and Good 
Governance. New York: United Nations. Online at 
<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_publications/cdpreport2004web.pdf> 
(Accessed 13 November 2012) 
  98 
following the publication by the World Bank of a report entitled ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: 
From Crisis to Sustainable Growth’ in 1989. The report argued that: 
A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure 
of public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are 
important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance – a public 
service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an 
administration that is accountable to its public.115 
The problematization of governance shifted responsibility for development failures 
away from the economic policies being implemented, and attributed blame to the 
states of developing countries for failing to provide adequate support for market 
conditions to take root.116  
 The proposed solution to such governance failures is the promotion of ‘good 
governance’, which in most conceptualizations requires states to demonstrate political 
legitimacy, a fair and efficient judicial system, bureaucratic and financial 
accountability, and efficient and effective public sector management, whilst ensuring 
freedom of information, association and participation, and cooperating with civil 
society institutions.117 The good governance agenda emphasizes transparency and 
accountability in governmental institutions and processes. Governments must avoid 
corruption and be accountable and responsive to their citizenry. The United Nations 
describes good governance as a framework that: 
promotes equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and 
the rule of law, in a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring. In 
translating these principles into practice, we see the holding of free, fair and 
frequent elections, representative legislatures that make laws and provide 
oversight, and an independent judiciary to interpret those laws.118 
 Contemporary good governance discourse provides the framework for the 
model of ‘effective’ statehood envisioned by the international community, and a 
means for the internal transformation of state institutions according to an externally 
defined template. As the good governance agenda gained momentum during the 
1990s, governance reforms were attached to IFI financing in developing countries, 
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constituting a ‘new generation of conditionality’ which Craig and Porter have termed 
‘structural conditionality’, or ‘governance conditionality’.119 Good governance was 
cast as the necessary complement to the economic prescriptions of project and 
adjustment loans, and involving the attaching of orthodox economic conditionalities 
to technical assistance programmes, facilitating a more comprehensive embedding of 
market-friendly reforms in the social, political, and economic affairs of recipient 
countries.120  
 The governance agenda comprises a key part of the ‘new regime of 
development’ that arose in response to the failure of the neo-liberal project of the 
1980s.121 Graham Harrison argues that the first generation of neo-liberal reform 
“failed to legitimize itself within the states of the global South: it produced economic 
instability [and] was perceived as an external imposition”.122 As noted above, the 
adjustment era failed to embed neo-liberal ‘technologies of government’ in subject 
states, or to implant the market vision of social organization within the populations of 
these states.123 Attributing this failure to poor governance posits governance reforms 
as the remedy to the challenge of development. Whereas externally imposed 
adjustment programs tended to generate considerable resistance amongst political 
elites in adjusting states, governance discourse conveys an emphasis on ‘ownership’ 
rather than conditionality – albeit a limited form of ownership that does not 
correspond to ‘sovereign’ control over development policy. Despite this, governance 
initiatives have proven more successful in socializing neo-liberal policies into subject 
states and societies; governance discourse is more empowering than adjustment, and 
has succeeded in producing more ‘complicit’ elites and rendering neo-liberal reforms 
more stable and less contentious.124  
 Rather than rolling states back, governance-based lending is geared towards 
the reconstruction of states, with elected governments serving less as owners than 
‘custodians’, and state sovereignty directed away from decision-making towards 
‘management control’ and the implementation of “nationally specific versions of 
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neoliberal templates”.125 This process amounts to the reconstitution of the role of 
government from sovereign decision-making bodies to national administrations for 
the implementation of a set of externally determined prescriptions. The governance 
agenda thus contributes to the narrowing of the democratic space in the global South, 
where a technocratic neo-liberal discourse – otherwise known as ‘scientific 
capitalism’ 126  – has severely curtailed the scope for autonomous government 
policy.127 
 Like the majority of state-building reforms, the high levels of external 
influence associated with governance reforms have been enabled by the use of a 
technocratic discourse that denies the political implications of governance 
interventions. Use of the term ‘good governance’ has enabled a shift in the discussion 
of the conduct of public affairs from the field of ‘government’ to the more general 
area of ‘governance’ – a term which does not necessarily bear any connection to the 
state, and therefore one which has been favoured by those within development circles 
who would seek a reduced or altered role for the state. This rhetorical shift has 
enabled IFIs and development agencies to push for the reform of state institutions, 
obscuring the political nature of their activities by evoking an apparently more 
‘technical’ process. 128  Craig and Porter argue that the governance agenda is 
fundamentally political in nature. However, the IFIs that have driven this agenda are 
constrained by internal organizational prohibitions against interference in the political 
affairs of states. This prohibition necessitated the delineation of distinct domains for 
the political and the technical in government – a separation that has been reinforced 
by good governance discourse, which portrays governance considerations as technical 
concerns involving the efficient conduct of economic management and public 
administration.129  
 By emphasizing ‘good governance’, development is presented as a neutral 
concept, a value-free, ontological reality that is therefore applicable in all contexts. 
The good governance agenda, as a form of development discourse, presents 
governance as a politically and culturally neutral process, emphasizing efficiency and 
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sound management techniques rather than particular ideological systems. 130 
Abrahamsen argues that the good governance agenda has thus enabled the World 
Bank and the IMF to enlarge the scope of their activities in developing countries 
whilst retaining a semblance of ideological neutrality. This claim to neutrality is based 
on the perception of economics as an empirical, value-free scientific discipline, and 
economic policy as a matter of objective, quantifiable data, rather than subjective, 
political criteria. This ‘scientific’ discourse has facilitated a host of programmes that 
impinge upon the economic, social, and political spheres of developing countries. 
However, the extent and the political nature of this interference is obfuscated by the 
technocratic, managerial tone of good governance discourse.131  
Governance reforms have been geared towards the instilling of principles of 
efficiency, incentivization, and budgetary austerity in government institutions.132 
From the 1990s, state institutions in developing countries have been provided with 
expatriate technical assistance in order to develop more efficient systems of resource 
and information management. In many cases, the public sector reforms carried out 
under the auspices of good governance represent fundamentally new forms of state 
management.133 These measures represent the reproduction of neo-liberal governance 
within states and the reconstruction of states themselves.  
The area of public service provision provides a telling example of this process. 
The current era of ‘inclusive’ neo-liberalism has witnessed a renewed acceptance of 
the role of the state in providing public services such as healthcare and education, 
accompanied by the elaboration of a social discourse that emphasizes social inclusion, 
poverty reduction, gender equity, and environmental sustainability.134 However, the 
procurement of external funding for these areas is dependent upon the internalization 
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principles within government ministries. PRSPs and other more inclusive forms of neo-liberal 
codification draw on the same language as governance discourse. It does not fall within the scope of 
this thesis to examine such initiatives here. For further discussion of the implications of PRSPs and 
discourses of ownership, see Harrison, p. 57-58. 
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of neo-liberal principles of management and efficiency within state institutions and 
government ministries.135 Furthermore, institutional arrangements for the discharge of 
these functions must be disciplined and brought into line with neo-liberal principles.  
The 2004 Report Making Services Work for Poor People argues that there is a 
need for institutional improvements in order to assist governments to discharge their 
public responsibilities (such as the provision of basic health and education) more 
effectively. “Making services work”, it claims, “requires changing the institutional 
relationships among key actors.”136 The report identifies economic growth, increased 
public spending, and ‘technical interventions’ as essential requirements for improved 
outcomes, but insists that ‘sustainable improvements’ cannot be achieved without 
“reforming the institutions that produce inefficiencies”. 137  Key problems of 
accountability are to be addressed by constructing the relationship between the 
government and the public as a provider-client transaction. This is to be achieved by 
introducing incentivization and penalization, carrying out technological improvements 
to allow greater access to information, increasing the participation of the poor in the 
service delivery process, and, in many cases, encouraging decentralization.138  
The method for achieving improved service provision echoes standard 
governance prescriptions. Reforms must be ‘embedded’ within the public sector, with 
specific sectoral reforms linked to deeper, ongoing reforms in public administration 
and budget management. Rigorous evaluation by international agencies is 
recommended to ensure compliance and effectiveness.139 The technocratic, non-
democratic nature of such reforms and the mechanisms of regulatory discipline that 
accompany them are defining features of the contemporary regime of global 
economic governance. The result is the transferal and replication of a disciplinary 
form of neo-liberalism within states of the global South, which functions to limit the 
potential for autonomous decision-making and reorients states towards an external 
constituency in key areas of social and economic policy.140 
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Service delivery represents only one of many areas connected to the broader 
project of public sector reform. This demonstrates the far-reaching nature of the 
institutional reform envisioned by the good governance project. The reform of public 
management is intended as a tool for the implementation of further reforms 
throughout all areas of state-society relations. 141  The application of neo-liberal 
principles to key sectors of the economy including healthcare, education, justice, 
agriculture, and basic infrastructural services (such as water and power), is achieved 
in part through the reconstitution of public institutions according to market 
disciplines, under whose auspices the furthering of the liberal vision of market and 
society is to be achieved. 
The reformulation of state practices associated with the good governance 
agenda is geared towards the creation of institutional environments deemed necessary 
for the realization of the liberal vision of society. Governance initiatives reconstruct 
states through the transplantation of a market ethos and provider-client mentality 
within public institutions. Sovereign governance is thus replaced by the managerial 
role prescribed by good governance discourse.142 These re-engineered states carry out 
a key function within the architecture of global economic governance, serving to 
transmit prescriptions from the core of the global economy to societies in the global 
South. 
State-­‐building	  and	  Development	  	  
 As a central component of the liberal peace-building framework, state-
building is based on the same constellation of liberal market values that frame 
contemporary development practice. Together, state-building and neo-liberal 
development comprise interlocking mechanisms for the advancement of the liberal 
peace in the global South. According to this vision, Lund argues:  
market-oriented economic reform, democratization, civil society building, 
human rights, rule of law, and good governance are assumed to be the most 
promising approach both to preventing intra-state and inter-state conflicts as 
well as to developing poor societies and organizing nations. … Every 
component of liberalism, whether economic reform or war crimes tribunals, 
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now has a theory of peace and long-term conflict prevention lying behind 
it.143 
With this liberal paradigm now dominating contemporary development discourse, 
neo-liberal approaches to economic and social policy form the basis for the 
transformation of societies in the global South. The state-building project facilitates 
this transformation through the embedding of neo-liberal principles within states 
themselves. 
 The problematization of statehood in countries of the global South has 
provided the key point of convergence for the development and state-building 
projects. With the problematization of ‘poor governance’ as the source of previous 
development failures, efforts to reconstruct states in accordance with a liberal vision 
of ‘good governance’ have become a focal point of development policy. This 
discursive shift has been paralleled by similar intellectual currents in liberal peace-
building circles, where ‘weak statehood’ has been identified as a primary factor 
contributing to the outbreak of conflict. Prior to this, the correlation between 
underdevelopment and conflict had already driven a strategic convergence of 
development and peace-building concerns. 144  The formation of a state-building 
agenda has reinforced this association, with efforts to bolster state capacities and 
reform public institutions facilitating the embedding of neo-liberal relations within 
states themselves.145  
 Good governance initiatives are a central mechanism of liberal replication in 
subject states within the overlapping domains of neo-liberal state-building and 
development. These governance initiatives – ostensibly involving the implementation 
of a series of technical reforms in order to subject public institutions to best practice 
principles of efficiency, incentivization, transparency, and accountability – exert a 
tremendous influence on key questions of economic and social policy in the global 
South. By identifying certain aspects of economic and social policy as ‘technical’ 
governance concerns, governance discourse has facilitated a separation of “the 
economic from the political” that places certain policy matters beyond the influence 
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of elected governments. 146  Recourse to governance discourse has justified the 
implementation of neo-liberal reforms by external actors and ensured their 
maintenance in perpetuity by the use of legal guarantees and sanctions that serve to 
‘lock in’ policy commitments.147 This process has been carried out through intrusive 
external interventions, conducted beyond the remit of domestic democratic 
contention. The state-building agenda has enabled international actors unprecedented 
influence over the internal affairs of subject states, contributing to the construction of 
a new regime of global economic governance that exposes states to heightened levels 
of surveillance and neo-liberal discipline.148  
 The reconstruction of statehood according to neo-liberal principles and the 
subordination of states to external regulation constitute a dramatic restriction of 
sovereign decision-making capacity. Systems of external control over internal policy 
associated with governance reforms are highly undemocratic, serving to distance 
decision-making from mechanisms of political accountability. Key questions of social 
and economic policy are removed from domestic political contention, resulting in the 
narrowing of the domestic democratic sphere and serving to insulate neo-liberal 
reforms from the ‘threat’ of mass democracy.149  Conditions of aid dependence 
reinforce the workings of disciplinary regulation; post-conflict states in particular are 
highly dependent on international institutions and donors, and thus face a dilemma 
between external and internal standards of legitimacy. Where the requirements of a 
state’s external and internal constituencies are in conflict, governments must submit to 
the requirements of international actors to ensure continued access to resources.150  
This erosion of governmental authority prevents states from embodying a collective 
expression of society, undermining social cohesion and political legitimacy and 
sabotaging the social contract upon which ‘modern’ democracy is purported to rest.151 
 These twin processes of neo-liberal development and state-building result in 
the construction of ‘phantom states’, which possess the appearance of legal 
sovereignty without the substance of political sovereignty.152 The embedding of such 
states within international institutions repositions the state from sovereign 
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representative of national interests into a mediating link in the architecture of global 
governance. This re-engineered form of statehood requires states to act as domestic 
facilitators of neo-liberal governance. The liberal state-building vision is predicated 
on the creation of strong yet limited states: states capable of providing an enabling 
environment for markets to flourish, whilst themselves subject to market discipline.153 
 The expansion of global economic governance – or ‘disciplinary neo-
liberalism’ – has wrought deep social and economic dislocations in subject societies, 
and has thus depended upon a strategy of “cooptation of opposition” in order to 
survive in a formally democracy world order.154 The construction of markets in non-
market societies is a highly disruptive process that necessitates the subordination of 
all areas of society to market disciplines.155 To succeed, this process must be shielded 
from the repercussions of the social dislocations it creates, for the imposition of 
market structures creates deep social and economic upheavals, precipitating attempts 
by local populations to exert democratic control over capital to avoid social 
disintegration.156 As has already been suggested, the depoliticization of neo-liberal 
reform has provided a means of insulating unpopular economic policies from 
domestic political interference. Consequently, the exercise of mass democracy is 
restricted to “safely channelled areas” whilst retaining the trappings of democratic 
participation.157  
 The ‘good governance’ regime in particular arose out of a need to contain the 
threat of democracy for neo-liberal development, and has served as a mechanism to 
shield the exercise of neo-liberal reforms from widespread stirrings of popular 
opposition.158 As has already been demonstrated, ‘governance’ does not afford to 
populations a right self-determination over the process of development. Rather, 
governance discourse promotes a controlled and technocratic approach to democracy 
that contains democratic aspirations within a highly prescribed social and economic 
framework.159 This brand of ‘low intensity democracy’ is calculated to manage 
conflicts without threatening the neo-liberal regime or the power structures it 
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represents.160 Such is the form of democracy being promoted in countries of the 
global South as a result of neo-liberal state-building initiatives – a highly 
circumscribed form of democracy that emphasizes formal democratic processes over 
matters of social and economic substance.161  
 Duffield argues that the promotion of this shallow vision of democracy in 
developing and post-conflict countries constitutes a project of global ‘riot control’ and 
‘global poor relief’ through which the ‘dysfunctional’ societies of the South are to be 
transformed into ‘cooperative’ and ‘stable’ entities within a global liberal 
framework.162 Within this liberal order, development is construed as a “process of 
self-management within a liberal market environment”.163 State-building can thus be 
understood as a means of ensuring the stability of the international neo-liberal system, 
by recruiting states to act as agents and managers of the liberal peace at the national 
level.  
 As has been suggested in previous chapters, the task of liberal social 
transformation is afforded heightened urgency in post-conflict situations due to 
humanitarian and strategic considerations. However, such environments are also 
widely held to offer greater opportunity for reform, where the destruction of 
institutions and social relationships as a result of conflict is held to leave “an 
institutions and values vacuum.”164 In this view, post-conflict societies offer a ‘blank 
slate’ upon which new market structures can be written.165 State-building after 
conflict thus appears to present a unique opportunity for good governance initiatives, 
with extreme social devastation and high levels of dependence on the international 
community giving unprecedented scope for the expansion of neo-liberal governance.  
Conclusion	  
 In light of neo-liberalism’s current hegemonic position in international 
development, it can be tempting to speak of the process of international liberalization 
in such a way as to ascribe neo-liberalism itself with agency. Whilst neo-liberal policy 
and practice has certainly shaped the international system to an extraordinary degree 
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in recent decades, this has been neither an inevitable nor an uncontested process.166 
Harrison argues that the rise of global neo-liberalism was a highly uncertain and 
contested process that took place “through a series of interrelated debates and policy 
changes in many states and international organisations that enables advocates of 
economic liberalisation to shape the direction of economic orthodoxy towards the 
practices and premises of neoliberalism.”167 However, this nebulous process has 
evolved into what can now be described as an “institutional and discursive neoliberal 
project”168, a process of replication and social transformation backed up by a global 
‘neoliberal architecture’ of overlapping international norms, legal regulations, 
financial structures, trade regimes, security complexes, donor relationships, and 
institutional frameworks that serve to constrain the potential for autonomous action or 
alternative arrangements.169 
 In the decades since the dissolution of official Keynesianism, neo-liberal 
economic reform has been globalized to the extent that market forms of economic 
organization now represent a ‘common sense’ that pervades virtually all international 
organizations and the majority of states. The dominance of neo-liberal ideas is evident 
in the ‘narrowing’ of the discourse of international development. No longer is the 
general desirability of market forms of organization under question; the contemporary 
challenge for international development is to ‘make the market work’170 for the 
poor.171 
 Neo-liberal hegemony was consolidated during the 1990s, with the embedding 
of an ideological consensus amongst key actors and organizations associated with 
international development. Following a decade of structural adjustment during which 
the role of the state in adjusting countries was drastically reduced, state effectiveness 
came to be seen as the fundamental determinant of development success, justifying a 
range of disciplinary measures geared towards the construction of ‘capable states’ – 
states capable of creating and maintaining an enabling environment in which the 
prescriptions of the neo-liberal development model could flourish. 172  The 
establishment of such states would thus form a primary preoccupation of development 
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policy throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. This transformative 
project is central to the state-building agenda, linking governance considerations to 
the post-conflict imperative to foster peaceful national development.  
 In many ways, the ongoing dominance of neo-liberal practice (despite its 
failure to achieve stable economic growth or social welfare) can be attributed to the 
absence of an alternative set of practices and ideas to rival it. The collapse of 
international socialism as an influential alternative system has allowed for the 
‘endless assertion’ of neo-liberalism, which, despite repeated failures and 
misadventures, continues to evolve and recapitulate.173 The overlapping arenas of 
good governance and state-building can therefore be understood as the most recent 
iterations of neo-liberal development practice, itself part of a system of global neo-
liberalism that incorporates both developed and developing countries into interrelated 
– but deeply uneven – processes of accumulation and governance. 
 The vision of liberal peace encompasses a particular framework of 
governance, development, and democracy, predicated upon a market approach to 
economic, social, and political relations. As a central element of liberal peace-
building policy, the state-building project is geared towards the implementation of this 
vision in countries held to present a heightened risk of conflict. In practice, neo-liberal 
development and state-building initiatives comprise a mutually reinforcing front for 
the advancement of global economic development in countries of the South. This has 
been achieved through the reconstitution of states as facilitators and partners in the 
process of neo-liberal development. 
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Chapter	  Four:	  CONFLICT	  AND	  STATE-­‐BUILDING	  IN	  
TIMOR-­‐LESTE	  
  
Introduction:	  Historical	  Background	  
East Timor occupies the eastern half of the island of Timor, located in the 
Indonesian archipelago in the southern Pacific Ocean to the north of Australia. With a 
land area of approximately 15,000 square kilometres, East Timor shares a border with 
the Indonesian province of West Timor, which passed from Dutch colonial control to 
Indonesia in 1949. The territory of East Timor was colonized by the Portuguese, who 
first reached the island in the early sixteenth century – yet did not establish a colonial 
administration until 1769, when the Portuguese settlement was relocated to Dili.  
Throughout much of their administration, the Portuguese made little effort to 
consolidate their authority or develop the territory, maintaining a relatively 
unobtrusive presence until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.1 Chronically 
starved of funds and unable to support a sizeable official presence, Portuguese reach 
was minimal outside Dili, and the administration relied on systems of informal 
alliances with local chiefs or kings (known as liurai) to exercise authority. Direct 
colonial authority only extended to the sub-district level, beyond which the colonial 
administration depended on traditional authorities to implement colonial policies at 
the village level, carrying out tasks such as tax collection, labour supervision, and 
communicating with other village chiefs.2 The Portuguese’s reliance on indirect rule 
meant that a large proportion of Timorese traditional authority structures remained 
intact. Rod Nixon argues that this preservation of Timorese socio-political institutions 
could prove conducive to stability in the state-building context.3 However, ongoing 
state-building activities in what is now known as Timor-Leste have yet to incorporate 
local authority structures into formal governance institutions in any meaningful way. 
Colonial authorities did not institute any significant industrial development or 
social modernization programmes in East Timor, with the result that Portuguese 
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Timor has been described as “the most economically backward colony in Southeast 
Asia”.4 Little modernization of cultivation practices took place under Portuguese rule. 
Only a small proportion of arable land was appropriated by the Portuguese and the 
majority of land remained under customary ownership, with East Timor remaining a 
predominantly subsistence economy upon the Portuguese withdrawal in the 1970s.5  
The Portuguese ceded control of East Timor in 1975, following a bloodless 
coup in Portugal that ushered in a new regime intent on relinquishing the country’s 
colonial territories. For the first time, the receding Portuguese administration 
permitted the formation of new political parties, precipitating a ‘political awakening’ 
among the country’s educated urban elite as political involvement expanded beyond 
previous, limited membership in clandestine political organizations.6 The Timorese 
Democratic Union (UDT), Timorese Social Democrat Association (ASDT – later 
succeeded by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, commonly 
known as FRETILIN), and Timorese Popular Democratic Association (APODETI) 
emerged as the most prominent political parties in this period, and held divergent 
positions over the independence process.7 Political tensions culminated in the UDT 
and APODETI joining forces against FRETILIN, and escalated into armed violence 
following a UDT coup attempt in August 1975, claiming an estimated 1,500 to 3,000 
lives. By early September, FRETILIN had taken control of Dili and consolidated its 
position throughout the country. FRETILIN served as de facto governing authority 
from September to December, seeking (unsuccessfully) to conduct decolonization 
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talks with the Portuguese and attempting to garner international support by 
unilaterally declaring independence on 28 November 1975.8  
 The Indonesian invasion of East Timor began on December 7 with a 
combined land, sea, and air campaign, marking the onset of a brutal 24-year 
occupation that would claim the lives of approximately 180,000 people – over a 
quarter of the population.9 East Timor was officially incorporated into Indonesia on 
17 July 1976, and the Indonesian military set about consolidating administrative 
control over the new province and suppressing the Timorese armed resistance. 
FRETILIN members quickly established a national resistance network based on 
traditional district and village-level administrative structures, with a civilian 
clandestine movement providing support for military activities. The National Council 
of Revolutionary Resistance (CRRN) was established in 1981 to lead the military and 
political wings of the resistance movement, and – under the leadership of Xanana 
Gusmão – a policy of reconciliation was pursued between the opposing political 
parties of 1974 and 1975, in particular FRETILIN and UDT.10 This development was 
linked to a broader depoliticization of the resistance movement and the development 
of a unified East Timorese national identity,11 forming a nationalist united front that 
became increasingly adept at attracting international attention to the Timorese cause.12 
 The Indonesians made considerable investments in infrastructural 
development during the occupation years, laying thousands of kilometres of roads, 
expanding the public administration, and constructing and staffing schools and 
hospitals. Despite this, little progress in terms of social and economic modernization 
was made during the Indonesian period. In 1997 East Timor remained Indonesia’s 
poorest province: development indicators were consistently low in comparison to 
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other Indonesian provinces, and the economy remaining overwhelmingly subsistence-
based. 13  Broad education programmes during this time generated a growing 
proportion of educated East Timorese youth with few prospects of employment or 
further education, a development which proved critical to the Timorese independence 
movement, as student activism was instrumental in garnering international attention to 
the country’s plight.14 Many of the infrastructural developments introduced during 
this period would later be reversed, with post-referendum violence and scorched-earth 
tactics destroying an estimated 70 per cent of the country’s infrastructure.15 
 Political developments in Indonesia set in motion the train of events that 
ultimately resulted in East Timorese independence. Indonesia’s long-standing 
president Suharto resigned in 1998 amid deep social unrest associated with the Asian 
financial crisis. His successor – President B. J. Habibie – agreed to hold a referendum 
to determine the future of East Timor, offering a choice between political autonomy 
within Indonesia or independence.16 The referendum was carried out under UN 
auspices on August 30, in which an overwhelming majority (78.5 per cent) voted for 
independence despite intimidation and violence by pro-Indonesian militias. 
Widespread violence broke out immediately after the results were released, as the 
Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militias attacked independence supporters, 
forcibly displaced much of Dili’s population, and systematically burned or destroyed 
much of the country’s physical infrastructure.  The violence claimed the lives of 
approximately 1,400 civilians and displaced virtually the entire population, with over 
250,000 refugees driven into West Timor province, and a further 100,000-200,000 
Timorese internally displaced.17  
 The UN Security Council responded quickly to the violence, authorizing a 
Chapter VII peace enforcement mission mandated to use all necessary means to 
restore security and facilitate humanitarian assistance. INTERFET (International 
Force in East Timor) was deployed on 20 September 1999, and assumed de facto 
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governance functions until an official transitional authority could be established. 
UNTAET was established in October 1999 as a transitional administration tasked 
with preparing the territory for full independence in partnership with the East 
Timorese people.18 UNTAET was granted unprecedented authority over governance 
functions during this period, in which it sought to establish viable structures for 
independent self-governance through intensive state-building activities. 19  The 
following sections will examine the ongoing process of state-building in East Timor 
(now the independent nation of Timor-Leste), and evaluate their impact on the 
political processes and democratic prospects of the young nation. 
UNTAET:	  Building	  the	  (Insulated)	  State	  in	  East	  Timor	  
The UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) was 
established on 25 October 1999 by UN Security Council Resolution 1272, which 
conferred “overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor” on the new 
mission and authorized it “to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including 
the administration of justice” until the territory achieved formal independence.20 
UNTAET was also tasked with providing security and maintaining law and order; 
establishing an effective administration; assisting in the development of civil and 
social services; ensuring the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
rehabilitation, and development assistance; carrying out capacity-building for self-
government; and assisting in the establishment of conditions for sustainable 
development.21 The mission structure included an armed security force, a governance 
and public administration bureau comprising a large civilian policing contingent, and 
a humanitarian and emergency rehabilitation component.22 
Commentators have argued that the conditions that UNTAET met upon its 
deployment in November were in many ways extremely favourable, the prospects for 
success much more promising than those generally experienced by peace missions.23 
Indonesian forces had by this time withdrawn from East Timor (although some pro-
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Indonesian elements remained), clearing the way for the rapid establishment of 
internal and external security. The local population welcomed the presence of the UN, 
and the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) – as orchestrator of the 
resistance movement and pro-independence representative body – constituted a single 
local body with which to negotiate. The reconstruction effort had been provided with 
substantial funding by donor governments, and the World Bank and IMF were closely 
involved with the mission, bringing various development agencies together at an early 
stage. Presiding over the peace-building effort was a mission endowed with 
unparalleled administrative and legal authority to govern the territory, with the strong 
support of international public opinion and political will.24 
The degree of authority and the breadth of responsibilities bequeathed on the 
mission were unprecedented in the history of UN peace operations, with the UN for 
the first time assuming sovereign control over a territory in preparation for self-
determination. Authorized “to enact new laws, promulgate regulations and amend, 
suspend or repeal existing ones”, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative 
(SRSG) – also the Transitional Administrator of East Timor – wielded virtually 
autocratic power within the territory.25 Not only was the UN responsible for public 
administration and the various functions associated with that role, it was also 
responsible for establishing state institutions and building up local capacity for the 
exercise of autonomous statehood. The UN administration in East Timor was thus 
taken as a test case for a ‘trusteeship’ model of state-building missions, with the 
territory serving as a “laboratory for an experiment of governance”.26 
In effect, UNTAET’s mandate required the organization to establish in East 
Timor an administrative system reaching from the central to the village level, one that 
would ultimately be staffed by local civil servants recruited and trained in the tasks of 
public administration. UNTAET was required to establish political mechanisms such 
as an electoral process, facilitate the emergence of a political system, and conduct 
national elections. As the acting sovereign authority, UNTAET was also responsible 
for establishing financial and tax systems, drafting legislation, determining foreign 
policy, establishing border security, carrying out revenue collection, developing and 
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training new police and defense forces, and training professionals such as teachers, 
health workers, lawyers, prosecutors, court officials, and prison officers to staff the 
country’s new institutions.27 
The	  Failure	  of	  ‘Timorisation’	  
As UNTAET’s emergency humanitarian role and security tasks became less 
pressing, the lack of East Timorese participation in the transitional administration 
became a cause of increasing resentment. 28  The UN-orchestrated state-building 
project had arrived in East Timor assuming the existence of a ‘state-centric terra 
nullius’, carrying out its institution-building activities accordingly. However, the 
situation in East Timor was far from a political vacuum: a broad-based political body 
already existed which had successfully mobilized popular support and orchestrated 
resistance activities for the previous two decades.29 The CNRT had acted as an 
umbrella organization for resistance activities and a shadow governing body during 
the Indonesian occupation, and still enjoyed widespread popular legitimacy. However, 
reflecting the impartiality ethic of traditional peacekeeping missions and a desire not 
to antagonize Indonesia and pro-Indonesian elements remaining within East Timor, 
UNTAET held the CNRT at arms length, effectively alienating the one body equipped 
to serve as a link between the Dili-based UN administration and the local 
population.30 
Chopra attributes this exclusion of local representatives to a desire to avoid the 
problems of previous missions with fragmented local authorities – in particular the 
experiences of Somalia and Afghanistan. A second factor behind the unwillingness to 
include Timorese in any meaningful way in the transitional administration stemmed 
from the attitudes of international officials themselves, who exhibited ‘colonial-style 
behaviour’ and a sense of superiority towards the local people. Chopra argues that the 
unprecedented powers of the UN in East Timor had a corrupting effect on 
international staff, many of whom viewed the Timorese as unreliable, unskilled, and 
therefore incapable of self-government.31  
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These attitudes contributed to a growing gap between the official authority of 
the UN, and the de facto authority of the CNRT, which still effectively controlled East 
Timor’s towns and rural areas.32 Communication with the CNRT had been minimal 
during UNTAET’s planning stages, setting the tone for the patterns of inadequate 
consultation that followed. 33  This failure to engage politically with the CNRT 
undermined the mission’s legitimacy, leading the organization to establish its own 
parallel structures and become increasingly vociferous in its critique of UNTAET and 
demands for broader Timorese participation.34 
In late November 1999, a National Consultative Council (NCC) – later 
replaced by the expanded but equally constrained National Council (NC) – was 
established in an attempt to increase Timorese participation in the transitional process. 
The Council was required to consult with the East Timorese population and was 
authorized to submit recommendations on UNTAET regulations, yet remained an 
advisory body only and lacked legislative powers. Members of the national councils 
(and smaller district councils) were appointed rather than elected, and the SRSG 
reserved the right to approve or discard Council recommendations. 35  Although 
intended as the “primary mechanism through which the representatives of the people 
of East Timor [should] actively participate in the decision making process”36, the 
councils were neither autonomous nor sufficiently representative, and fell short of 
Timorese expectations.37 
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In an effort to facilitate greater direct Timorese participation, in July 2000 
UNTAET replaced its Office of Governance and Public Administration with the East 
Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA), to be administered by a Transitional 
Cabinet – distinct from the NC – with a greater role in public administration. The 
Cabinet was given portfolios in the areas of internal administration, infrastructure, 
economic affairs, social affairs, political affairs, justice, finance, and police and 
emergency services, and granted the new ministers responsibility for formulating 
policies and issuing recommendations to the NC. This measure accorded more closely 
with Timorese expectations, allowing local leaders a significant role in the transitional 
administration. However, the Cabinet was half comprised of UNTAET officials, and 
remained subordinate to the SRSG, ensuring that UNTAET retained exclusive 
political power. In late 2000, the East Timorese members of the Cabinet threatened to 
resign if UNTAET failed to transfer greater authority to them. Timorese members of 
the NC and Cabinet wielded little influence and few resources, resulting in a string of 
resignations and fuelling demands for an accelerated transfer of power.38 
Despite this increasing dissatisfaction with the ETTA, Michael Smith argues 
that the establishment of ETTA represented a significant deviation from the 
transitional process as it was originally conceived, whereby the Timorisation of 
political posts would not take place until near to the time of national elections (while 
the Timorisation of administrative functions would take place at an earlier date). The 
formation of ETTA began this process of political transition earlier, informed by the 
belief that effective preparation for self-government cannot take place without 
providing national leaders with direct governmental experience. 39  However, the 
incorporation of Timorese leaders into the transitional process proved too little, too 
late. The failure to ensure meaningful participation from an early stage severely 
undermined the political legitimacy of the UN mission. This lack of popular support, 
together with UNTAET’s poor progress in the areas of reconstruction and economic 
development and mounting resentment at the glaring inequalities between 
international officials and the living conditions of the local population, led East 
Timorese leaders to seek independence as early as possible.40 
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In February 2002, the NC issued recommendations calling for the 
establishment of a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution and, upon 
independence, to act as the country’s first parliament. UNTAET accepted this 
proposal and began preparing for Constituent Assembly elections to be held on 30 
August 2001. From this point on, UNTAET shifted its focus from its transitional 
governance mandate to crafting a feasible exit strategy and providing the “minimal 
requirements necessary to allow for sovereignty transfer.”41 
The Constituent Assembly elections were a resounding victory for FRETILIN, 
which – in coalition with the ASDT party – comprised an overwhelming majority in 
the Assembly and was thus able to draft the new constitution without consultation 
with other parties. The document was drafted with minimal public consultation and 
adopted without a referendum, allowing FRETILIN – with UN approval – free reign 
in determining the country’s future governing arrangements.42 The new FRETILIN 
government effectively controlled parliament, but – in anticipation of being unable to 
control the presidency – adopted a bi-centric governance system that awarded broad 
executive and legislative powers to the prime minister and cabinet ministers while 
limiting the president to a largely symbolic role. 43  The UN, desperate for the 
appearance of success, was able to leave the country in 2002 with its own elected 
legislature. However, FRETILIN’s authoritarian tendencies and the deep antagonisms 
between the ruling party and the president cast a long shadow over the country’s 
prospects for political stability. Commentators predicted a difficult relationship 
between Xanana Gusmão – elected president in April 2002 – and FRETILIN Prime 
Minister Marí Alkatiri, who had strong personal and political differences and 
divergent views on the future of the country. Their predictions proved correct, with 
tensions between the two undermining the unity of the new government and 
contributing to the outbreak of conflict in 2006.44  
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The	  Legacy	  of	  UNTAET	  	  
Despite conditions in East Timor that appeared to presage peace-building 
success, Anthony Goldstone argues that UNTAET was from the outset hindered by a 
number of structural factors that undermined its legitimacy and ability to fulfill its 
responsibilities. Resolution 1272 offered little guidance regarding the means by which 
UNTAET was to fulfill its mandate, and, while calling for UNTAET to cooperate and 
work closely with the East Timorese people, did little to clarify how such 
participation was to be achieved. This lack of clear planning and direction resulted in 
a ‘trial and error’ approach to governance and institution-building, and negligible 
involvement of Timorese in the political and administrative structures established.45 
This non-consultative tendency carried through into the independence period, largely 
as a result of the institutional template established by international interveners and the 
nature of ongoing relations between the independent government and the donor 
community. 
UNTAET’s state-building activities were conducted through the Office of 
Governance and Public Administration (GPA), which bore responsibility for 
establishing mechanisms of governance at the central and district levels, managing a 
civilian police force, restoring public service provision, establishing the rule of law, 
and fostering market development.46 The viability of the institutions established, 
however, was sorely affected by UNTAET’s centralized and authoritarian style, 
which generated resentment and mistrust and ultimately resulted in the UN’s 
accelerated withdrawal in response to demands for a faster and more comprehensive 
transferal of power to Timorese leaders. This unwillingness to share power until the 
latter stages of the transitional administration greatly undermined the ability of local 
leaders to build sufficient capacity to perform the required tasks for the running of 
liberal institutions.47 
 The state-building aspects of UNTAET’s mandate floundered under UN 
Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) management, which – in keeping 
with its operational experience – structured the mission as a peacekeeping operation. 
The recruitment, budgetary, and organizational aspects of the mission were therefore 
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informed by standard peacekeeping practice, and failed to adequately provide for the 
civilian governance requirements of the mission. Lacking experience or capacity for 
managing large governance operations, the planning phase emphasized security-
oriented tasks at the expense of other components of the mission – in particular the 
operation’s legal and civilian administration components.48 Chopra has commented 
that high ranking UNTAET officials – including SRSG Sergio de Mello himself – 
exhibited a controlling, ‘bullying’ style which contributed to internal fragmentation in 
the GPA and further undermined UNTAET’s capacity to implement successful 
reconstruction strategies or establish an effective bureaucracy.49 These factors – 
together with the lack of local knowledge of the mission’s international personnel – 
contributed to a lack of clear operational ‘direction’ and reinforced the top-down 
mentality of the operation. 
 The result of this combination of operational uncertainty, bureaucratic 
centralism, and administrative incapacity was that at its very conception, Timor-Leste 
inherited an institutionally weak state.50 Chopra has gone so far as to argue that UN 
administration had “given birth to a failed state”, the social and political conditions of 
which were comparable to “the most severely collapsed states in the world.”51 The 
inadequate attention paid to building local capacity for self-government meant that the 
newly established state institutions remained essentially foreign structures with very 
little basis in Timorese society. Without some form of social contract to foster local 
legitimacy, such rapidly constructed institutions could scarcely have proven 
responsive to their local constituency. In its refusal to recognize the CNRT as a local 
partner for governance and development, UNTAET squandered a potential 
opportunity to establish local legitimacy by interacting with and building on pre-
existing Timorese governance structures.52 Throughout the transitional period, the 
administration’s real constituency was located externally in the international 
organizations, UN member states and donor governments involved with the running 
of the mission. The product was a “state-building enterprise that skidded on the 
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surface of the country, and that did not penetrate the sub-districts and villages or make 
a positive difference in the daily lives of individuals.”53 
Beyond	  Independence:	  Societal	  Alienation	  and	  the	  Insulated	  State	  
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste became an independent state on 20 
May 2002. The UN remained in the country in a reduced capacity to carry out a 
supporting role for the new independent administration. UNTAET was succeeded by 
the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), which was tasked with 
supporting the new government’s administrative and security capacities until 2005, 
when it was replaced by a small observer mission, the UN Office in Timor-Leste 
(UNOTIL). The UN presence would be scaled up once again in mid-2006 following a 
brief conflict that pitted the defence force against the police force, and resulted in the 
forced resignation of the Prime Minister and the prosecution of members of his 
cabinet (the events of 2006 will be addressed in further detail later in the chapter). The 
UN Mission in Timor-Leste was deployed in August 2006 with a mandate to provide 
administrative support to the Timorese government, and as such was endowed with 
greater responsibilities and authority than UNMISET and UNOTIL.54 Although only 
intended to last one year, UNMIT’s mandate was extended four times, finally 
concluding with the withdrawal of the mission in December 2012.  
 The fledgling Timorese nation inherited a collection of externally constructed 
institutions that stood in abstraction from social and political realities. UNTAET’s 
technocratic efforts to insulate state institutions from potentially harmful social forces 
and ‘blank slate’ approach to reconstruction in East Timor resulted in the formation of 
an ‘insulated state’ with little basis in Timorese society.55 As argued in previous 
chapters, the formation of stable states is a historically contingent process – a process 
deeply rooted in social relations that determine the role, structure, and power of states 
in accordance with social expectations.56 This contractual relationship ensures some 
level of accountability to local constituents, although accountability mechanisms may 
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take different forms in different social and political contexts.57 Essentially, states must 
remain responsive to forces operating in society in order to secure their ongoing 
political legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.  
The process of state formation that occurred in East Timor did not follow this 
pattern. In their efforts to foster peace in a country scarred by conflict, interveners 
associated high levels of physical destruction with a presumed absence of structures 
for local organization.58 Adhering to internationally prescribed concepts of what 
constitutes a peaceful society, interveners disregarded existing governance structures 
in favour of an institutionalist, technocratic model.59 As a result, the state-building 
process that took place resembled an experiment in liberal ‘state transplantation’ 
rather than any meaningful attempt to support the emergence of locally relevant 
governing structures. Accordingly, the peace that has been constructed in Timor-Leste 
is a “virtual peace resting on [the] empty institutions” of an “illiberal and ineffective 
state”.60 These institutions are neither viable instruments of public administration – as 
suggested by the country’s consistently low development outcomes, inadequate public 
service provision, and poor budgetary capacity – nor are they relevant in terms of 
local culture and everyday life for the average Timorese citizen.61 
The ineffectual state institutions that have been established in Timor-Leste, 
although legally sovereign, are largely defined and dependent upon the international 
community. This dependent and in many ways subordinate relationship is a 
magnification of the changing nature of sovereignty in international relations, a trend 
that impacts all countries. However, nowhere has the concept of ‘sovereignty’ been 
more dramatically redefined than in the state-building experiments of post-conflict 
countries. Chandler argues that international state-building attempts have brought 
about the ‘inversion’ of the sovereign state, wherein the state no longer embodies the 
collective wishes of the nation, serving instead to channel inward an externally driven 
agenda. The state has undergone a fundamental transformation, having been 
restructured in accordance with the dictates of ‘good governance’ into a ‘mediating 
link’ between domestic politics and international relations.62 This is the function 
performed by the state in Timor-Leste – that of a gatekeeper between the domestic 
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and the global, dependent upon the international community for survival and 
ultimately more responsive to this external constituency than its national 
community.63  
In this context, the extent to which Timorese society can be accurately 
described as ‘self-determining’ or truly independent is highly questionable. Hughes 
describes sovereign communities as collectives that “employ local knowledge and 
deploy locally generated legitimacy”64 – a capacity that has been notably absent in the 
brief history of Timor-Leste and remains beyond the grasp of most communities 
subject to external peace interventions. The experiences of Timor-Leste demonstrate 
that, in practice, a great gulf may exist between sovereignty in its formal, legal sense, 
and the actual ability of states to act as a collective expression of society. Such states 
are sovereign in name only – they bear sovereign status on paper, but do not function 
as independent, self-governing political entities. In practice, the condition of aid 
dependence brought about by the state-building project prevents the exercise of true 
sovereignty.65 
The reformulation of sovereignty associated with the state-building agenda has 
generated a form of statehood in which states are increasingly embedded in 
international institutions. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of this ‘embedded 
sovereignty’ can be seen in the governance arrangements for Bosnia. Although 
formally existing as an independent country with its own elected legislature, the 
highest political authority in the country is an externally-appointed representative of 
the international intervention in Bosnia (the High Representative for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), who retains the power to dismiss elected officials and to repeal or pass 
legislation over twenty years after the initial intervention.66 In Timor-Leste, where the 
withdrawal of the UN transitional administration spelled an end to official 
international sovereignty, the practical outcome in terms of government policy is 
much the same, with the government required to court international support for 
legislation or risk being hamstrung by donor disapproval. Where government policies 
have strayed from international approval, pressures applied by external donors and 
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institutions to conform to an externally prescribed policy agenda have constrained the 
government’s ability to take autonomous action.67 
The outcome of the implementation of this externally driven model has been 
the widespread alienation of the East Timorese population. Timorese participation in 
state-building activities has been largely limited to a small, Dili-based, Portuguese-
speaking elite, excluding the voices of the majority of the population living in rural 
areas, and also marginalizing the Indonesian-educated youth population, whose 
activism had been essential to ensuring ongoing international attention to the 
Timorese resistance movement during the 1990s.68  
 As previous chapters have illustrated, recent approaches to state-building have 
emphasized the contextual nature of state formation, and the importance of fostering 
state-society relationships in order to lay a foundation of political legitimacy for state 
authority.69 These approaches recognize the importance of a social contract between 
the state and the societies they govern, and the need for state-builders to incorporate 
local systems of governance and legitimacy into new institutional frameworks. It has 
been noted that the process of institution building in East Timor before independence 
did not pay adequate attention to such local structures, nor did it create opportunities 
for adequate Timorese participation in the transitional process. Rather, the 
“institutionalist and rationalist” approach to constructing state institutions in East 
Timor relegated the Timorese people to the sidelines, creating a scenario in which 
“[i]ndividuals and their relationship with the state are defined by the institutions of 
governance, rather than by their own contractual agency.”70 Instead of the promotion 
of a social contract rooted in indigenous concepts of authority (admittedly a lofty task 
for an intervening force to achieve), the situation in Timor-Leste is that of an alien 
state coexisting in uneasy relationship with Timorese society. Local ‘contracts’ have 
been replaced by the governance contract, which prescribes for the state a role that it 
has been largely incapable of fulfilling. 
Governance	  in	  an	  Aid	  Dependent	  State:	  Negotiating	  the	  Domestic	  and	  the	  Global	  
Caroline Hughes describes the situation of the government of Timor-Leste 
since independence as one of aid dependence, defined as “the pressing and continuous 
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orientation of local political practices towards a monitoring, evaluating, and decision-
making international audience.” 71  Extreme levels of international supervision 
associated with the state-building project in East Timor have functioned as a ‘political 
straitjacket’, diminishing the possibilities for the formation of a truly empowered 
national public sphere as an arena for popular participation and consultation.72 
Domestic politics has been effectively emptied of content – little is at stake due to the 
removal of many questions of social and economic policy from democratic 
contention. Good governance has facilitated the transfer of formerly domestic 
considerations into the international sphere, removing key decisions from the purview 
of the national community and leaving few areas open to democratic contestation.73 
The result of state-building intervention in the country has been “the subordination of 
the national public to international surveillance and regimentation”,74 with the pursuit 
of good governance requiring Timorese institutions to structure themselves in 
accordance with stringent international standards.75 
 Thus donor expectations have frequently required the Timorese government to 
elevate international priorities over specifically local concerns. Local political 
authorities must behave in such a way as to secure continuing access to the 
international resources upon which the state depends, often marginalizing local 
constituencies in the process.76 In order to attract external resources, the FRETILIN 
government upheld UNTAET’s centralized, technocratic approach once in power, 
placing a greater emphasis on international diplomacy than on the rapid economic 
decline occurring within the country. This trend was manifest in the government’s 
adoption of austerity measures between 2002 and 2006, despite the widespread 
economic hardship experienced in Timor-Leste after independence. Driven by an 
admirable desire to reduce Timorese dependence in the long-term by refusing to take 
out international loans, Mari Alkatiri’s government proposed a number of economic 
nationalist measures in order to cover budgetary shortfalls, but was forced to abandon 
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most of these in the face of pressure from donor agencies and international business 
interests.77 
This pressure to court international approval at the expense of domestic 
requirements raises important questions regarding the nature of democracy in post-
conflict environments, and in particular the impact of state-building activities on the 
prospects for broadly inclusive democracy in subject states. The form of democracy 
constructed in post-conflict environments such as East Timor reflects a minimalist, 
procedural vision of democracy – an approach that places particular emphasis on 
democratic processes, such as multiparty elections, often at the expense of genuine 
broad-based participation.78 ‘Procedural democracy’79 provides equal formal rights, 
yet by its tendency to elevate process over participation provides unequal resources 
for the utilization of these rights. This is the form of democracy promoted by 
contemporary development discourse – one that reflects the tendency in development 
circles to separate the political and economic spheres by dissociating democracy from 
notions of social progress and economic equality. The favouring of formal legal rights 
over socio-economic rights is a result of the conflation of democracy and economic 
liberalism within the governance agenda, and represents a common feature of liberal 
peace-building activities in the intersecting areas of state-building and development.80  
 Abrahamsen argues that the form of democracy arising from the governance 
agenda’s conflation of democracy and economic liberalism often “bears little 
relevance for the majority of citizens in developing countries.”81 The majority of poor 
citizens in these countries, she argues, value their political and civil rights largely as a 
means for demanding socio-economic reform. Thus engagement in democratic 
politics is seen as a means of achieving a better standard of living. However, the 
governance agenda as currently promoted by the development community emphasizes 
the procedural elements of democracy without any corresponding commitment to 
resource redistribution or socio-economic equality.82 The outcome in Timor-Leste has 
been extreme disillusionment amongst the majority of the Timorese population, 
whose democratic experience has proved tremendously disempowering, producing 
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few tangible results and bequeathing on them a “state [with] little substance” or 
bearing on everyday life.83 
 Popular disillusionment with the experience of ‘independent’ statehood played 
a pivotal role in the 2006 riots in Timor-Leste, allowing for the rapid mobilization of 
disenfranchised groups in Dili in response to an initial dispute between the armed 
forces. Discontent had been brewing amongst members of the F-FDTL (East Timor 
Defence Force) from the western part of Timor-Leste – known as the ‘Kaladi’ – in 
response to perceived discrimination from the predominantly eastern (‘Firaku’) 
officers. On 28 April, protests in Dili by Kaladi petitioners were joined by other 
disaffected groups, including ex-veterans and youth gangs, sparking clashes between 
protesters and security forces and between rival gangs, which engaged in a spate of 
looting and arson that targeted the homes and property of easterners. The police forces 
disintegrated completely after twelve members of the national police (PNTL) were 
killed in clashes with the military. Widespread violence continued throughout May 
until the deployment of an international stabilization force, and sporadic violence 
continued into 2007. At least thirty-eight people were killed and sixty-nine wounded 
during the conflict, which resulted in the destruction of over 1,500 houses and the 
displacement of 150,000 people.84  
 The political fallout from the conflict was dramatic and immediate. Defence 
Minister Roque Rodrigues and Interior Minister Rogério Lobato were removed from 
their posts immediately, with Lobato accused of arming para-military groups for 
personal political interests. Lobato’s court testimony implicated Prime Minister 
Alkatiri in the irregular distribution of weapons for use against political opponents, 
who was forced to resign on 26 June, to be succeeded by Jose Ramos-Horta as interim 
Prime Minister. FRETILIN received only 29 per cent of the party vote (down from 59 
per cent in 2001) in national elections the following year, and was removed from 
office by a party coalition headed by Xanana Gusmão.  
 Hughes argues that the structure of the Timorese state and its relations with 
the donor community prevented it from carrying out the crucial governmental 
function of political management. In order to maintain stability and legitimacy, 
governments must have the capacity to reward and respond to their main 
constituencies. However, throughout its term the FRETILIN government was unable 
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to accommodate the economic and political demands of the Timorese population – a 
failure that expressed itself in the buildup of anti-government sentiment that emerged 
during the 2006 crisis.85 Restrictions on the use of state power in Timor-Leste as a 
result of external state-building prescriptions had denied the Timorese government the 
capacity to build popular support through public spending. 86  As a result, the 
FRETILIN government sought to build a support base through alliances with other 
social forces, including clan networks and regional interests such as those that 
manifested themselves in the conflict of 2006. Social competition for power and 
resources that may otherwise have found expression in the political process – but had 
been denied as a result of neo-liberal constraints on economic policy – was thus 
expressed within the state apparatus itself. Disenchanted social groupings seeking to 
have their economic and political demands met were incorporated into leaders’ 
patronage networks in an environment of intense competition over scarce resources.87 
The 2006 crisis demonstrates the dangers of the denial of sovereign authority and 
political legitimacy associated with the state-building project. Attaining a stable 
government in Timor-Leste in future will therefore be attendant on the ability of 
national governments to carve out space for discretionary action, independent of 
donor politics. 
Conclusion	  
Timor-Leste’s lack of autonomy since independence has prevented successive 
governments from responding to popular pressure for socio-economic reform. Human 
development represents one of the greatest challenges facing the new country, and the 
population has repeatedly called for a more equal distribution of resources. However, 
these demands have not been translated into policy at the government level, where the 
beleaguered state has been largely prevented from directing its financial resources 
towards human development outcomes.88 The following chapter will explore this 
issue in depth, particularly in relation to the management of Timor-Leste’s oil funds 
and donors’ responses to proposals to draw down greater quantities to fund public 
welfare. 
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86 Jones, p. 558, 561 
87 Ibid. p. 561-63 
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  130 
Chapter	  Five:	  DEVELOPMENT	  AND	  RESOURCE	  
POLICY	  IN	  AID	  DEPENDENT	  TIMOR-­‐LESTE	  
 
Introduction	  
 The exercise of neo-liberal governance in the South generally translates into a 
‘triangular relationship’ between three sets of actors: the state, “cross-cutting global 
networks of interveners, investors, and donors”, and “the mass of the impoverished 
population”.1 The requirements of neo-liberal governance place these actors in a state 
of great tension. As noted in earlier chapters, processes of international state-building 
and neo-liberal development expose states to a dilemma between internal and external 
standards of legitimacy. Conditions of aid dependence often require governments in 
developing countries to accede to the demands of external interveners, posing 
considerable difficulties for elites who must simultaneously generate political 
legitimacy at home.2 This chapter will explore this dynamic in Timor-Leste in relation 
to the management of oil resources, questions of food security, land, agricultural 
policy, and broader issues of social and economic development. 
Petroleum	  
 Issues regarding the exploitation and management of oil reserves in Timor-
Leste highlight the challenges of pursuing a path of autonomous economic 
development in the context of global economic governance. This challenge is 
magnified by conditions of aid dependence, which require states to submit to a greater 
degree of external neo-liberal discipline. The post-independence Timorese 
government under Mari Alkatiri sought to end Timor-Leste’s aid dependence as 
quickly as possible, and refused the World Bank’s urging to cover budgetary short-
falls accruing from reductions in aid by signing up to loans and debt. The government 
dealt with the resulting financial deficit by slashing its budget and imposing austerity 
measures – despite the desperation of much of the Timorese population. The 
                                                
1 Hughes, p. 135  
These ‘cross-cutting networks’ have often been referred to throughout this thesis in generic terms as 
‘external agents’, ‘international interveners’, or at times even more broadly as ‘the international 
community’. It is important to recognize that these networks do not constitute one unified entity, but a 
coalescing of international financial and political actors and interests around the concept of neo-liberal 
governance.  
2 Tadjbakhsh; Hughes  
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government’s willingness to cut expenditure was lauded by IFIs as a “masterly 
display of fiscal responsibility and neoliberal minimalism.”3 Less favourable to 
international donors were the government’s efforts to elicit revenue by establishing a 
progressive income tax system and imposing fees and taxes on foreign agencies and 
investors. These measures gave the country a bad reputation amongst international 
investors; by 2006, Timor-Leste was considered the second worst country to do 
business, based on World Bank survey ratings.4 
 The government’s greatest opportunity to achieve economic autonomy 
depends upon the maximization of revenues from oil and gas reserves in the Timor 
Sea, estimated to be worth US$30 billion.5 The Timor-Leste Strategic Development 
Plan outlines a key role for the petroleum sector in its vision for national development 
for Timor-Leste. By 2030, the government hopes to transform Timor-Leste into a 
“modern diversified economy”, based on a system of commercial smallholder 
agricultural production for domestic and international markets, and a large industrial 
petroleum sector generating both upstream and downstream revenue through oil 
extraction and onshore oil and gas refinery. 6  Underpinned by a sophisticated 
infrastructural network of roads, ports, power, and telecommunications, the petroleum 
and agricultural sectors are projected to serve as the foundations for sustainable 
economic development, providing income for investments in health and education 
services. The maximization of oil revenues in the short-term is seen as a first step 
towards this process, providing crucial funding for the long-term development of the 
agricultural sector into a “leading driver of private sector jobs” and the construction of 
a solid infrastructural foundation for broader development.7 
 Oil and gas exploration in the waters surrounding East Timor began in 1962. 
By 1970, the presence of viable petroleum and gas reserves in the Timor Sea and 
Bonaparte Gulf region had been detected. Seismic data also suggested the presence of 
further, potentially vast hydrocarbon reserves in the Timor Sea. Exploitation of these 
reserves required the clarification of respective claims to the seabed by Australia and 
                                                
3 Hughes, p. 144 
4 Ibid. p. 145 
5 Ibid. p. 145 
6 República Democrática de Timor-Leste. (2011) Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030. 
Dili. Online at <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Timor-Leste-Strategic-Plan-2011-
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Indonesia.8 The Australian government sought to reach a rapid settlement of maritime 
boundaries with Indonesia, which could then be presented to Portugal (who remained 
the colonial power of East Timor at the time, and from whom some resistance was 
anticipated) as a fait accompli. At the time of these bilateral negotiations in the early 
1970s, Indonesia had carried out no exploration of its own in the Timor Sea, and had 
little evidence of its own to counter aggressive Australian claims to maritime territory. 
It is doubtful whether Indonesia was aware of the vast hydrocarbon potential in the 
Timor Sea – as yet unproven but presumed to exist, and later confirmed in 1974 with 
the discovery of the Greater Sunrise natural gas field in the Timor Sea.9 
 The Australian seabed claim extended as far north as the Timor Trough, which 
the Australian government argued constituted a break in the continental shelf between 
Australia and Timor, creating two distinct shelves separating the Australian and 
Timorese coasts. According to this interpretation, the Timor Trough formed a natural 
divide between a narrow shelf extending from Timor, and a wide shelf extending from 
the Australian coastline. The Australian government bolstered its claim with an 
abundance of oceanographic data, which was alleged to provide firm geological 
evidence that Timor Trough indeed marked the end of the Australian plate. In the area 
to the east of longitude 133°14' East, where Indonesia and Australia shared a common 
shelf, Australia held that an equitable boundary should be drawn.10  
 According to international law, maritime boundaries between adjacent 
countries are situated along the median line between the countries’ coasts, unless 
otherwise specified on the basis of official agreement between respective 
governments. Australia argued that the presence of the Timor Trough constituted 
‘special circumstances’ under the 1958 Geneva Convention whereby the median 
principle did not apply, as the Convention did not specify a legal precedent for 
maritime boundaries where two continental shelves existed. The Indonesian 
                                                
8 R. King. (2013) A Gap in the Relationship: The Timor Gap, 1972-2013. In Submission No 13: Inquiry 
into Australia’s Relationship with Timor-Leste. Canberra: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade, p. 2 
9 Ibid. p. 4, 8-9 
10 Ibid. p. 2-3, 9 
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Geological consensus at the time implied that a shared continental shelf extended north of Timor, with 
the Timor Trough representing only an incidental depression in the seabed rather than the boundary of 
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government did not subscribe to this view, yet succumbed to the weight of Australian 
argument and to political considerations that inclined the regime to court the favour of 
its southern neighbour.11 
 Eager to gain international recognition after the overthrow of the previous 
government and a series of bloody anti-communist purges, and apparently unaware of 
the extent of the Timor Sea’s oil and gas potential, the Indonesian regime acceded to 
Australia’s demands.12 The Seabed Agreement was signed in October 1972, fixing the 
boundary approximately two-thirds of the way between Australia and the Indonesian 
islands, close to the Timor Trough. The negotiations left a ‘gap’ in the seabed 
boundary to the south of East Timor – known as the ‘Timor Gap’ – in recognition of 
the Portuguese claim to maritime territory.13 The exclusion of the Timor Gap from the 
1972 Agreement would leave the area open to further bilateral negotiations between 
the Australian and Indonesian governments in future.14  
 Australia was the first Western government to legally recognize the 
Indonesian annexation of East Timor, and was rewarded in 1989 with the settlement 
of the Timor Gap Treaty after years of negotiations. The Treaty established a joint-
development area in the Timor Gap, whereby the two nations would cooperate in 
offshore petroleum exploration and exploitation and each receive 50 per cent of 
revenues. The Timor Gap Treaty lapsed when the East Timorese voted for self-
determination in 1999, spelling an end to the Indonesian claim to oil reserves in the 
Timor Sea. An interim treaty negotiated with the UN administration enabled the 
continuation of oil extraction during the UNTAET era. It was replaced by the 2002 
Timor Sea Treaty, which created a Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) 
between Australia and Timor-Leste on the basis of the previous boundaries 
established with Indonesia, and accorded 90 per cent of revenue from the JPDA to the 
Timorese government and the remainder to Australia.15 The JPDA incorporates the 
Bayu-Undan oil and gas field, which was projected to generate US$6 billion in 
revenue for the Timorese government over a 20-year period (see figure 1).16 
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13 Despite remaining the colonial power in East Timor at the time of the Agreement, Portugal was 
excluded from the negotiations. The incumbent Indonesian regime appeared more amenable to the 
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15 Ibid. p. 1; McDonald, p. 4 
16 King, p. 47 
  134 
 Immediately prior to signing the Timor Sea Treaty, Prime Minister Alkatiri 
specified that the agreement should ‘under no circumstances’ be construed to signify a 
maritime boundary, and announced the government’s intention to utilize international 
mechanisms to achieve a revision of the seabed boundary and a greater proportion of 
oil and gas revenues.17 Replicating the boundaries established in earlier negotiations 
with Indonesia, the treaty situated the majority of the most profitable petroleum 
ventures in Australian territory. These boundaries place 80 per cent of the Greater 
Sunrise oil and gas field – comprised of two large oil and gas fields, together 
constituting three times the size of Bayu-Undan – in Australian territory, and 20 per 
cent in the JPDA (see figure 1).18 
 
 
Figure 1. Timor-Leste’s maritime rights (under the median principle), current treaty 
boundaries, and the distribution of oil and gas reserves.19 
 
 As a newly independent nation, Timor-Leste had no established maritime 
boundaries. The Timor Sea Treaty was to remain in force only until permanent 
delimitation of seabed boundaries between Timor-Leste and Australia could be 
established, or for thirty years after it entered into force. The Timorese government’s 
agreement to the Timor Sea Treaty was a compromise, driven by economic necessity.  
                                                
17 Ibid. p. 47 
18 Ibid. p. 49 
19 La’o Hamutuk. (2013b) Timor-Leste's Undersea Oil and Gas Resources. Image Online at 
<http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/Boundary/2013/TSAreas2013en.gif> (Accessed 25 November 2014) 
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Foreign Minister José Ramos Horta expressed a belief that Australia, as a “fair-
minded country”, would concede a larger share of Greater Sunrise gas field through 
negotiation.20 The Treaty was thus seen as a short-term contract to ensure the 
generation of oil revenues whilst the two countries sought a solution to the dispute. 
The Timorese government maintained exclusive right to revenues from the disputed 
oil and gas fields under international law, yet lacked the financial resources to finance 
its budget without oil revenues. Facing a precipitous reduction in aid flows following 
the departure of UNTAET in 2002, the Timorese government opted for a compromise 
to ensure that gas exploration would continue in the interim as it searched for a more 
favourable settlement.21 
 Four years of bitter negotiations between Dili and Canberra followed, during 
which Timor-Leste continued to claim exclusive rights over the disputed fields. The 
Australian government responded with bullying, intelligence surveillance of Timorese 
officials, and delaying tactics, offering various specious legal and technical arguments 
whilst continuing to extract revenues of around US$1 million a day.22 To generate 
international support for its claim and shame Australia into acquiescence, the 
Timorese government initiated an international publicity campaign. This campaign 
generated considerable support internationally and within Australia itself, and drove 
the Australian government to make a series of concessions, whilst still maintaining its 
essential position regarding the position of the maritime boundary.23 
 In 2006, facing considerable economic pressure domestically and continuing 
Australian intransigence over maritime rights, the government of Timor-Leste 
accepted Australia’s offer to increase its share of upstream revenue from Greater 
Sunrise to 50 per cent. The Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor 
Sea (CMATS) was ratified in February 2007, to remain in effect until 2057. The 
CMATS established a framework for joint exploitation of the Greater Sunrise field 
between Australia and Timor-Leste, which had not been possible under the terms of 
previous treaties, as only 20 per cent of Greater Sunrise is located within the JPDA. It 
also set a moratorium on claims to sovereign rights and maritime boundaries for the 
duration of the treaty, barring the government of Timor-Leste from asserting 
                                                
20 East Timor Considers Court Action against Australia. (20 May 2002) Asia Pulse. Online at 
<http://www.etan.org/et2002b/may/19-25/20etcons.htm> (Accessed 1 December 2014) 
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jurisdiction over maritime territory incorporating the Greater Sunrise field for the next 
50 years.24  
 The treaty permits termination by either party if initial plans for the 
development of Greater Sunrise had not been settled by 2012. To date, basic 
development plans remain subject to considerable dispute, stemming largely from 
disagreements over arrangements for petroleum processing. Successive Timorese 
governments have insisted on the location of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing 
facility in Timor-Leste, anticipating considerable spin-offs from downstream 
processing in terms of local employment and local and national economic 
development. Government revenue from oil is currently derived exclusively from 
taxes on offshore exploration and production, with revenues from midstream and 
downstream sectors (transportation, refinery, and processing) realized in other 
countries.25  
 The government’s ambitions regarding the Sunrise LNG plant have thus far 
been thwarted by Woodside Petroleum – the Australian company that operates the 
Sunrise project – which has rejected piping gas to Timor-Leste, citing technical risks 
posed by the Timor Trough in laying and maintaining a pipeline. Woodside maintains 
that the LNG development plan is a commercial decision, and has indicated its 
intention to construct a floating LNG plant in the Timor Sea or a pipeline to Darwin 
for processing.26 Whilst domestic opinion is primarily in favour of the construction of 
an onshore LNG plant in Timor-Leste, some groups have declared the plan unfeasible 
in light of the country’s current economic and infrastructural conditions.27 
 In 2013 the Timorese government initiated arbitration proceedings in favour of 
its right to terminate the CMATS. The government disputes the validity of the treaty, 
arguing that the Australian government engaged in espionage during the course of 
negotiations in 2004, rendering the provisions of the treaty void. Australia denies 
these allegations, and contends that the CMATS remains valid. The dispute is beyond 
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the dispute settlement 
provisions of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), as Australia 
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withdrew from these mechanisms shortly prior to Timorese independence. The 
Timorese government is therefore seeking to overturn the CMATS on the basis of 
dispute settlement provisions within the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty, arguing that the 
Australian government used fraudulent means to secure Timorese consent.28 
 The maritime dispute between Timor-Leste and Australia highlights the 
unequal relations of power that face small, developing, or newly established states on 
the international stage. As a small, newly independent nation, impoverished after 
decades of exclusion and conflict, Timor-Leste has few resources with which to assert 
its sovereign interests against larger national powers or corporate interests. 
Furthermore, the oil issue in Timor-Leste illustrates the challenges of pursuing 
autonomous economic development within a framework of global economic 
governance, as the government has struggled to exercise economic sovereignty within 
the confines of external neo-liberal discipline.29 
 Hughes argues that efforts by the Timorese government to secure a greater 
degree of economic sovereignty have served to bind it more tightly to international 
prescriptions regarding development policy.30 Timorese attempts to gain international 
leverage in its dispute with Australia limited the options available to the government, 
requiring it to submit to external preferences in the management of oil revenues and 
plans for the public investment of oil wealth in order to reassure an international 
audience. Despite having succeeded in reducing economic conditionalities associated 
with debt financing, the task of garnering international support for its oil claims 
required the Timorese government to conform more closely to international 
prescriptions of economic management. In particular, the Alkatiri government sought 
to reassure the international community that the country was capable of managing 
such vast natural resource revenues in a competent and transparent manner.31 
 International attitudes to natural resource management are informed by the 
dominance of the ‘natural resource curse’ argument in economic circles. The idea of a 
‘resource curse’ is linked to the high prevalence of corruption and conflict in many 
resource-rich developing countries, where the illegal exploitation of resources and 
allocation of profits may be used to garner political support, and domestic competition 
for resources has often resulted in internal armed conflicts. International economists 
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have argued that the exploitation of large quantities of natural resources often has a 
detrimental impact on political and economic institutions, largely due to economic 
distortions as a result of an unbalanced emphasis on extractive industries and 
fluctuations in revenue arising from price volatility on international markets.32 These 
arguments have conditioned international approaches towards Timor-Leste, stirring 
up fears that the Timorese state may be incapable of managing the large revenues 
projected from oil exploitation.33  
 Donor concerns regarding the ‘resource curse’ have influenced the way in 
which the government may use its oil revenues. In order to assuage these concerns, 
the Timorese government passed the Petroleum Fund Law in 2005, which required 
that all petroleum revenues be deposited in a Petroleum Fund (PF), to be held outside 
Timor and managed jointly by the Central Bank of Timor-Leste and the Ministry of 
Finance. The Petroleum Fund Law states that: 
The Petroleum Fund shall contribute to a wise management of the petroleum 
resources for the benefit of both current and future generations. The Petroleum 
Fund shall be a tool that contributes to sound fiscal policy, where appropriate 
consideration and weight is given to the long-term interests of Timor-Leste’s 
citizens.34  
Administration of the Fund has been conducted with a high degree of transparency 
and disclosure of information in order to ensure accountability and international 
confidence, and from 2009 the participation of external banking and investment 
groups was sought to assist in the management of the Fund’s portfolio.35 The terms of 
the Fund permit the government to withdraw approximately 3 per cent of revenue 
each year to finance the state budget, corresponding to an Estimated Sustainable 
Income (ESI) calculated by the Ministry of Finance.36 However, government plans to 
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withdraw further quantities from the PF – with parliamentary support – in order to 
fund free education and health care and establish public enterprises as an engine for 
economic growth have met with predictable opposition from international donors.37 
 Rejecting proposals to channel oil revenues towards the formation of a 
developmental welfare state – one which would actively pursue policies of 
redistribution and establish state-directed industries as a foundation for national 
development – the UNDP and other international agencies have cautiously 
recommended a policy of ‘effective’ utilization of oil wealth to “promote sustainable 
development of the non-oil economy.”38 To date, ‘prudent’ financial management and 
high returns on oil resources39 have not translated into positive socio-economic 
outcomes for the majority of the Timorese population. Whilst the government has 
gone to great lengths to manage revenues in a responsible and sustainable manner, 
little progress has been made in using these revenues to support wider economic 
initiatives that will benefit its citizens.40 It is essential that the government establish a 
broader non-oil basis for the Timorese economy, particularly if it is to achieve its 
aims of drawing on petroleum revenue to support self-reliance and domestic priorities 
for economic development. Oil revenues peaked in 2012, and oil and gas reserves are 
expected to run dry within six years.41 Whilst there are considerable grounds for 
disputing the ‘resource curse’ thesis, too great a reliance on the oil sector at the 
expense of other areas of the economy will not sustainable in the long term – 
particularly in light of dwindling oil reserves.  
 Over 95 per cent of state revenue and three-quarters of GDP is derived from 
oil and gas exports, making Timor-Leste one of the world’s most petroleum-
dependent countries.42 The creation of the PF was intended to generate sustainable 
income for decades after oil and gas reserves run dry, through the investment of oil 
revenues on the global stock market. However, Charles Scheiner of La’o Hamutuk 
(Timor-Leste Institute for Development Monitoring and Analysis) argues that 
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39 Even without access to the oil resources claimed by the Australian government, high global oil prices 
have generated high returns from current oil reserves. 
40 Scheiner 
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government overspending beyond the Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI) benchmark 
has reduced the balance of the PF, limiting the returns on future investments. Rapidly 
expanding budgets, transfers above ESI, amendments to the Petroleum Fund Law, 
optimistic price projections and decreased oil production have made the government’s 
ambitions for the PF unlikely.43 La’o Hamutuk has warned that the PF may be 
depleted by 2025, adding to the imperatives to develop Timor-Leste’s non-oil 
economy, increase domestic revenues, and spend public money wisely. Based on this 
projection, Timor-Leste may have as little as a decade in which to “use its finite oil 
resources to underpin long-term prosperity and development.”44  
 In the short term – although external actors remain extremely influential in 
Timor-Leste and are active in various areas of governance, institution building, and 
development – oil revenues have provided something of a buffer insulating the 
Timorese state from a greater extreme of aid dependence. Given the rapid depletion of 
oil reserves, the state has only a limited time frame within which to establish 
foundations for a more autonomous path of national development, before severe 
economic hardship drives it into deeper conditions of aid dependence.45 Should the 
government fail to develop the country’s non-oil sectors before oil and gas income 
disappears and the PF is no longer sufficient to cover state expenditure, Timor-Leste 
will be driven into austerity.46  
 Scheiner contends that the government of Timor-Leste must develop its 
human resources through investments in education, nutrition, health care and rural 
water and sanitation. Crucially, it must bolster domestic capacity to meet basic needs 
and reduce the country’s reliance on imports by developing the agricultural sector, 
which remains the primary source of employment and economic activity for 
Timorese.47 With agriculture comprising such a fundamental component of the local 
economy, the country’s prospects for sustainable development are intricately 
connected with its course of agricultural policy. The next section discusses the 
interconnected issues of food security, land, and agricultural policy in Timor-Leste, 
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highlighting the contradictions between internal and external priorities for 
development in these areas. 
Agriculture,	  Land,	  and	  Food	  Security	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  
 Food security is one of the most pressing issues facing the majority of the 
Timorese population. Despite the substantial aid funds that have been allocated to 
Timor-Leste, the country remains a predominantly subsistence economy. Nation-
wide, the private sector is only able to provide approximately 400 new jobs per 
annum,48 and in 2005, 33 per cent of the country’s population relied on subsistence 
agriculture alone. Approximately 75 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, 
where subsistence agriculture is the primary mode of economic activity, and the small 
paid workforce consists largely of government-employed teachers, medical staff, and 
department staff.49 While a relatively low percentage of arable land (approximately 30 
per cent) is currently engaged in agricultural use, the country’s unique geographical 
features – mountainous terrain, erratic rainfall patterns and shallow, low-fertility soil 
– exacerbate the dangers of food insecurity, making it a priority for successive 
national governments.50 
 Food shortages have been a common occurrence in Timor-Leste since the 
post-referendum violence of 1999, which caused significant damage to food sources 
and infrastructure. Most households experience an annual ‘hungry season’ during the 
period prior to harvest. This is more severe in rural areas, where poverty is most 
pronounced and families typically experience 3.8 months with very limited access to 
rice or maize – the two staples of the Timorese diet.51 With a high fertility rate52 and 
an annual population growth rate of approximately 3.2 per cent, Timor-Leste’s 
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population is expected to double in the next 17 years, which will place greater 
pressure on the country’s already-strained food resources. 53  Despite the large 
proportion of the population engaged in small-scale agriculture and the traditional 
emphasis on maize and rice production, in 2007 the country imported close to half of 
its grain consumption requirements.54 Food security has been identified as a crucial 
issue by the national government and donors alike, with the government proposing to 
ensure national food security by 2020 through a combination of public agricultural 
investment, private sector development, and joint public-private initiatives.55  
 The issue of food security is intricately connected to a country’s trade, 
agricultural, and resource management policies. The contemporary emphasis on trade 
liberalization and the aid conditionalities imposed by donors often require the 
governments of developing countries such as Timor-Leste to pursue export-orientated 
agricultural policies. However, the production of crops for export generally requires 
alterations in land usage and farming practices, moving from the small-scale farming 
of a range of crops produced for a local market, to specialization in large-scale 
monocultures produced for an external market. While countries may employ a 
mixture of approaches to achieving food security – seeking to bolster production and 
develop domestic markets whilst engaging in modest production for export to 
supplement domestic food markets – countries must ultimately choose whether to 
emphasize self-sufficiency or trade and specialization.56 
 There is often a fundamental disconnect between the expectations of 
international donors and financial organizations and local-level priorities and realities 
within developing countries. As Anderson indicates, “[t]he peoples of small rural 
economies generally look to food security policies that support both subsistence 
production and the extension of domestic produce markets … [while] International 
banks and governments anxious for hard currency try to promote export-earning 
production.”57 Recognizing the significance of small-scale agriculture for Timorese 
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society, the country’s authorities have consistently emphasized the importance of 
consolidating and improving domestic food production. Such a policy was first raised 
during the transitional period in the form of proposals for using oil funds to generate 
enhanced domestic rice production and grain storage. These proposals were rejected 
by the World Bank, which preferred a strategy of export orientation and the creation 
of a ‘buffer fund’ to import food during times of severe shortage. The alternative 
suggested by the World Bank is consistent with the institution’s general approach to 
poverty reduction and food security, which emphasizes private and foreign investment 
as the basis for economic growth, and the pursuit of food security through commercial 
development and international trade.58 
The World Bank’s approach to agricultural development is centred on the 
development of labour-intensive private sector activities in rural areas, emphasizing 
the importance of agricultural growth to boost employment levels and generate 
foreign exchange earnings. 59  The influence of this approach is evident in the 
development strategies of the Timorese government, which has sought to integrate the 
preferences of international donors with its own ongoing emphasis on self-
sufficiency. The government’s most recent Strategic Development Plan demonstrates 
a strong commitment to boosting small-farming productivity through investments in 
infrastructure and machinery and the provision of subsidized fertilizers and pesticides, 
in an attempt to achieve surplus domestic food production by 2020.60 The plan also 
advocates the development of the cash crop sector to create economic growth and 
rural employment. Suggested export crops include coffee, candlenut, and coconut – 
all popular locally produced crops from which the government hopes to maximize 
export revenue, adding value in-country by fostering improved technological practices 
and extending infrastructural support.61  
 However, there are dangers for Timor-Leste in pursuing such a ‘split’ 
approach. By attempting to accommodate international demands for trade 
liberalization and courting foreign investment as a source of hard currency, the 
government risks exposing domestic agricultural production to the harmful effects of 
fluctuating international markets. Technological and infrastructural advantages in 
developed countries and in particular the agricultural subsidies maintained by the 
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governments of the United States and European Union (in defiance of the ‘free trade 
policies they so diligently propagate elsewhere) have wreaked a devastating effect on 
domestic production in developing countries, which are generally unable to compete 
with the low prices of international imports.62 Cheap food imports force down local 
prices, undermining the potential returns for domestic production and ultimately 
rendering the labour-intensive work of planting and harvesting unremunerative. This 
process triggers increasing import dependence, a trend that has forced most 
developing countries into becoming net food importers. The impact on societies in 
these countries is nothing short of devastating – particularly in rural areas. Traditional 
livelihoods based on agricultural production are destroyed, while other sectors are 
unable to absorb workers displaced from traditional farming, resulting in high levels 
of unemployment and dispossession that pose severe social, economic, and 
environmental challenges for governments.63  
The potential impacts of such import dependence in Timor-Leste would be 
profound. Disruptions to rural agricultural production would likely exacerbate 
national food shortages, precipitate a loss of rural livelihoods and an attendant rise in 
poverty, and trigger large and destabilizing urban migration movements. Recognizing 
the central importance of small-scale farming to Timor-Leste’s social and economic 
structures, the national government must find ways of protecting domestic agricultural 
production despite pressure from external donors for trade liberalization. This is 
imperative in order to prevent food insecurity and the immense socio-economic 
upheaval that would necessarily accompany attempts to effect large-scale changes in 
agricultural production.  
 The government’s attempts to negotiate a middle ground and promote a level 
of crop production for export also has important implications in terms of land 
ownership and resource management. Large tracts of land must be mobilized to 
support large-scale production, necessitating the disruption of ‘inefficient’ small-scale 
agricultural patterns in these areas. 64  In the case of Timor-Leste – where the 
overwhelming majority of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and the 
country’s geographical features limit the availability of land for large-scale 
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commercial production – the displacement caused by the commercialization of 
customary lands would be tremendous, severely undermining social relations which 
are closely linked to customary patterns of land ownership.  
 While small farming does not generate significant export earnings, Anderson 
argues that there are a number of social benefits associated with subsistence-based 
farming communities. Small-scale agriculture provides widespread employment and a 
form of social security, providing an ongoing livelihood even where the formal 
economy fails. The greater diversity of crops and the methods used in small-scale 
farming also prove more sustainable, posing less damage to soil and water systems.65 
Such ‘positive externalities’ cannot be quantified in market terms, which view 
agriculture – like all markets – in terms of productivity and competitiveness. 
Agricultural liberalization, by contrast, involves the establishment of large 
monocultures using chemical-intensive methods in order to maximize productivity, 
provoking a number of ecological problems including soil erosion and degradation, 
and disruptions to river and marine systems from silt and fertilizer outflows.66 Given 
the country’s steep terrain and shallow soil, the potential environmental costs of large 
monocultures in Timor-Leste are severe. The country also has rich coastal marine life, 
an asset that must be protected from toxic waste if the government is to succeed in 
capturing the economic opportunities from fisheries.67 
 The World Bank World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for 
Development acknowledges the importance of small-scale agriculture for poverty 
reduction, but does not move beyond the dominant export-oriented approach, nor does 
it recognize the diverse social, economic, cultural, and environmental benefits of 
small-scale production. Reflecting the contemporary international emphasis on 
economic growth and private sector-driven development, the report echoes orthodox 
prescriptions for greater agricultural liberalization.68 
 Critics argue that the projected gains of agricultural liberalization for 
developing countries are extremely small.69 Very few developing countries are able to 
compete on international markets, a reality reflected in the World Bank’s own 
predictions that project high-income countries to capture nearly 90 per cent of total 
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gains from agricultural liberalization for the year 2015.70 Countries that can compete, 
such as Brazil and Argentina, are characterized by high levels of industrialization, 
modernized agricultural techniques, highly developed infrastructure, and vast 
quantities of highly fertile land for cultivation.71 According to Tim Wise, the returns 
for developing countries amount to less than $2 per person per year.72 Small-scale 
farmers stand to benefit the least from liberalization, with large-scale industrial 
producers positioned to reap maximal gains from export markets.73 Such minimal 
gains hardly seem to justify the tremendous costs associated with agricultural 
liberalization, particularly in light of Timor-Leste’s small-scale, subsistence-based 
agricultural profile.  
 The government’s Strategic Development Plan indicates a commitment to the 
preservation of Timor-Leste’s small-scale agricultural structure, but seeks to boost the 
productivity of this sector by commercialization. The process of agricultural 
commercialization – both in relation to smallholder farming and larger, export-
oriented production – will require fundamental changes in patterns of land tenure in 
Timor-Leste.74 The Constitution states that only ‘natural persons’ can own land in 
Timor-Leste – a provision that prohibits corporations and foreigners from owning 
land. 75  However, a draft Transitional Land Law approved in 2010 effectively 
circumvents this restriction by normalizing medium to long-term leases, allowing for 
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the regularization of leases of large tracts of land to foreign agribusinesses. The draft 
law also affords the state authority to claim ‘unused’ land, which may then be leased 
to private companies.76 Currently these provisions largely exclude rural customary 
land, but external pressure is mounting for widespread land ‘modernization’ that will 
allow private companies greater access to rural land. Commentators and lending 
institutions have consistently called for the clarification and strengthening of property 
rights, and the privatization of land in order to stimulate greater agricultural 
efficiency.77 
 Arguments for ‘land reform’ in Timor-Leste are driven by a neo-liberal 
rationale of land commercialization, which frames agricultural development in terms 
of the commodification of land, large monocultures and agricultural liberalization.78 
The neo-liberal development model posits trade liberalization as a solution to food 
insecurity, based on the assumption that trade liberalization leads to economic growth 
and growth leads to poverty reduction, which in turn resolves food security issues.79 
Aid agencies such as USAID, AUSAID, and the World Bank in particular advocate 
land and agricultural ‘modernization’ in Timor-Leste. The liberal economic attitudes 
to land, agriculture, and food security pushed by these organizations are based on the 
mobilization of land for large-scale production, in order to generate sufficient income 
on international markets to purchase food.80 This framework conceives of agricultural 
and food policy in purely market terms, placing the needs of subsistence and small 
farming communities second to the dictates of market efficiency and an export-
oriented development model that emphasizes economic growth over sustainable 
development.  
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 In Timor-Leste, where the majority of land remains under customary 
ownership, the pursuit of an export-oriented agricultural model requires the 
‘rationalization’ of land – the replacement of non-market mechanisms of land tenure 
and agricultural organization with market ones. 81  In order to establish market 
conditions, traditional arrangements of land tenure must be reformed and uncertainties 
in land title resolved, to be replaced by strong titles, land registration, the 
establishment of land markets, and opening opportunities for foreign investment.82  
 The relationship between human communities and the natural environment in 
Timor-Leste has traditionally been regulated by customary systems of resource 
management, which have contributed to the protection of sensitive ecological 
resources.83 Despite disruptions to traditional ownership arrangements due to decades 
of conflict, displacement and resettlement, customary structures remain dominant in 
rural areas, where land ownership is determined by clan-inherited usufruct rights. 
Customary prohibitions – known as tara bandu – have traditionally governed resource 
use, establishing systems of control over the harvesting of trees and forest products 
and the maintenance of water areas.84 Despite renewed efforts by communities across 
the country to extend customary resource protections, recent moves towards land 
reform pose a considerable risk to the continuity of customary ownership and tenure 
arrangements. Land commodification associated with agricultural development 
requires the alienation of land from such systems of social organization, and the 
creation of markets to govern land ownership and real-estate transactions.85 
 This process of land rationalization is an essential feature of the construction 
of market economies. Despite claims by neo-liberal proponents, the history of the 
development of liberal economic and political systems demonstrates that market 
societies did not arise through any natural, spontaneous process, but as a result of 
deliberate state intervention. As Karl Polanyi has argued, markets are neither ‘self-
regulating’, nor do they constitute a natural state for societies; in order for markets to 
succeed, all the factors of production – including land, labour, and capital itself – 
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must be subjected to market organization. Market values must be assigned to all the 
elements of human society involved in market production, necessitating dramatic state 
intervention to break up previous systems of social organization and establish market 
conditions. Land, as an essential element of economic production, must therefore be 
detached from non-market forms of social organization – such as kinship and custom 
– and reconstituted in commercial terms.86  
 Where the global liberal project encounters systems of land tenure that do not 
correspond to liberal economic principles, these systems must be restructured 
according to market ‘laws’. In previous eras this process has been enacted by states 
within their own territories – as in eighteenth century England – or by imperial 
powers as part of the colonial project of land expropriation for resource exploitation 
in regions of the ‘periphery’.87 The expansion of agricultural liberalization continues 
in the non-market frontiers of developing countries, where new means of coercion and 
control have been implemented in order to ensure state compliance with the dictates 
of international markets. In the contemporary period of neo-liberal state-building and 
development, states in the global South have been enlisted as agents of this process of 
global liberal reconstruction. 
Whether the government will succeed in achieving food security by 2020 
despite the constraints of aid dependence remains to be seen. Indecisive rhetoric and 
efforts to appease both an international and a domestic constituency through a middle 
ground approach to agricultural development will not result in greater food security 
nationwide, nor improve livelihoods for Timor-Leste’s rural population. 
Diversification, rather than agricultural specialization, will deliver greater food 
security for Timor-Leste.88 Building on the country’s pre-existing agricultural profile 
by prioritizing small-scale domestic agricultural production for local markets will 
safeguard the livelihoods of the rural majority and reduce levels of import 
dependence. Such a policy will ultimately reduce the country’s aid dependence, 
ensuring basic needs are met even in times of national financial hardship and 
minimizing the need for the government to submit to additional forms of external 
regulation as a condition for financial assistance.89  
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Aid	  Dependence	  and	  Prospects	  for	  Development	  in	  Timor-­‐Leste	  
 Aid dependence in Timor-Leste has been magnified by a number of factors. 
As a small, geographically isolated territory, with a subsistence profile and 
consistently low human and economic development indicators qualifying Timor as the 
poorest province of Indonesia, economic shocks associated with the conflict in 1999 
and subsequent separation from the Indonesian economy have been particularly 
devastating. Economic conditions in the late 1990s were crippling; the effects of the 
Southeast Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, followed by the destruction of 1999, the 
severing of the Timorese economy from Indonesian subsidies and markets, and the 
conversion of the Timorese currency from the rupiah to the dollar exacerbated the 
country’s dependence on external financial assistance.90 Donor funding comprised 
approximately half of the Timorese government budget in the first years of 
independence, with aid constituting around 60 per cent of GDP. In 2001, the size of 
the country’s real economy amounted to only 88 per cent of its size in 1997. The 
economy contracted further following independence – as a result of diminishing 
donor interest and the departure of UNTAET – and in response to the violence of 
2006.91  
 High levels of capital investment associated with the international presence in 
East Timor in 1999-2002 left little sustainable economic impact. A large proportion of 
the capital injected into the country was repatriated; donor agencies tendered for 
international contracts, directing funds towards reconstruction projects that employed 
foreign workers, companies, and supplies. The influx of foreign currency brought into 
the country by international personnel contributed to economic distortions, fuelling 
unsustainable urban expansion in Dili and a subsequent crisis in the urban economy 
after UNTAET’s departure. Local spending by international employees was 
concentrated towards a Dili-based service industry that sprung up to cater to the 
external clientele. Hotels, restaurants, and supermarkets patronized by UNTAET 
personnel were foreign owned, importing their products from abroad and repatriating 
profits. As a result, only a very small proportion of the UNTAET budget entered the 
local economy, and what was invested locally was predominantly spent in Dili. While 
it remained in the country, this unbalanced investment generated some degree of 
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economic activity. However, the UNTAET withdrawal and shifting of donor priorities 
elsewhere facilitated a dramatic economic downturn and left behind a minimal 
amount of sustainable economic infrastructure.92 
 The dire situation of the Timorese economy following independence 
heightened the new country’s petroleum dependence. Given the multiple challenges 
facing the country as a small developing nation, struggling to cope with the social and 
economic effects of a devastating conflict, it is perhaps unsurprising that the economy 
of Timor-Leste has come to reflect in many ways the predictions of ‘resource curse’ 
theorists. Despite the government’s concern to assuage international reservations 
through the establishment of a PF to promote accountability and sustainability in the 
management of petroleum income, the short-term profitability of the oil and gas 
sector has contributed to a highly unbalanced economy and unsustainable patterns of 
national development.93 In 2012, the Timorese economy appeared to be growing at 
‘double-digit rates’, with the non-oil economy contributing approximately 22 per cent 
of GDP. However, roughly half of this non-oil GDP is driven by state spending 
towards public administration, procurement, and infrastructure construction. As 
government revenue is currently derived almost entirely from the petroleum sector, 
this income will disappear when oil and gas reserves are exhausted – which is 
expected to occur by 2020.94  
 High global oil prices in recent years have generated increased oil revenues in 
the short term and dramatically elevated GDP, allowing Timor-Leste to achieve 
middle-income status in 2011.95 However, the country’s median status does not 
accurately represent the state of the Timorese economy or the circumstances of the 
majority of the country’s population. The 2014 Human Development Index (HDI) 
ranks Timor-Leste at 128 out of 187 countries. Timor-Leste’s HDI value increased by 
33.4 per cent between 2000 and 2013, placing it above the average of many other 
countries within the medium human development group.96 However, HDI is an 
average measure of calculating basic human development outcomes in a given 
country, and thus masks inequalities in the distribution of human development 
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throughout populations. Accounting for inequality results in a 30.7 per cent reduction 
of Timor-Leste’s HDI value, recognizing to some extent the disparities between GDP 
and actual living conditions as experienced by the majority of the Timorese 
population.97  
 The HDI represents a human development approach, which avoids the 
traditional focus on narrow economic indicators such as GDP by accounting for a 
range of social indicators, including gender equality, access to education, and infant 
mortality. However, despite this social emphasis, economistic data sets such as the 
HDI cannot adequately capture socio-economic realities and inequalities in target 
countries. In Timor-Leste, where the high international presence has magnified the 
urban-rural divide and oil and gas revenues create a skewed picture of the economy as 
a whole, such measures are particularly misleading.98  
 Social conditions experienced by the majority of the Timorese population 
belie the country’s middle-income status and the optimism of government officials. In 
November 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights 
reported after her official mission in Timor-Leste: 
[G]rowth and development has not translated into sustained improvements in 
standards of living, livelihoods and job creation. Poverty remains pervasive 
and widespread. Around 41 per cent of the population lives on less than a 
dollar per day. Approximately 58 per cent of the population suffers from 
chronic malnutrition, while an additional 19 per cent from acute malnutrition. 
Unemployment and employment vulnerability is estimated to be as high as 70 
per cent. In a country with a young population, where more than half of all 
people are less than 19 years old, 90 per cent of those between 15 and 34 years 
old cannot find work.99 
Despite the Strategic Development Plan’s emphases on participation and equity in 
issues such as education, gender, and rural development, in practice government 
support for key aspects of human development such as health and education has been 
disappointing.100 
 The petroleum sector is the backbone of the economy, yet generates virtually 
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no on-shore employment; its local economic impact is expressed entirely through 
government spending.101 Despite government intentions to invest oil revenues in the 
wider economy in order to boost living standards and non-oil economic activity,102 
public spending on productive sectors of the economy – agriculture and 
manufacturing – constitutes only 4 per cent of GDP.103 Whilst the government has 
gradually increased public spending on health and education, the amount of public 
investment in these key human resources amounts to 40 per cent less of its budget 
than that of ‘well-managed’ developing countries.104 Government initiatives such as 
food subsidies and job creation through publicly funded programmes of labour-
intensive employment in infrastructural development are believed to have had positive 
impacts in terms of human development,105 yet significant long term challenges 
remain which must be addressed through concerted policy efforts that prioritize 
domestic imperatives and are suited to local conditions. 
 Currently, less than half of state expenditure enters the local economy. 
Together with construction, the costs of public administration dominates state 
expenditure, relatively little of which is invested in local productive activity.106 In the 
absence of convenient local products, the country’s small Dili-based elite looks to 
foreign markets to supply goods and services. External markets supply a range of 
products for the Timorese middle and upper classes, including chicken, rice, noodles, 
eggs, beer, milk, candles, and cigarettes. Despite official priorities of self-sufficiency 
and food security as outlined in government development plans, economic 
sovereignty and long term sustainability appear to carry little bearing in the spending 
habits of the country’s small middle and upper classes. Such incongruities between 
official ‘policy’ and individual practice have resulted in conditions of import 
dependency. The consequences of such unsustainable practices have been deferred in 
the short term by the inflow of oil and gas revenues. When these revenues are 
exhausted, however, the resulting cash shortage will render imports unaffordable. 
Social immiseration will ensue if local food production is insufficient to prop up 
                                                
101 Scheiner, p. 4 
102 This is a common sentiment in official government communications. See, for example, República 
Democrática de Timor-Leste 
103 Scheiner, p. 2 
104 Ibid. p. 7 
105 UNDP (2011), p. 5 
106 Scheiner, p. 2-3 
  154 
domestic consumption by this time.107 
 As the primary source of economic activity for the majority of the population, 
agricultural policy will play a defining role in the future of the Timorese economy. 
Agriculture sustains most of the Timorese population, yet in 2014, the state budget 
allocated only 2 per cent to the agricultural sector. 108  To date, the Timorese 
government has demonstrated elements of both a liberal and an economic nationalist 
approach to agricultural policy. Moves to lease large tracts of land to foreign 
agribusinesses and the introduction of radical tax cuts for investors demonstrate the 
influence of liberal economic ideas and external commercial pressures on 
development policy, undermining the government’s purported commitment to 
agricultural self-sufficiency.109 
 The government of Timor-Leste must choose whether to follow external 
preferences that push for agricultural specialization and export orientation, or to 
prioritize a food security and agricultural development strategy that emphasizes local 
production.110 Quite aside from questions regarding the suitability of the country to 
such large-scale production or the potential negative impacts of export orientation for 
local food security and social and environmental well being, Anderson argues that 
“export orientation in agriculture assumes that the economy has no better export 
options”.111 Despite troubling forecasts regarding the sustainability of oil revenues 
and the failure to date to adequately invest oil income into non-oil economic sectors, 
the government’s management of its petroleum resources compares favourably with 
the experiences of other petroleum-dependent countries.112 Although unlikely to 
generate state revenue for decades to come as envisioned, the existence of the PF 
provides the government with resources for the development of the agricultural sector, 
potentially allowing the state greater freedom to determine economic policy in this 
area without the conditionalities associated with international loans.  
 Since independence, international prescriptions associated with neo-liberal 
governance have significantly curtailed state authority in terms of social and 
economic policy. Furthermore, unequal relations of power between Timor-Leste and 
external agencies and national and commercial interests have dramatically reduced the 
                                                
107 Ibid. p. 3 
108 Ibid. p. 7 
109 Anderson (2010b), p. 43 
110 Anderson (2007), p. 182 
111 Ibid. p. 182 
112 UNDP (2011), p. 5 
  155 
government’s access to potential petroleum resources. However, despite poor living 
conditions, unbalanced national development, and ongoing structures of external 
regulation, the country’s oil wealth and relative lack of external debt113 offers the 
government an opportunity to carve out a greater sphere for government action. 
Whilst certainly remaining effective, the influence of global structures of neo-liberal 
governance may be slightly less felt whilst the petroleum sector continues to act as a 
buffer for national development. 
Conclusion	  
 As the youngest country in Asia, with high birthrates, low social development 
indicators, and an unbalanced economy carried by unsustainable oil revenues, the 
challenges facing Timor-Leste are tremendous. This chapter has focused primarily on 
issues relating to petroleum and agriculture, highlighting the impact of current 
policies in these areas and the imperative to take decisive action to harness the 
potential of these sectors to promote the interests of the Timorese people. Other 
significant aspects of social and economic policy that have not received attention here 
– such as welfare, healthcare, education, labour regulation, and taxation – will also 
play a critical role in national development. Petroleum and agriculture represent two 
primary areas of economic policy that together generate crucial state income, 
employment, and socio-economic security for Timorese people. However, health and 
education policy and welfare provisions are key areas of concern for the local 
population – concerns which must be prioritized if the government is to succeed in 
boosting living conditions for the majority of its citizens. These public investments in 
human resources are also essential in laying the foundation for a future of sustainable 
and equitable development. 
 Carmeneza dos Santos Monteiro argues that the focus on governance and 
institution building in Timor-Leste has come at the expense of other areas of 
development, diverting government attention from pressing issues of socio-economic 
development and equality.114 Whilst successive post-independence governments have 
                                                
113 The government of Timor-Leste has sought to reduce conditions of aid dependence by avoiding 
external debt. However, declining oil revenues forced the government to commence a modest 
programme of external borrowing in 2012, in order to finance development initiatives. See La’o 
Hamutuk (2013a)  
114 C. Monteiro. (2010) A Reflection on Ten Years of Nation- and State-Building in Timor-Leste: 
Conference Report. In Nation-building across the Urban and Rural in Timor-Leste, pp. 38-41. Dili: 
RMIT University, p. 41 
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expressed a strong commitment to addressing the social and economic needs of their 
citizenry, conditions of aid dependence within a highly regulated framework of 
governance have had a profoundly disempowering effect on the potential for 
autonomous development policy.115 Aid dependence requires states to orient policies 
towards the wishes of an external constituency, creating a legitimacy dilemma 
between the demands of international donors and interveners, and the needs and 
expectations of the domestic population. As previous chapters have demonstrated, 
state institutions in Timor-Leste were established with an unprecedented level of 
external influence, and remain subject to ongoing state-building initiatives which 
frame governance as a matter of adherence to neo-liberal prescriptions. 
 These neo-liberal assumptions condition all aspects of the relationship 
between the Timorese state and the international community. The influence of 
economic liberal ideas is evident in conflicting attitudes towards agriculture, where 
pressure for liberalization and export orientation from the international community is 
at odds with the country’s subsistence profile and the interests of the country’s large 
rural majority. The Strategic Development Plan demonstrates the government’s 
attempts to reconcile these competing approaches.  
 The government has sought to maximize oil revenues in order to generate 
sustainable economic development, but has been unable to harness this oil wealth to 
build momentum in other areas of the economy. As a result, the state has been 
“unable to respond to the needs of the poor and marginalized people”116 – a failure 
which has fuelled popular resentment, and at times carried over into violent 
confrontations as witnessed in the 2006 conflict. If it is to generate internal 
legitimacy, the state must prioritize the needs and realities of its own people as it 
seeks to lay the foundations for long term development, matching social and 
economic policies to the cultural, environmental, economic, and social context of 
Timor-Leste, rather than to the demands of international actors. 
 
  
                                                
115 Hughes 
116 Monteiro, p. 41 
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CONCLUSION 
  
  Since the 1990s, state-building has emerged as a strategic alignment of the 
development and security communities, appearing to offer a solution to multiple 
crises of poverty, underdevelopment, internal conflict, and wider manifestations of 
insecurity. With the problematization of weak statehood as the primary source of such 
issues, the state-building project envisions a central role for strong, reconstituted 
states in efforts to implement conditions for the liberal peace in societies of the global 
South. States are to be reformed as partners and facilitators of liberal peace-building; 
their function is conceived of primarily in terms of the management of liberal 
transitions within a domestic context. Within a framework of global liberal 
governance, states are to assist in the establishment and maintenance of the conditions 
deemed necessary for liberal, market relations at the local level. In implementing and 
maintaining these liberal systems of organization in non-liberal societies, the 
cooperation of states is essential for the extension of liberal governance throughout 
the globe. 
 A current trend that has not received attention in this thesis yet deserves 
mention is the concept of ‘resilience’, which has achieved prominence in international 
state-building and development circles in recent years. Resilience discourses have 
emerged out of disillusionment with liberal internationalism, and in particular the 
failure of liberal peace operations to achieve their goals of peace, development, and 
democracy through the construction of liberal institutions in subject societies.1  
 The failure of international state-building operations to construct self-
sustaining liberal relations in subject states through the export of liberal institutions 
has led to a shift in attention towards the societal sphere. Whereas state-building 
operations have focused primarily on the task of liberal state engineering as a top-
down approach towards the dissemination of liberal relations throughout society, the 
failure of this approach to regularize wider liberal systems of organization in non-
liberal societies has necessitated moves to engage more directly with populations 
themselves.2 Resilience can thus be understood as an ‘internalizing’ discourse which 
shifts responsibility for the failure of state-building operations onto local 
                                                
1 D. Chandler. (2013) International Statebuilding and the Ideology of Resilience. Politics 33(4):276-86. 
2 Ibid. 
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communities.3 This shift away from a state-based approach towards a ‘society-
centred’ approach constitutes populations themselves as a political problem. 4 
Elements of this shifting societal focus have been alluded to at times throughout this 
thesis; however, any comprehensive discussion of resilience discourse falls beyond 
the scope of this study, which has focused on the implications of processes of state-
building and neo-liberal development for statehood, sovereignty, and democracy in 
the South. 
 Discourses of resilience can be understood as an extension of the international 
state-building project. Given the failure of state-building operations to successfully 
implement liberal social transformations through the reconstitution of state 
institutions alone, resilience discourse has emerged as a further innovation in the 
liberal peace project, legitimizing a range of external interventions into the societal 
sphere.5 Far from representing a move towards allowing subject societies greater 
autonomy in processes of development and state formation, ‘bottom-up’ discourses of 
resilience facilitate more extensive intrusions into the workings of non-liberal 
societies in the global South in pursuit of liberal formations of peace and 
development. Furthermore, Chandler argues that interventionist resilience discourses 
have “facilitated the evasion of Western responsibility for the outcomes of 
statebuilding interventions through problematising local practices and understandings 
as productive of risks and threats and as barriers to liberal progress.”6  
 Elements of this internalizing social discourse can be discerned in relation to 
the process of state-building in Timor-Leste. However, this thesis has been primarily 
concerned with the interconnection between processes of state-building and neo-
liberal development, which aspire to a wide-ranging reformation of political, social, 
and economic relations in subject states through the construction of liberal state 
institutions and subordination of social and economic policy to external networks of 
global governance. The process of state-building in Timor-Leste has been 
characterized by unprecedented levels of international control. State institutions were 
created during a period of official international administration, implemented by 
international agents and technocrats in accordance with a liberal template of 
                                                
3 M. Duffield. (2012) Challenging Environments: Danger, Resilience and the Aid Industry. Security 
Dialogue 43(5):475-92, p. 476-77 
Chandler (2013), p. 279 
4 Chandler (2013), p. 280 
5 Ibid. p. 284 
6 Ibid. p. 276 
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statehood.  Timorese participation in this process was minimal. As a result, the 
process of state formation in Timor-Leste has more closely resembled an experiment 
in liberal state transplantation than any meaningful attempt to support the 
establishment of locally informed institutions based on the Timorese historical, social, 
cultural, and political context.  
 The post-independence Timorese government inherited an ‘insulated’ state, 
one which stood apart from its domestic context rather than embodying a collective 
expression of Timorese society. Neo-liberal state-building facilitates the replacement 
of the state-society social contract with a ‘governance’ contract, which requires the 
constant orientation of domestic policy towards an external audience. The 
institutionalization of governance practice prescribes a narrow framework for social 
and economic policy, which is reinforced through systems of neo-liberal discipline 
and international surveillance that place considerable limits on the potential for 
autonomous decision-making. Like other states subject to state-building interventions, 
the state in Timor-Leste has been constituted through conditions of aid dependence, 
forcing successive governments to seek the approval of an external constituency in the 
process of national development and the formulation of social and economic policies. 
 The state-building project exposes states to a legitimacy dilemma, placing 
governments under considerable pressure as they seek to navigate a course between 
the obligations of their domestic constituencies and the expectations of external 
donors. The Timorese government has often been required to prioritize international 
prescriptions over local demands, resulting in a loss of popular legitimacy. The 
government’s inability to respond in a satisfactory manner to the needs of its own 
people has served to distance it from the Timorese population, alienating many 
elements of society and fuelling public dissatisfaction with the experience of 
independent statehood.  
 The form of liberal statehood being advocated through state-building 
programmes constitutes a dramatic reformulation of the concept of sovereignty. 
Subject states are to be embedded within overlapping structures of global governance, 
and the role of the state redefined as a national intermediary between international 
liberal structures and domestic societies. This reconstitution of sovereign authority 
has important implications for societies in the global South. The reframing of national 
sovereignty as a result of state-building and neo-liberal development practice limits 
the potential for alternative action beyond a prescribed liberal framework. Through 
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the implementation of governance reforms and ongoing state-building initiatives, key 
aspects of social and economic policy are removed from the sphere of domestic 
political control and replaced by the bureaucratic, ‘apolitical’ exercise of good 
governance practice. 
 This reformulation of sovereignty poses a number of questions regarding the 
potential for authentic democracy in the state-building context, where intrusive 
external involvement has brought about the inversion of the sovereign state – the 
creation of states that act to channel inward an externally prescribed agenda. State-
building practice subordinates the democratic process to the dictates of ‘good 
governance’, limiting the substance of socio-economic policy by casting political 
issues as technical matters beyond the remit of democratic contestation. Thus liberal 
state-building and development practice extends the promise of democracy to 
populations in the global South, whilst simultaneously stripping it of its content in 
terms of participation, equity, and social justice. 
 The liberal vision for peaceful relations is predicated on certain assumptions 
regarding social, economic, and political organization. In particular, markets are 
upheld as the optimal organizing structures for peaceful social relations and economic 
development. The pursuit of market-led growth strategies is thus expected to offer a 
solution to conditions of poverty, underdevelopment, and conflict. State-building 
programmes require states to act as ‘handmaidens’ of the market – fostering the 
necessary institutional conditions for the functioning of markets, and pursuing 
internationally approved policies of market-led development. Active state intervention 
in the economy beyond this managerial role is strongly discouraged. Efforts to bolster 
economic development and social and economic security through a state-based 
developmental approach and redistributional policies are strongly discouraged by 
international agents, and generally prevented through external pressure and 
mechanisms of conditionality associated with aid dependence. 
 In Timor-Leste, pressure to adhere to market-based prescriptions for national 
development has contributed to social immiseration and mounting discontent. 
Demands for the state to take decisive action to improve social conditions and 
prioritize issues of distribution and inequality have not been met. The government has 
been encouraged to focus its attentions on facilitating private sector growth as a 
solution to the country’s economic woes. Suggestions to establish state enterprises to 
generate local employment and food production and help relieve the suffering of the 
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Timorese population have been eschewed by donors, in favour of the apparent long-
term benefits of a strategy of market-led development.7 By 2006, a combination of 
economic contraction, austere budgets, distant and ineffective state administration, 
and a refusal by donors and international institutions to countenance deviations from 
market-based policies in the early years of independence had contributed to a situation 
of “sclerosis at the center and penury in the villages”.8  
 In April 2006 – after four years of lacklustre economic performance, social 
deprivation, and mounting public discontent – Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri declared 
the government’s intention to pursue a new development trajectory, by using state 
resources to provide a much-needed boost to the country’s struggling economy.9 
Alkatiri claimed that conditions of extreme poverty and regional asymmetry left the 
government with no choice but to use the state to drive the Timorese economy: 
In order to contribute to reducing the number of poor people in Timor-Leste 
and to achieving the Millennium Development Goals in 2015, and the 
National Development goals in 2020, there is only one way: due to the still 
weak condition of the Timorese private economy, it will have to be the State 
to boost the economy – create employment, promote the construction of the 
infrastructures that the people continue to demand in good right (roads, 
bridges, health centres, schools, electric power, drinkable water), and enable 
the many citizens who make their living off subsistence farming to go to the 
nearest market sell their surplus and have a few dollars in their pockets. … It 
is decision time, and the decision has been made: we will have the State make 
our economy grow.10 
 However, the decision came too late, with events already in motion that would result 
in political breakdown and the Prime Minister’s forced resignation in June 2006. The 
government had failed to deliver on the promise of democratic development, or to 
distribute the anticipated benefits of independence to a desperate and economically 
disenfranchised population. Widespread disenchantment contributed to the escalation 
of conflict in 2006, with other disaffected groups joining protests in Dili to add their 
grievances to the dispute between the armed forces.  
                                                
7 Hughes, p. 151 
8 Ibid. p. 151 
9 M. Alkatiri. (4 April 2006) Decision Time. Address at the Opening Session of the Timor-Leste 
Development Partners Meeting. Dili: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Office of the Prime 
Minister. 
10 Ibid. p. 4 
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 The government’s inability to generate popular legitimacy prior to 2006 
sprung in large measure from conditions of aid dependence, which prevented it from 
fulfilling the crucial role of political management. The insulated nature of state 
institutions and the ongoing exercise of disciplinary neo-liberal governance had 
created a situation in which successive governments had proven more responsive to 
external pressures than to their domestic constituency. In the absence of 
comprehensive state programmes to improve the socio-economic conditions of the 
Timorese population, increasing competition for scarce resources has contributed to 
social and political instability – most notably in the riots of 2006, but also in less 
dramatic expressions of social unrest, such as the country’s high levels of youth gangs 
and gang-related activities.11  
 To date, the experience of democracy in Timor-Leste has been profoundly 
disempowering. The task of fostering economic development, social cohesion and 
generating tangible socio-economic benefits for the Timorese population will require 
the government to carve out a greater degree of autonomy over key issues of national 
development than it has done thus far. The harnessing of petroleum resources towards 
a more equitable trajectory of economic development may offer a step towards this 
goal. However, unsustainable dependence on declining oil resources will not result in 
greater autonomy in the long-term; decisive state action to develop the country’s 
agricultural resources will be essential in terms of providing local employment, food 
security, and an environmentally sustainable basis for wider economic development. 
Rather than seeking to radically alter the country’s agricultural and cultural profile in 
favour of disruptive programmes of agricultural liberalization, the state must promote 
domestic production as a cornerstone of economic development. Domestic production 
can provide a basis for economic stability and social well being, whilst the investment 
of oil revenues towards building up local social and economic capacity can help to 
achieve a broader foundation for economic development. Neither state nor society can 
afford for key aspects of social welfare such as health, education, and employment to 
be left to the private sector alone. Establishing means for providing a level of 
comprehensive social services for the Timorese population will be essential, both in 
terms of human development and political stability. 
                                                
11 Space has not permitted mention of the issue of youth gangs in Timor-Leste. For a discussion of the 
link between gangs and youth groups and the outbreak of violence in 2006, see J. Scambary. (2006) A 
Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste. Canberra: AusAID. 
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 Such a path will necessitate decisive efforts to prioritize domestic concerns 
over international expectations. How this is to be achieved given the realities of aid 
dependence and external neo-liberal governance is unclear. Timor-Leste’s oil 
resources – while finite – do potentially afford a greater potential for government 
autonomy than would otherwise be available. Whether the government of Timor-
Leste can succeed in achieving the lofty goals outlined in the Strategic Development 
Programme remains to be seen. However, this momentous task cannot be realized 
under the present conditions: in order to achieve locally relevant forms of democratic 
development, relationships between state and society must be redefined. Rather than 
remaining insulated and distant, the state must come to operate as an expression of 
Timorese society – it must be responsive to local cultural, historical, social, and 
economic conditions if it is to navigate a path towards a more independent and 
equitable future. 
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